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Foreword

Readers of these essays ought to come away shaken by the expanded definition of terrorist “sanctuary” and “safe haven” that the authors present and quite ably defend. We in the West are conditioned by political leaders and the media to think of sanctuaries as specific geographic locations where terrorists can assemble, train, and plan in a relatively unthreatening environment. Such places are assumed to be mostly in so-called failed-states or in states that are ineffectively governed. And in many cases, this is exactly where they are located: Somalia, Afghanistan, the North Caucasus, Iraq, Yemen, Bangladesh, and a startlingly numerous group of other states. The essays in this volume address these physical locations and reveal the benefits that terrorists derive from them, including the lack of governmental interference, inaccessibility to those hunting them, and an environment that allows systematic and patient training.

To their credit, however, the authors likewise point out that these remote safe havens also present problems for the terrorist groups in some of the same ways, such as difficulties of ingress and egress, primitive living conditions, and the lack of modern communications. In addition, we find that the lack of an effective central government does not mean an absence of local authorities that hinder terrorist activities. Tribal and clan rule in African countries, to take just one example, can limit the terrorists’ ability to fully exploit their safe haven.

The authors generally see these geographic sanctuaries as almost a lure to imperialism in the sense that to the extent that the United States and other Western governments focus on bringing these “ungoverned regions” under control, they must use military operations that unavoidably lead to prolonged occupations and the emergence of new Western dependencies. With this argument I certainly concur, but I believe it results less from an imperialist urge in the West than
from the endemic moral cowardice among Western leaders that keeps them from effectively using their overwhelming military superiority to destroy the enemy at hand and then leave. Many of the terrorist problems that crop up in ungoverned regions can be solved militarily, but not if force is applied with a dainty or incremental hand. As always, the only mercy in war—as Machiavelli suggested five centuries ago—is the use of annihilating force at the start in order to end the conflict as quickly as possible. And, yes, by consistently remembering that once the military job is complete, the time has arrived to withdraw and go home.

Beyond geographic sanctuary, the authors closely examine the safe havens and sanctuaries that terrorists have developed in urban areas, via the Internet, and through cooperation with well-organized criminal groups with international reach. The authors also make clear that the terrorists have built a comfortable, proficient, and thoroughly modern relationship with globalization’s impacts, and are exploiting the increasing unwillingness of Western governments to enforce their own laws.

The vital importance of urban sanctuary to the terrorists discussed in these essays is on mark for two reasons. First, because it is indisputably true. For the United States, for example, the attacks of 9/11 became realities because the attackers were able to lose themselves in the crowd and function effectively in Karachi, Hamburg, Jakarta, New York, and other mega-cities, just as much as because they were able to train at camps in Taleban-ruled Afghanistan. Second, the volume’s emphasis on urban and electronic sanctuary drives home an essential point that is still too much ignored by Western governing elites: Islamist terrorists more often than not come from among the best-and-brightest of the Muslim world’s population. These are not poor, hopeless, illiterate economic migrants; they are educated, talented, pious, modern, and computer savvy men and women drawn from the middle and upper-middle classes, individuals who not only fit into urban environments but thrive there. Their motivation is based on religion-based hatred for the impact of U.S. and Western actions on Islam and its followers, and this keeps them tightly focused on their basically defensive goal—protecting their faith by waging war to remove the Western, and especially the U.S., presence from the Muslim world. This focus enables them to work effectively, as Osama bin Laden has long advised, with such lesser, un-Islamic evils as organized crime, interest-based financial institutions and networks, and narcotics traffickers.

In fact, so comfortable and efficient are terrorists in using these lesser evils to further their goals that they have created lose-lose situations for the United States and the West in several areas of the world. This is demonstrated in the volume’s essays analyzing the West’s losing and Taleban-benefiting efforts at heroin eradication in Afghanistan; the painful reality that the UK government may well alienate its large Muslim population by taking the law-enforcement measures needed to reduce the chances of domestic terrorism; and the emerging fact that unbridled globalization—especially in finance, commerce, and communications—has created sanctuaries for terrorists that can only be destroyed by blows that
would strike just as hard against the West’s basic economic and ideological, i.e., free speech, interests.

I also want briefly to note a further, fairly durable terrorist sanctuary—or at least a protected niche—that the essays strongly suggest, even though there is no paper that deals with it specifically. That sanctuary lies, I think, in the deep and stubborn left-right division of Western politics. The essays capture the ability of terrorists to operate in the West’s modern and urban environment, and suggest—at least to me—that this favorable environment is likely to remain open to them because as the West fights the terrorists, we are also fighting each other. From the right, we find the oddity of an overemphasis on military operations that are simultaneously too mild to be effective, an element that favors Christian crusading, and an unfettered desire to promote globalization and illegal immigration to sate the need for continuing economic growth and the always voracious greed of human beings. From the left, we see an almost doctrinaire and surely ahistorical religious faith in the viability of multiculturalism, the benign benefits of globalization, and the ebbing belief in the efficacy of the nation-state and its military capabilities. And both sides share a studied, fearful reluctance to publicly debate politically hard and nasty domestic issues, such as enforcing immigration laws and border controls, toughening antidrug laws, and—most difficult of all—giving careful consideration to what extent, or even whether, Islamism is compatible with contemporary Western society. As long as right and left remain at daggers drawn, it seems to me that effective self-defense in the West is a very distant goal, and that this reality offers the terrorists another valuable sanctuary.

Overall, the essays presented in this well-edited volume are a welcome addition to the literature on terrorists and the bases and sanctuaries—physical and virtual—from which they operate. Readers will, of course, agree, disagree, or simply reject certain of the essays’ specifics and conclusions. They would be daft, however, to come away from these essays without a greater respect for the modern, resourceful, and adaptable enemy the West faces; indeed, the term “terrorist” seems to minimize and even belittle the foe’s size, power, geographical reach, and potential impact. The authors have done a splendid job in laying bare this reality, and have provided a greatly expanded foundation from which a more multifaceted and sophisticated consideration of the problem of the terrorists’ sanctuaries can be constructed. For this service, we owe them thanks and a hearty, if old-fashioned, “Well done.”

Michael F. Scheuer
Preface

First thanks, as always, go to the contributors to this book. Their recognition of its importance, and their commitment to thinking and writing about sanctuaries, meant that this volume was one whose time had come—it was a book, simply, that needed and wanted to be published. Thanks also to Hilary Claggett at Praeger, whose patience and guidance have been a lesson in professional standards. The book’s focus first emerged as a line of inquiry while I was thinking primarily about post-war and transitional issues in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which resulted in a short article in *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. Thanks are due to Bruce Hoffman for seeing fit to publish that initial piece. Early discussions with Ken Menkhaus were also formative. His has been a voice of reason in a sea of near-hysteria on state failure and its potential to draw in terrorist entrepreneurs. His work on Somalia and the Horn of Africa has been an invaluable aid in distinguishing truth from fallacy in the war on terror. A book on sanctuaries was in many ways intended to be a corrective to the prevailing wisdoms. At a basic level, however, it was meant to give substance to a subject much debated but poorly understood. It went beyond being simply a germ of an idea as a direct consequence of our discussions.

For those parts of the book that I wrote, the statements and findings are my own, and in no way reflect the official interest or endorsement of any past or present employer. That said, extended dialogue with numerous scholars and practitioners has benefited the project immensely. Thanks to Peter Andreas, John Torpey, Tom Sanderson, Daniel Lambach, Pete Stoett, and Frank Chalk, for indulging early (and often incoherent) drafts, and to the usual suspects, Callum, Caroline, Arpad, Sebastien, the two Pacos, Matt and Marc-Olivier, for their comments, criticism, and suggestions on various bits and pieces I threw their way.
Alice Hills and Clive Jones at the School of Politics and International Studies, University of Leeds, deserve special mention for their interest in seeing continued research into the subject. James Gow helped crystallize some of my thinking: in a very brief meeting in London in June 2006, he suggested that my approach to sanctuaries lay somewhere between understanding its “anthropological underground” and an inquiry into the politics of “veiled intent.” Both issues, and the realm of behavior and activities that relate to them, have obvious relevance across a range of challenging topics, *inter alia*: cultural masks and warlordism, flight and refuge from war crimes prosecution, cross-border criminal and political mechanisms, the use of surrogate and secret forces in foreign policy, broader issues of sovereignty, empire, and civilization, and so on.

This book limits its coverage to problems directly and indirectly associated with terrorism, broadly speaking, in the post-9/11 world. It is not meant to be a book only about al Qaeda or jihadi terrorism. It incorporates issues as diffuse as asylum policies in the West, legal and political exceptionalism, terrorist and counter-terrorist thought and practice, and the changing character of war. It is structured quite deliberately to flesh out ten specific problem-sets of the war on terror; the political geography of sanctuary, the political discourse that has structured our understanding of it, al Qaeda and the state, terrorist exploitation of state failure, bordered security and urban warfare, transnational crime and terrorist finance, national security law, information warfare and virtual havens, diaspora issues, and problems of state-building and reconstruction. Its observations and lessons are meant to challenge the way we think about the threat of terrorism, and provide cues for dealing with it constructively and effectively. Such lessons, I hope, will provide the sort of intellectual leverage that can help us better survive the complexities and difficulties of contemporary and international affairs.

The contributors have engaged the topic with innovation and substance. In some cases the currency and changing nature of global security problems lent an immediacy and urgency to their work. When the project was initiated, Afghanistan and Iraq were foremost in our thoughts, but as 2006 wore on, crises in Somalia and Lebanon reminded us that we continue to live in interesting times. By no means do the authors all agree on the issues. Given the breadth of subject matter, achieving consensus was not the intent—although all concur that terrorist sanctuaries are a complex subject of inquiry. Here, also, a brief note on transliteration is called for. While purists may insist on a more correct *Usama ibn Laden* over *Osama bin Laden*, and quibble over the countless variations and accuracy of the spelling of *al Qaeda*, they have also become household names since 2001. Understanding the content and contours of what they represent requires broad thinking across the disciplines, with a view to the wider accessibility and practical application of research outcomes. Ultimately, if those working the issues or simply seeking to understand them find this book to be useful, then it has achieved its purpose.

Michael A. Innes

*Brussels*
Cracks in the System:
Sanctuary and Terrorism After 9/11

Michael A. Innes

In 2000, Rory Stewart, a former British Army officer and diplomat, set out to cross the breadth of Asia on foot. Starting in Turkey and heading east, his journey was interrupted in December 2000 when the Iranian government revoked his visa, and he was refused entry into Afghanistan. He picked up the trail in Pakistan and carried on, reaching eastern Nepal by the end of 2001. There he heard of the fall of the Taliban. He returned to Afghanistan in January 2002 to the western city of Herat—shortly after the opening battles of the war on terror, when the United States, United Kingdom, and Allied troops were just beginning the long hunt for the country’s former al Qaeda guests. He would take a straight line from there to Kabul, thus joining the two sections of his long walk. Public utilities and western amenities were nonexistent on the Herat-Kabul road, where “Villages combined medieval etiquette with new political ideologies.” For many households “the only piece of foreign technology was a Kalashnikov, and the only global brand was Islam.” The irony was not lost on Stewart: “All that had made Afghanistan seem backward, peripheral, and irrelevant now made it the centre of the world’s attention.”

Armed with little more than a well-developed sense of local history, a smattering of Afghan languages, and enough hard currency to smooth the way, he was a Westerner sussing out hidden and lost places along ancient trading routes, impossibly isolated villages, and lethal mountain passes. He was doing it during a period when foreign visitors tended to arrive bearing arms and deadly intentions, not gifts and idle curiosity. His commitment to the physical rigor of the trek, not to mention his indifference to its dangers, was equally suspect. What good purpose could it serve? Who in their right mind would choose to test the limits of endurance across such a forbidding and hostile landscape? Why would someone choose to do such a thing in a place everyone now knew was the quintessential terrorist sanctuary?
For Stewart, the answers were both simple and complex. After finally negotiating his way into the country, he explained to a Los Angeles Times reporter his reasons for such a mad caper. “I told him that Afghanistan was the missing section of my walk,” Stewart recounts, “the place in between the deserts and the Himalayas, between Persian, Hellenic, and Hindu culture, between Islam and Buddhism, between mystical and militant Islam.” More, “I wanted to see where these cultures merged into one another and touched the global world.” The physical side was unimportant, “more a way of looking at Afghanistan and being by myself,” although explaining away the danger was difficult to do “without sounding awkward, insincere, or ludicrous.”

Reading his memoir of the journey, The Places in Between, one gets the impression that the Afghan security officials, special forces operators, and al Qaeda sympathizers he met probably suspected him of being an intelligence officer on a deep reconnaissance mission. Stewart’s asceticism, however, was enough to convince them that he was something other than a learned traveler with questionable motives. He was a latter-day mystic, a walking transnational dervish in search of meaning and depth in a world of revealed mysteries and exposed truths.

Sleeping in mosques and caravanserais, and subsisting on a basic diet of bread, water, and what incidental fare local villages could afford, the harshness of daily life reduced his expectations of survival to an ecstatic minimum. Cultural discovery meant learning that traditions of hospitality are often the grudging result of open shaming and arm twisting, and tend to favour familiar faces less desperate for it over those of strangers and beggars. It also meant stumbling over fragments of long lost civilizations, only to find that their artefacts were being vigorously excavated and hawked to alleviate the crushing burden of poverty. The harshness of rural life offered the classic bandit’s retreat from the law, and the refuge of death itself loomed persistent and close to those unwise enough to think they could disappear behind the protective cover of climate, terrain, or local politics.

Minimal nourishment, exposure to the elements, and countless hours of walking took their toll, leading Stewart to psychological detachment and euphoric contemplation. It also allowed him to compartment injury and persevere. “Exhaustion and repetition,” he recollected, “created within the pain a space of calm exhilaration and control.” In shorter dispatches from earlier sections of his Asian walk, he likened interstitial sensory experiences to T.S. Elliot’s “moment of silence,” incidents of deliberate calm beyond the random cacophony of modern experience. Such episodes of mundane and extraordinary transcendence offer a recurring theme of sanctuary, in all the escapist potential one might expect of a risk-laden jaunt at the edges of terrorist space.

Stewart’s tale personalizes one of the most vexing issues in contemporary politics. It suggests there are as many ways, places, and reasons to hide as there are approaches to understanding and locating the hidden. Indeed, notions of sanctuary are ubiquitous, embedded in legislative frameworks, political and religious conventions, cultures of hospitality, and codes of honor and revenge the world over. Their varied and subtle facets have traditionally been depicted in ways that relate
to individual human beings, but they are also more generally places and spaces apart, where real and perceived challenges to established order can thrive and persist. Guerrilla movements have used them as bases from which to plan and launch paramilitary operations against conventional armies, and criminal organizations have used them to avoid police and judicial interference in their illegal activities. In medieval England, sanctuaries were religious facilities meant to provide individuals accused of various wrongdoings with temporary and legally sanctioned asylum. In traditional Albanian society, kanun law contains provisions for protected physical locations, where members of families embroiled in long-standing blood feuds can seek shelter from the vengeful. In Islamic cultures, extending hospitality to guests, with all the protection that it implies, is a key element of the social fabric.

The global world is pocked with circumstances of intermediate character, threaded with gaps and omissions, filled with histories of the ignored, the discarded, the secret and the forgotten. In the international system, traditional diplomacy provides foreign embassies and their staff immunities from local laws. Refugees fleeing violence and persecution can seek asylum outside their home countries. Exiles abroad join diaspora communities in their search for better economic opportunities, improved access to higher education, or greater political freedoms. The privileged elite of almost any nation can hide their wealth in offshore financial and tax havens while hawaladar conduct untraceable business off the digital grid. Broad sketches of international order look to the social and political frictions at the frontiers of the world’s great communities. During the Cold War, communism and capitalism bedded down into armed camps, but exceptions to bipolarity persisted through nonalignment—even as wars of national liberation and anticolonial resistance often served one or the other of the two dominant paradigms. Recent wars in Africa and the Western Balkans have been widely described as neomedieval battlefields, set apart from the proper conduct of civilized states. More distant wars of the twentieth century have shown that allegedly advanced, modern societies sometimes perpetrate acts of unspeakable cruelty and atrocity, the reality and acceptance of which can remain suppressed beneath a gossamer veil of hubris.

Sometimes things fall through the cracks, or so the expression goes. Other things are willfully thrown into them. Still other things deliberately hide within them. After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Afghanistan was seen to be the archetypal terrorist base of operations, linking official sponsorship of terrorism, failed state vulnerability to terrorist exploitation, and the absence of international legitimacy that underscores both. Terrorist sanctuaries have since captured the collective attention of policymakers, intelligence officials, and military planners. The sad truth, evidenced in the post–Cold War record of so-called intelligence failures, is that we know precious little about the terrorist underground beyond what its denizens choose to reveal to us. Our perceptions and understanding of terrorism, insurgency, and war have been in a continual process of negotiation with events and trends in Afghanistan and Iraq, in Istanbul, London, and Madrid. Military and counterterrorist campaigns have raised important questions on how
we deal with security both at home and elsewhere in the world. Terrorist sanctuaries have been at the center of such discussions, and they remain important for several reasons.

Terrorists operate across a broad spectrum of political, insurgent, and criminal realms. There is little doubt that being better equipped to identify such sites will help to combat the threats to individual and collective security that inhabit them. Just as importantly, terrorists and their sanctuaries go to the heart of debates on national security because of the questions they raise about the interface between states and individuals. They raise doubts on our endurance for the expediency of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, on our willingness to track and neutralize terrorists, on our capacity for ferreting out the threats that lurk in the hidden worlds of al Qaeda, Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), the Kurdish Worker’s Party (PKK), the Irish Republican Army (IRA), and countless other terrorist organizations. They remind us of the vulnerability of our own freedoms, of our sometimes tenuous commitment to the ethical pursuit of threats to it, and of the complex moral and practical outcomes of the war on terror.

John Kenneth Galbraith once noted, famously, “the enemy of the conventional wisdom is not ideas but the march of events.” The primary thrust of this chapter, and of this book as a whole, is an extension of that most pointed criticism: that the war on terror so defined is essentially a war on a tactic. The argument put forward here is somewhat narrower: given the war’s emphasis on “denying sanctuary to terrorists,” it places a premium on locations—and a war on locations is equally fraught with complexities and pitfalls. Much of what we know and think about sanctuaries is rooted in poorly conceptualized policy statements. As such, this chapter, and this book, treats sanctuaries as an intellectual challenge, surveying, among other things, the context within which the subject has gained prominence in recent years. It also interrogates the conventional wisdom policymakers have proffered since September 11, 2001, focusing on Bush administration statements, policy, and related problems of implementation in the “grey zones” or “black spots” of the war on terror. The 2004 Report of the 9/11 Commission is probably the single most important document to address the problem. It receives special treatment, as do the Congressional hearings that followed its release. I raise more questions than I answer, in an effort to expand the way we think about the clandestine worlds of terrorists. To understand the secret lives of sanctuaries, in short, is to uncover the internal workings of multiple hidden realms, filled with militants, criminals, soldiers, and spies, with the pious and the profane, with dangers that lie below the surface and in the margins.

THE LONG WALK INTO THE FUGITIVE UNDERGROUND

At about the same time Stewart was crossing through Nepal, nineteen terrorists in four airliners brought to a sudden end the lives of thousands of civilians within the United States. Since then, decision makers, intelligence officials, and military
planners, interested in confronting terrorists as part of an expansive, open-ended campaign, have expended considerable ink and blood identifying and denying ground to their quarry. The opening salvos of that war gave Stewart the opportunity to alter course. A geostrategic analogue hardly bears elaboration, but if it can be compared to anything, it would be to the British adventurer’s break from the mundane to head off on a long walk through uncharted and fugitive spaces. The “war on terror” has been a similarly benighted march into the unknown, based on a vaguely defined political and military concept. Everything that follows from it begs deeper study and review.

Political scientist Richard Jackson tells us, for example, that “At the heart of every counter-terrorism campaign is a ubiquitous narrative of threat and danger.” Far from dismissing that threat as a political fabrication, the London School of Economics’ Mary Kaldor notes, “it is too serious to be hijacked by fantasies of old war.” The current war on terror, she argues, deliberately merges archaic notions of heroic armed struggles between states (what she terms “Old War”) and a state of war readiness in which armed confrontation is subordinate to the ideological convictions that sustain it (such as the Cold War, the “war on drugs,” the “war on crime,” and so on). This has created a false sense of political community whose overextended militarism could, in turn, produce a condition of perpetual violence, largely bereft of redeeming purpose or regulatory mechanisms (or “New Wars”). As politically defined subsets of the war on terror, terrorists and their sanctuaries have not fared any better. Oxford University’s Sir Adam Roberts, for example, has criticized post-9/11 U.S. policy for its limited sense of “previous experience of governments in tackling terrorist threats, or the ways in which certain international wars of the twentieth century were sparked off by concerns about terrorism.”

Denial of sanctuary is specifically problematic. Karin Von Hippel, formerly of the War Studies department at King’s College, London, and now with the Centre for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC, notes two camps in the U.S. policy debate on denial of terrorist space. “Night Raiders” are conservative advocates of “smash and grab raids” against terrorist threats and military options against their sponsors, but prefer noninvolvement in the broader domestic conditions of foreign states. “Reluctant Intervenors,” on the other hand, believe “that force will only make a difference if it is accompanied by development and humanitarian assistance,” arguing that the only effective approach to denying terrorists sanctuary “is to help restore effective government, provide adequate security sector reform, and strengthen the economy.” The two sides of the debate link the shape and character of foreign engagement to the political will for it, but specifically neglect “the enormous differences between the types of problem states.”

Such strategies present additional concerns. “The proposition that terrorism should be attacked at source is attractive,” Roberts observes, but notes that it is “a false choice” since engaging “the enemy at longer range . . . is no substitute for defensive anti-terrorist and counter-terrorist activities.” More, “the history of counter-terrorist operations suggests no simple conclusion.” Surgical denial of sanctuary operations have been successfully conducted, but there have also
been real constraints against waging war on asymmetric threats, such as limited capability for launching long range military operations, or political disinterest in openly engaging powerful state sponsors of terror. Finally, Roberts notes, denial of sanctuary “is a recipe for a revival of imperialism,” since military operations intended “to eliminate the sources of terrorism must inevitably mean, in many cases, exercising external domination for a period of decades.” As such, the policy perspectives put forward in the five years since the Twin Towers fell deserve much scrutiny. Much can be learned from the political and military responses to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and from longer-term inquiries into the failures and consequences leading up to that day.

Smoking Them Out of Their Holes

The current Bush administration has been at the forefront of voicing contemporary denial of sanctuary concerns—although not the first to use the term or voice concerns of a similar nature, in the United States or elsewhere. Speaking from Camp David four days after September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush set the tone for his administration’s counterrorism policy. As he gathered senior administration officials together to plan the nation’s response to the attacks, the focus of their meetings was locked into a denial of sanctuary framework. “We’re going to meet and deliberate and discuss,” he told reporters, “but there’s no question about it, this act will not stand; we will find those who did it; we will smoke them out of their holes; we will get them running and we’ll bring them to justice. We will not only deal with those who dare attack America, we will deal with those who harbor them and feed them and house them.” Following statements by Secretary of State Colin Powell and Attorney General John Ashcroft, a reporter asked Bush what he would say “to Americans who are worried that the longer it takes to retaliate, the more chance the perpetrators have to escape and hide and just escape justice?” Bush’s lexicography wavered little. “They will try to hide,” he replied, “they will try to avoid the United States and our allies—but we’re not going to let them. They run to the hills; they find holes to get in. And we will do whatever it takes to smoke them out and get them running, and we’ll get them.”

Bush’s promise to seek out terrorists where they live and “smoke them out of their holes” quickly became totemic of the administration’s approach to al Qaeda. Often criticized for his stilted oratory and derided by pundits for his smirking and swaggering style, this particular sound bite would take on significant policy relevance and a great deal of political loading. The phrase fit with the much caricatured frontier mentality of a former Texas Governor. It also acted as a salve for Americans still in shock that an enemy attack could have taken place on U.S. soil, with such devastating consequences. The notion that a foreign-based and sponsored enemy had struck into the heart of America was only part of the picture. Its corollary was that North America had always been an impenetrable refuge from the conflict and instability of the world, a sanctuary now compromised by foreign
terrorists. Bush: “Americans have known wars—but for the past 136 years, they have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans have known the casualties of war—but not at the center of a great city on a peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks—but never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in a single day—and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under attack.”12

In a series of speeches and addresses, the U.S. President focused on the global and offensive nature of the coming “long war” against terrorism. “We will starve terrorists of funding, turn them one against another, drive them from place to place, until there is no refuge or no rest,” he stated. “The only way to defeat terrorism as a threat to our way of life is to stop it, eliminate it, and destroy it where it grows.”13 A little over a week later, on the scope and focus of the U.S. campaign against al Qaeda: “our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and beachheads of the past” and “this war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.”14 Bush was clear that Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban would share the fates of their historical analogues: “We are not deceived by their pretenses to piety. We have seen their kind before. They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th century. By sacrificing human life to serve their radical visions—by abandoning every value except the will to power—they follow in the path of fascism, and Nazism, and totalitarianism. And they will follow that path all the way, to where it ends: in history’s unmarked grave of discarded lies.”15

The powerful administration rhetoric that followed in the days and weeks after 9/11 expressed outrage over the attacks in often indelicate and insensitive terms, a public tone that for many was strikingly reminiscent of arguments against humanitarian intervention in the early 1990s. References to “crusaders” and “barbarians” could hardly have reassured world leaders—particularly those in the Muslim world—already faced with the certainty that the global security agenda had quite literally undergone a radical overnight shift. But the demonization of foreign terrorists also contains important cues on perceptions of sanctuary and of the terrorists that inhabit them. To wit, the primitive conditions in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan: “We’re mounting a sustained campaign to drive the terrorists out of their hidden caves and to bring them to justice”; “slowly, but surely, we’re smoking al Qa’ida out of their caves so we can bring them to justice”; and “In terms of Mr. bin Laden himself, we’ll get him running. We’ll smoke him out of his cave, and we’ll get him eventually.”16

The conduct of subsequent counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, the Balkans, and Iraq—and the public addresses and policy statements that followed—reaffirmed the opening rhetoric of the war. The February 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism made denial of sponsorship, support and sanctuary to terrorists its “second front” in the war on terror. The July 2004 report of the 9/11 Commission devoted significant attention to terrorist sanctuaries and the policy options available for denying them to the enemy.17 The following month a number of government documents and hearings discussed, with varying degrees of elaboration, the
Commission’s key findings and recommendations on the issue. A Congressional Research Service study, *Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy*, was published on August 10, 2004. It noted that the focus on terrorist refuges had been a long-standing pillar of U.S. strategy, but that after September 11, 2001, “U.S. efforts to deny terrorists sanctuary were substantially increased worldwide.”\textsuperscript{18} Congressional hearings held on August 6, 10, and 19, 2004,\textsuperscript{19} and subsequent public testimony on March 10, 2005,\textsuperscript{20} elaborated on the Commission’s interpretation of sanctuary, and identified policy approaches and methods for tackling the threat.

### The 9/11 Commission and Beyond

The substance of the 9/11 Commission’s findings revolved around militant Islam, the threat of mass casualty terrorism, and the most likely geographical conditions in which terrorists could organize, plan, and train for such attacks. For the Commission, the complexity of mass casualty terrorism, on a par with 9/11, required “Time and space to develop the ability to perform competent planning and to assemble the people, money, and resources needed for the terrorist act,” “A relatively undisturbed area to recruit and train those who will carry out the operation,” “A logistics network,” “Access to materials needed to conduct a chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear attack,” “Reliable communications,” and “Conditions in which the plan can be rehearsed and tested.” Commission members argued that such activities are most easily planned and prepared in “states with rugged terrain, weak governments, and low population density” where “terrorists can hide themselves, as well as their supplies and infrastructure.”\textsuperscript{21} For Commission members, “these characteristics provide a recipe for a terrorist sanctuary or haven.”\textsuperscript{22} They noted other forms of sanctuary, including diaspora communities among liberal democratic states, but settled on a “consensus view” that “the United States should focus on remote regions and failed states.”\textsuperscript{23}

Subsequent discussion of the Commission’s ambiguous formula did not look much further than the territorial implications of terrorist threats. State supporters of terrorism, and the vulnerability of failed states to terrorist exploitation, figured prominently at Congressional hearings. California Congressman Brad Sherman asked: “Which states lack the desire to confront terrorists operating on their soil? Which states have the desire but lack the resources? Which governments are losing control of some of their territory, and which countries are becoming failed states where terrorists can operate freely? And which of these states, or portions thereof, contain persons who are receptive to the al Qa’ida ideology?”\textsuperscript{24} 9/11 Commissioner Richard Ben-Veniste observed that “Active sponsors of terrorism must be coerced into giving up sponsorship, and if they will not, they should be dealt with severely,” while “many other states are hostile to al Qa’ida, but are not able to control their own territories sufficiently to stop it. These countries, victim countries, should be bolstered wherever possible.”\textsuperscript{25} Deputy Secretary of Defence...
Paul Wolfowitz, similarly, identified “the kind of geographical sanctuary that terrorists enjoy when they are harbored by sympathetic regimes like Afghanistan under the Taliban and Iraq under Saddam Hussein,” and the kind “also found in the vast ungoverned regions in the world, areas that are beyond governmental control”—typically involving “notoriously difficult terrain, far removed from population centers, in countries with fragile governments.”

Such statements emphasize a geographic and rural vision of terrorist sanctuaries, in line with the 9/11 Commission’s general privileging of the state in international affairs, and its special focus on Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Iran, and Pakistan (among others). But the important distinctions made by Sherman, Ben-Veniste, and Wolfowitz were also accompanied by observations ranging from the crude “It is failed states that are a threat to us, because this is where the terrorists hide and this is where they plot”;26 to the confused “Congress need look no further than the World Trade Center bombing in New York City to see the adverse impact that this failed state in Afghanistan is having on United States national security”;27 to the contentious “Iraq would go to the top of the list as a terrorist sanctuary if it were to become a failed state.”28 Subtler interpretations focused on practical problems of governance and terrorist agency. Ben-Veniste: “Any area where there is lawlessness and the inability of a government to control its countryside is an area fertile for exploitation by terrorists,” and “areas where a government cannot control its borders may well provide an area for terrorists who will take root and move to strike at us.”

Oral and written congressional testimony also provides a glimpse into policy concerns with various types of sanctuary, although the issue is only addressed in the most rudimentary terms. Sometimes conflated, sometimes awkwardly differentiated, it offers little by way of a coherent breakdown of characteristics. “Sponsorship, support, and sanctuary” and “sanctuaries, leadership, finances, and command, control and communications”29 were repeatedly grouped as targets in a holistic approach to counterterrorism “using all instruments of national power.”

Paul Wolfowitz theorized that in addition to the geographic space terrorists occupy, the “911 terrorists themselves were able to create a kind of sanctuary inside the United States and other democratic countries, exploiting the very freedom and openness they were attacking in order to hide their evil plans.”30 He noted the ideological sanctuary “our enemies enjoy when extremist clerics provide cover by sanctioning terrorism, by recruiting new adherents, and by intimidating moderate clerics from speaking out against them”; and “cyber” sanctuary, “the ‘space’ that exists through communications networks made possible by modern technology.”

J. Cofer Black offered keen insights into the problem. He appeared before Congress as Ambassador-at-Large and Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State. He had also served as a CIA officer for almost three decades, including a rough and tumble stint as Station Chief in Sudan from 1993 to 1995. He intimated that there is an underlying hierarchy of terrorist sanctuaries. “The removal of the Taliban regime from Afghanistan,” he noted, “stripped al-Qaeda of primary sanctuary and support and shut down long-standing terrorist
training camps.” He also alluded to the importance of dispersed niche sanctuaries, differentiating between training and other sites of terrorist activity: “Although our work in Afghanistan continues to root out remnants of al-Qaeda,” he stated, “that organization has lost a vital safe haven. Our on-going operations against al-Qaeda have served to isolate the leadership and to sever communications links with operatives scattered around the globe.”

Ambassador Black’s statements were the nuanced exception to the rule. Policymakers have otherwise put forward a scattershot list of attributes within a thinly conceptualized framework, now enshrined on the public website of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the U.S. Department of State. The conventional wisdom, one might surmise, has been accepted somewhat uncritically, although it does have its detractors. It can be summed up as follows:

- Terrorist sanctuaries are embedded within the structures of states, whether those states are strong or deficient.
- They are geographical phenomena, linked to the physical territories of states, often behind poorly secured political and natural borders.
- They are primarily rural phenomena, concentrated in the countryside or on the rugged frontiers between states.
- They are both isolated and accessible, with low population density.
- They provide terrorists the time, space, and resources to gather, organize, learn, rehearse, test and implement plans, weapons, skills, beliefs, and so on.
- They are bases for numerous types of activity, including leadership, financing, command, control, communications, sponsorship, support, propaganda, and recruiting.

Taken in the aggregate, these six pieces of conventional wisdom offer a conceptual point of departure that is incomplete, awkward, sometimes misleading, and often conflicting.

**RECKONING WITH THE LIMITS OF CONVENTION**

Critics of the Bush administration’s war on terror note the deeply problematic nature of trying to deny something as ill-defined and potentially ephemeral as “sanctuary.” Former CIA analyst Michael Scheuer, the “Anonymous” author of *Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror*, and whose words grace the opening pages of this book, suggests that taken to its logical extreme, denial of sanctuary so defined will require a scorched earth campaign of profoundly destructive physical and human consequences. “With killing must come a Sherman like razing of infrastructure,” he writes, “Roads and irrigation systems; bridges, power plants, and crops in the field; fertilizer plants and grain mills—all these and more will need to be destroyed to deny the enemy its support base. Land mines,
moreover, will be massively reintroduced to seal borders and mountain passes too long, high, or numerous to close with U.S. soldiers.”32 Daniel Benjamin and Steve Simon, former National Security Council staffers and coauthors of two bestselling books on contemporary terrorism, note, however, “The jihadists comprise a social movement, not just a cluster of terrorist organizations, and they are totally opportunistic and endlessly plastic in how they accommodate to circumstances. They thrive on our preconceptions and our instinctive determination to come up with rigid schematizations, and we will get the better of them only when our thinking is as flexible and innovative as theirs.”33

These and other sobering critiques suggest the structures and functions of sanctuaries are infinitely variable.34 If Stewart’s long walk across Afghanistan provides numerous observations into the multidimensionality of sanctuary, it suggests some equally pointed insights into the limits of conventional thinking. Like the much politicized post-9/11 inquiries into the world of intelligence and its alleged failings, the apparent paradox of openly discussing secret processes and clandestine worlds raises some difficult questions. The search for hidden truths, however, need be neither awkward nor contradictory. To borrow from another Galbraith pearl, we should not let the conventional wisdom “protect us from the painful job of thinking.” Stewart’s experiences highlight the value of a return to basics and thoughtful analysis. In the following two sections, I work through some of the problems that limit our understanding of terrorist sanctuaries, first by contesting the validity of the conventional wisdom, and second by voicing alternative ways of thinking about the issues.

**Pushing Back the Boundaries**

A general reading of the issues suggests eight grounds on which the conventional wisdom bears further elaboration. First, it clearly privileges the state as the primary conservator of security in the international system. This is appropriate to a coherent global approach to collective security, but it favors Western perspectives, and is of dubious relevance to an enemy whose interests often differ greatly from Westphalian notions of politically and territorially structured power and identity. For numerous jihadists, the state is more or less relevant depending on their interpretation of Islam, and as with many secular terrorists, on its relation to their particular brand of militancy. Perspectives on this range from resistance against perceived inadequacies in state promotion of theological tenets, to an overarching community of the faithful that supercedes expressions of statehood.

Second, debates on rogue states and failed state polarize threats without assessing in depth the spectrum of problems that lies in between.35 The narrow focus of the 9/11 Commission is a case in point. As Richard A. Falkenrath suggests in an insightful review of the Commission report’s content, it fails to adequately explore “jihadist terrorism in general, a broader phenomenon of which al Qa’ida is only one manifestation,” and tends “to view al-Qaida in isolation from the myriad
issues that surrounded it.”36 While the Commission was clear in naming state sponsors and relatively straightforward in trying to describe state failure, it tended to merge the two without explaining the former. Dan Byman makes the excellent point that declining post–Cold War policy and analytical interest in state sponsorship of terror “suggests a superficial understanding of terrorism in general and of al-Qa’ida in particular.”37 State support to terrorism occupies a spectrum of passive and active intentions and measures, he writes. More, “[s]anctuary facilitates all other forms of assistance,”38 although “[n]uances in the provision of sanctuary are often missed, or deliberately overlooked.”39 The Commission’s findings and subsequent Congressional hearings rightly address a problem of clear significance to collective security, but express a limited range of categories and characteristics. Consequently, they propose a model of limited range and depth, for dealing with a terrorist phenomenon of allegedly unprecedented scope and complexity.

A third and related problem is that terrorist sanctuaries have been portrayed as foreign zones of hostility, lawlessness, or neglect, artificially separating them from domestic constituencies. This “war over there” vision, and the fortress mentality that accompanies it, is conceptually and practically unreliable. It leaves little room for insight into terrorist approaches to undermining collective security, and the role sanctuaries play in the process. Most importantly, it fails to convincingly address how diasporas and modern democracies fit into a possible matrix of terrorist sanctuaries. This is significant when one considers the various under explored terminologies of the war on terror. Notions of “remoteness,” “virtuality,” “flight,” and “safety”—among many others—can mean many things to many people, something not readily apparent in a reading of the conventional wisdom. Within a basic framework of insurgency and counterinsurgency, traditional assumptions certainly seem convincing enough, particularly when applied to local phenomena. It also raises the question, however, as to whether or not this provides sufficient understanding of the likely distortions and consequences of terrorism in a much wider transnational context.40 In a globalized world, is such a model of conflict, normally applied to local circumstances, still relevant? Or does it lend false coherence to a problem of enormous complexity?

This leads to a fourth point: a common criticism of Bush administration policy has been that it privileged military responses to terrorism over more subtle intelligence and policing approaches. The critique is debatable, given the potential consequences of allowing mass casualty terrorist capabilities to develop. I argue a narrower point: that the terrorist sanctuary target-set has been overmilitarized. In practical terms, this has meant denial of sanctuary operations have been plugged into a counterinsurgency framework—in which sanctuary is understood to mean protected terrain that allows clandestine groups to organize and train under paramilitary conditions, free from the unwanted intervention of hostile forces. The Commission report and Congressional hearings display a distinct sensitivity to such issues, not surprising in light of the complex emergences of the 1990s and the rejuvenation of “small wars” military doctrine for dealing with them.41 But insurgency theorists are clear on what they mean by both sanctuary
and insurgent reliance on it. There are also important distinctions to be made between terrorists and insurgents, which begs a more critical review of their respective places, spaces, and pathways. Understanding the trajectories, bases, and proxy battlefields of religious extremists and militants since the 1970s, and their victories and defeats along the way, is critical to understanding the relations between local and transnational terrorism. Indeed, it is central to defining, with any degree of accuracy, whether the threat of al Qaeda-inspired militancy and revolution is fundamentally parochial or global in reach and implications.

Fifth, an overemphasis on territoriality and what theorists refer to as “statelessness” leaves less room for an accurate assessment of the role of substate enclaves, nonstate areas, multistate areas, and transnational networks. Still, it does provide some important cues for potential research. Richard Ben-Veniste, for example, looked to the “inability of a government to control its countryside” and “areas where a government cannot control its borders,” after only obliquely acknowledging the role of cities. This is an especially significant gap, given that official rhetoric on sanctuaries was carried over from Afghanistan to the war in Iraq, where bloody battles have raged in Fallujah, Kirkuk, Najaf, and various border towns and urban enclaves. Not for nothing Bruce Hoffman notes, “I have long told soldiers, spies, and students to watch The Battle of Algiers if they want to understand how to fight terrorism.” An exploration of the role of cities as sanctuaries, as in Gillo Pontecorvo’s classic 1966 film, might reveal, for example, that population density—one of the defining criteria offered by the 9/11 Commission—is at best one variable among many in modeling the problem. Study of urban centers could yield clues to how terrorists and their networks function across the spectrum of rogue states, failed states, and perfectly healthy democracies, how they function across the spectrum of insurgent and criminal activity, and how they shift over time from one form of safe, subversive, or covert space to another.

Sixth, the importance of cause and effect has only recently been given much attention. Appropriately timed exit strategies will remain an elusive quantity in the absence of greater understanding of the issue—of the impact of armed interventions and international security assistance missions on the changing terrorist need for sanctuary, or on the evolving character of the sanctuaries themselves. The early diversion of U.S. resources from Afghanistan to Iraq in 2002–2003, for example, has been seen as a leading cause of Taliban, and possibly al Qaeda, resurgence in large parts of the country. The danger of premature withdrawal from Iraq, likewise, has been a key Bush administration argument against artificial deadlines for downsizing and departure of U.S. forces. Holistic approaches to counterterrorism and numerous international security assistance operations address complex local problems, but the sharp end of the issue—open combat and counterinsurgency in the world’s ungoverned spaces—has become much more problematic in the years since September 11, 2001.

Indeed, the logic that an offensive denial of sanctuary strategy can destabilize terrorists and make them and their organizations more vulnerable to disruption may be too simple. It assumes terrorists will inevitably and consistently flock to
the battlefield, and can thus be readily dealt within conventional military terms. The perils of urban warfare, the difficulty of effectively countering insurgent methods, and the radicalizing potential of conflict itself—ensuring a steady flow of insurgent and terrorist reinforcements—have proven to be significant obstacles to such a static approach. They have also shown that striking terrorists “at source” presupposes a static enemy that has shown itself to be, despite all efforts at confrontation and containment, at once composite, variegated, dispersed, and persistent. Just as importantly, furnishing a protean enemy with a guerrilla option can be an exercise in futility, if not potentially disastrous, when the source is misidentified as such, or when “source” is taken to mean physical location rather than the much broader issue of root cause and cognitive depth. The battlespaces of Afghanistan, Iraq, the Maghreb and the Sahel, of Bali, Karachi, London, and Madrid, suggest a much more complex clandestine reality. As Byman put it in his discussion of conditions in Iraq in 2004, “Even if the insurgents are contained or defeated, the security problem will shift, not disappear.” The conundrum that will continue to raise doubts is whether or not pursuing terrorists “where they live” is possible, plausible, or effective, and whether the short-term effects of such a strategy can be balanced against its longer-term consequences.

Seventh, the Bush administration’s denial of sanctuary strategy has raised numerous questions regarding the limits of legality in warfare, and the extent to which Allied and Coalition forces can or should exploit gray zones in international law to fight irregular and unlawful combatants. Consider Wolfowitz’s strategic vision:

Our goal should be to reduce the space in which terrorists find sanctuary to the maximum extent possible. There should be no room in this world for governments that support terrorism, no ungoverned areas where terrorists can operate with impunity, no easy opportunities for terrorists to abuse the freedoms of democratic societies, no ideological sanctuary, and no free pass to exploit the technologies of communications to serve terrorist ends. Approaching this goal will take time, and it will not be easy. It will involve difficult decisions about resources, it will require balancing diplomacy and the use of force, it will require protecting civil liberties while reducing the ability of terrorists to operate in our midst.

Although Wolfowitz carefully qualifies the need to balance collective security against individual rights, his attempt at a holistic framework brings to mind the difficulties inherent in the war on terror. It reaffirms early Bush administration statements that terrorists such as those who perpetrated the Manhattan and Pentagon attacks have no home in the world or in any religion, that they are *hostes humanis generis*, or “enemies of all mankind.” Subsequent public debate on the dubious legal status of Camp Delta at Guantanamo Bay, issues raised by the scandalous Abu Ghraib pictography, and the similarly contentious practice of “rendering” terrorist suspects to states more likely to torture information out of them, have undermined the public legitimacy of the Bush administration’s war on
terror. They raise questions regarding the grey areas of intelligence collection and special warfare, on the status and rights of terrorist suspects, on the sovereignty of partner states in the war on terror, and on the benefits and limits of an expansive denial of sanctuary policy.

This ties in to my final point, that discussions of sanctuary imply broader notions of legal, political, ethnic, cultural, and religious community. In order to understand sanctuaries as zones of exemption or exception, we need to understand the broader tapestries of membership and identity from which sanctuaries are set apart. In other words, what makes them exceptions to the rule? What are the standards outside of which they operate? How, why, and for whom are sanctuaries exceptional? The legal status of terrorists, and the assertion that they are enemies of all mankind, raises one of the most important questions of the war on terror: does it make them common criminals or enemy combatants? As a particular form of criminality, terrorism falls under what legal scholars refer to as “universal jurisdiction”—the sort of crime, along with piracy and genocide, serious enough to demand universal responsibility for prosecuting its perpetrators, across national and international jurisdictions. As a military problem, terrorism implies a much more direct course of action, permissible under an entirely different set of laws and obligations. The fault lines between these two frameworks are fairly straightforward. But when the rhetoric taps into political, cultural, and sectarian divisions, law becomes a much fuzzier proposition and terrorists tend to be portrayed as neither criminal nor combatant, but rather something undeserving of any legal status—subhumans that have slipped through the cracks of civilization. This leads down a murky conceptual and practical path, across which the crossfire carries with it a cost that tends to be borne by the many rather than the few. The challenge, perhaps, is not so much that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter,” but rather that in a world of violent extremes and zero tolerance for middle ground, true noncombatants have been squeezed out of a global box designed to fit as many terrorist enemies as possible.

Rethinking Terrorist Operating Environments

Terrorist sanctuaries are more than just places of refuge. As niche operating environments, the terms and frames of reference we use to define and describe them are critically important. Indeed, the central policy shibboleths of the debate relate directly to its terminology. Why sanctuary? Its root, sanctus, invokes sanctity and the religious right to shelter. Legally enshrined religious entitlement to sanctuary is an impossibly archaic notion that even today raises questions on the use of mosques (or Christian churches) in urban warfare by religious militants, for example, or the importance of transnational religious infrastructure for supporting fugitive war crime suspects. Then there is its derivative, the especially challenging contronym sanction, which can be either a license to operate or a penalty for doing so. This too has archaic religious origins, but in the conflicts of the post–Cold War era,
sanctions refer primarily to a diplomatic bargaining tool between states. The relevance of such punitive and coercive measures in the international system is in their potentially criminalizing consequences. In the shadow world of large-scale sanctions evasion, of the sort that made fugitive fortunes in post–Cold War Serbia and Iraq, “embargo busting” has provided the political and financial space for all manner of underground actors to avoid detection, evade capture, operate with relative impunity, and remain at liberty.51

One of the blurriest terms of reference in the debate on terrorist sanctuaries is safe haven, a politically loaded catchphrase implying the sub-rosa lives of terrorists are that way due to an overarching need for safety. This can mean many things, but patterns of terrorist activity, movement, and development suggest that freedom from harm is only one piece of the puzzle.52 At its worst, the terminology of safety is wide open to exploitation. It confuses issues of bona fide terrorism with concepts more appropriate to understanding humanitarian intervention and security.53 Perpetrators of complex humanitarian emergencies, for example, have also used the language of counterinsurgency and counterterrorism to demonize fleeing civilian populations who escape their grasp.54 There are important distinctions to be made between the noncombatant right to safety and the pursuit of clandestine actors living beyond harm’s reach. Equally, subversive activity reliant on secrecy and meant to undermine the established order is not the same as secret activity reliant on an unchanging or relatively stable status quo. An overemphasis on terrorist self-preservation reinforces the conventional assumption that denial of sanctuary operations keep terrorists on the defensive, and underestimates their ability to be proactive shapers of their own destinies. The terrorist requirement for physical safety should not be underestimated, but focusing on it to the exclusion of other characteristics encourages tunnel vision and possibly sets us up to be blindsided by threats on the periphery.

Traditionalist approaches to terrorist sanctuaries have generally revolved around “small wars” or a counterinsurgency framework, and have done little to push past the formulae offered by third world revolutionaries. Political scientist Rex Brynen, for example, offers an analytical framework patterned on the works of Mao Tse Tung, Vo Nguyen Giap, and Che Guevara, who all understood the importance of “a secure base area within which an insurgent group is able to organize the politico-military infrastructure needed to support its activities.”55 For Brynen, sanctuaries can be internal or external to the state, and constraints and opportunities offered by each are heavily influenced by their proximity and contiguity to the battlespace, as well as by their isolation or remoteness from it. This minimalist perspective is appropriate to groups such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, the subject of Brynen’s study, when they gather in larger numbers, train and plan as units, and generally function as militarized formations. Traditional insurgency theory is less well understood on the subject of sanctuary when armed groups and their members operate in compartmented cells, train and plan in isolation, and function in the absence of a stable territorial or political base.
In a sense, sanctuaries are symptomatic of this distinction. For purely insurgent organizations, requirements for survival are relatively straightforward. For terrorists, more specialized approaches to the issue, based in large part on a diversification of needs, suggest a more subtle and varied canvas. The two are not always so easily separated or differentiated, hence the need to consider sanctuaries within a broad spectrum of types and functions. Two military planners with Combined Joint Task Force 180 during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) IV in Afghanistan, for example, have addressed the problematic notion of “deep areas,” where the enemy prepares its forces prior to frontline or “close” engagement. They distinguish between enemy “physical depth” and “cognitive depth,” noting the challenge of understanding either in nonlinear insurgent and terrorist battlespace. Tellingly, they suggest that although physical depth is well understood in the literature, “the understanding and targeting of cognitive depth is rarely found.”

Bard O’Neill, Professor of National Security Strategy at the National War College in Washington, DC, captures this ambiguity quite adroitly: “... a closer look at Al Qaeda’s strategy thus far reveals the desire for a sanctuary somewhere [original emphasis] for planning, training, and otherwise supporting its global operations rather than specifying one adjacent to a targeted state.” More, “The transnational aspect of its strategy and its diffuse organization would both seem to imply that Al Qaeda really requires multiple sanctuaries for the various groups in its worldwide constellation, as opposed to one critical, contiguous sanctuary.”

The meaning of remoteness is especially challenging. In the sense promoted by the 9/11 Commission, it refers to physical isolation. But from what? In a very important sense, issues of physical and cognitive depth are both inseparable one from the other, and integral to understanding discrete aspects of the same problem. Specifically, they are directly relevant to three distinct areas of physical distancing and the spatial dimensions of terrorist activity mentioned throughout this chapter. First, remoteness implies a particular form of solitude, a critical characteristic of clandestine actors operating independently in the field, and of alienation, of the kind experienced by many displaced immigrant and refugee communities caught up in the frustrations of cultural and social isolation. Second, it touches on more nuanced al Qaeda theorizing on hierarchies of jihad, wherein religious revolt in terrorists’ countries of origin is being waged by remote in secondary zones of jihad elsewhere in the world—and in a post-9/11 evolutionary twist, al Qaeda affiliates are now bringing the global jihad back into the national sphere. Hence the most vigorous jihadi proponents of striking at “the far enemy” are also the Saudi-Yemeni Osama bin Laden, the Egyptian Ayman Al Zawahiri, and the late Jordanian Abu Musab al Zarqawi. This leads to third point. While nationalist and religious terrorist organizations have conducted certain types of activity—acquisition, fund-raising, training, proselytizing, and so on—at least one step removed from their domestic front lines, official assessments of terrorism and state sponsorship usually ignore the role of third party provision of sanctuary by client states. The approach, Byman notes, allows “various sponsors to ‘outsource’ sanctuary and other forms of backing without suffering any penalties.”
Whether terrorists exist as atomized cells along dispersed transnational networks, gather in numbers for training or planning purposes, or coalesce as semicohesive squads for insurgent activity in Afghanistan, Chechnya, and Iraq, understanding their clandestine operating environments will require a much wider array of considerations than policy perspectives have provided thus far. Paul Wolfowitz's four-part typology of democratic, territorial, ideological, and virtual sanctuaries is a case in point. Consider the geographic emphasis of territory, implying terrain within a well-defined system of political boundaries. The obvious elision is that solitary terrorists need neither vast expanses of countryside nor bordered areas of sovereign territory in which to operate, but rather the physical space needed for their personal survival and subsistence. Collapsing or expanding it to fit more or less terrorists is an issue of scale, but does not change the basic corporeal fact of their existence. They occupy the kind of spaces that do not exist in the absence of states, but instead are enabled by channels and conduits that pass between, over, and through them—exploitable sites and pathways, in other words, that defy the power and reach of government. The sovereignty of such space is another debatable quality, encompassing the political entitlements of legitimate states, as well as the human rights of individuals within them. Such sites might be conceived of at two basic levels: macro-level sanctuaries, with defined political or natural borders, including nonstate, substate, multistate, and international areas; and micro-level sanctuaries, that operate irrespective of the role, participation, or presence of states. The political geography of terrorist sanctuaries, with its dynamic "small world topology" of place, space, scale, and linkages, addresses this multidimensionality and the shearing force between dispersed social networks and the territorial states they overlay. 

Consider also that government efforts to qualify public understanding of ideology in this context often come across as thinly veiled cultural critiques. Setting this aside, ideology is constrained in its focus on revolutionary belief-sets or worldviews that can be real or perceived threats to the status quo. The issue is important, but it does not address the range of terrorist preferences or mentalités: the pragmatic needs of terrorists or their movements, the psychological spaces that captured and underground combatants make for themselves, the cultural masks and inhibitors that may guide their and their leaders' selection of particular sites and forms of refuge, or the measures terrorists take to compartment their own operational and information security. For jihadi terrorists, for example, martyrdom may ensure the path to heaven, but possible motives for sacrificing the self on behalf of an organization or cause are many. Social welfare and support to the families of suicide attackers, for example, arguably offer relief or refuge from economic distress—pointing to what may be poorly understood incentives for terrorist activity. Prisons are another psychological and intellectual haven for terrorists. Incarceration represents denial of individual freedom, but provides captive audiences in what all too often become breeding grounds for various forms of radicalization. In this context, "ideology" is inadequate to the complexities of terrorist intent, motive, and psychology, and neglects
the broader role of incentives, rewards, and context in the calculus of terrorist activity.

Finally, virtuality is a key element of contemporary terrorist threats, facilitating both domestic and transnational terrorism through access to digital and Internet-based channels for command, control, communications, and intelligence (in military terms, “C3I”). But a policy focus that suggests virtual sanctuaries are little more than Internet-based communications platforms, also potentially exaggerates the disconnect—paradoxically—between the physical spaces occupied by the Internet’s terrorist users, and the informational requirements that guide, inform, and inspire their exploitation of various means of communication—electronic or otherwise. It also minimizes an element of terrorist virtuality directly related to its informational dimensions. Policymakers have referred repeatedly to terrorist use of the Internet for online recruitment, training, and so on, and called the process “virtual” or the place “cyber” (or vice versa). But virtuality, meaning a perceived or imagined sense of things, is also the basic psychological factor that separates terrorism from other forms of political violence. The fear of horrible death or injury is what makes terrorism such a potent force and what makes it as much a psychological as a physical threat to security. Multiple meanings of virtuality also indicate that this pillar of official policy formulations is clearly inadequate to the problem set.

CONCLUSION

Making basic distinctions between the need for safety and the need for secrecy, and taking into account political objectives such as degrees of intended subversion, could help establish a more accurate and clearly defined understanding of clandestine and fugitive actors and their refuges. All of which brings us back to the logic of separating sanctuary from various other aspects of terrorist activity. The conventional wisdom clearly differentiates sanctuary from sponsorship, support, leadership, finance, command, control, communications, and so on. But it also clusters such characteristics into democratic, territorial, ideological, and virtual domains. The first approach predicates the distinctiveness of sanctuary on its physical attributes, while the second identifies a crosshatch of vaguely defined categories. Such policy perspectives do not convincingly identify or reconcile the often confusing array of terrorist-related phenomena. Do they set up false distinctions between what are arguably related issues? Cracks in the system, where terrorist interests, sites, and pathways function as specialized niches of clandestine activity, certainly bear closer study. As the contributors to this book demonstrate, sanctuary, in the broadest sense of the term, might be just as usefully defined according to what terrorists are thinking, and what they are trying to protect, accomplish, or hide from. Critics of the war on terror have quite rightly pointed to the futility of essentially waging war on a tactic. It is a philosophical turn of
phrase, better suited to politicking than defining the conduct of war. As this book suggests, waging war on locations is just as problematic.

In late 2001 and early 2002, when New York still smoldered and al Qaeda’s Taliban hosts were being smashed, few outside of government circles had given much serious thought to what a terrorist sanctuary might be. Nonetheless, all knew with certainty that Afghanistan fit the bill. It seemed like a good idea at the time to label it so, but five years later, things are much less clear. Although the Taliban were chased out of Kabul, its fighters persist in some parts of the country and across the border in Pakistan. Al Qaeda may have fled to inaccessible frontier caves, or not—several years after the invasion of Afghanistan, there is no consensus on whether they live furtively or openly, in a primitive cave or a residential suburb. Its leadership became invisible to counterterrorist planners and operators—choosing alternative media to reveal themselves at their own discretion—but whether or not they actually went “underground” would appear to be largely a matter of perspective. Whatever holes al Qaeda occupies do not lack for modern audiovisual and communications equipment. Its supporters, franchises, affiliates, and allies of convenience have proliferated. Iraq helped to muddy the waters, and to clarify them, as well. Mass casualty terrorist attacks have in the meanwhile killed hundreds more civilian noncombatants around the world, and the consequences of limited intelligence may have generated far more civilian deaths. Striking terrorists at source can be hit or miss, and new generations of terrorists and fighters continue to surface in places and ways that rarely fail to surprise. The long walk into the fugitive underground has only just begun.
Critical Reflections on Counter-Sanctuary Discourse

Richard Jackson

Together with human rights, global warming, and poverty reduction, terrorism has emerged as one of the most politically significant discourses of the modern era. Today, terrorism is a ubiquitous term of public discourse and its associated labels, assumptions, and narratives are embedded within innumerable official, academic, and cultural texts. It has, in fact, taken on the qualities of a negative ideograph and like “freedom,” “democracy,” and “justice,” now functions as a primary purpose term for the central narratives of the culture. Despite being loaded with culturally specific meanings, the term “terrorism” is now widely understood and ubiquitous in political debate and daily conversation.  

Central to the broader terrorism discourse is the sometimes controversial notion of “terrorist sanctuaries” or “terrorist havens”—understood as the places and spaces where terrorists take refuge, receive support, train, plan, organize, and launch their attacks from. It would be difficult to overestimate the importance of the language of “terrorist sanctuaries,” not least because it has been used by officials to justify three major wars in the past five years (Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Lebanon) and numerous other military actions in Palestine, Pakistan, Georgia, Yemen, Chechnya, Somalia, and elsewhere.

The purpose of this chapter is to critically examine the academic and political language of “terrorist sanctuaries”: to describe and dissect its central assumptions, labels, narratives, and genealogical roots, and to reflect on its political and normative consequences. The central argument is fairly simple: the discourse of “terrorist sanctuaries” is deeply problematic in its current form, not least because it is vague and imprecise, selectively and politically applied, founded on a number of highly contested assumptions and narratives, and functions in part to obscure state sources of terror. More importantly, the current “terrorist
sanctuaries’” discourse enables powerful states to pursue a range of hegemonic projects.

The methodological approach employed in this study falls broadly under the mantle of discourse analysis.\(^3\) This approach is at once both a technique for analysing political language and specific texts, and a way of understanding the relationship between discourse and social and political practice. Discourses are related sets of ideas that are expressed in various kinds of written and spoken texts, and which employ a distinct arrangement of vocabularies, rules, symbols, labels, assumptions, narratives, and forms of social action.

Discourses function ideologically because they dictate what it is possible to say or not say about a certain subject, what counts as normal, what is seen as commonsense and what can be accepted as legitimate “knowledge.” This is not to suggest that discourses are always completely uniform, coherent, or consistent; there are often exceptions and inconsistencies within and between texts. Many of the “terrorist sanctuaries” experts quoted in this chapter, for example, upon a close reading, can be seen to express quite nuanced arguments that contain both supportive and oppositional statements toward the overall discourse. Nor is it to say that discourses are always completely hegemonic; there are always areas of contestation and vulnerability—as many of the contributions to this volume reveal. It is however, to stress that discourses are never neutral or objective. They are an exercise in social power—the power to ascribe right and wrong, knowledge and falsehood, and the limits of the reasonable. This is because they set the parameters of debate and establish the boundaries for possible action. In the public policy context, discourses establish the limits, possibilities, and interests of policy formulation, primarily by making some options appear reasonable and others nonsensical. It is not that interests play no role in the formulation of policy, but that interests themselves are discursively constructed and reflect other discourses and narratives of national security, threats, identities, values, relationships, and the like.

The primary research for this chapter entailed a discourse analysis of prominent academic and official texts that discussed “terrorist sanctuaries,” including speeches by senior policymakers, the reports of governmental commissions, papers by important think-tanks, and academic books and articles on the subject. Each text was examined for the labels, assumptions, narratives, and discursive constructions it deployed, the kinds of existing cultural-political narratives it tapped into, and the ways in which the language functioned to structure the meanings, logic, and potential policy responses to the described events. Lastly, for the purposes of this chapter, terrorism is defined broadly as civilian-directed, politically motivated violence designed to cause fear and intimidate. This conceptualization incorporates both narrowly defined acts of substate terrorism and more broadly defined activities that harm civilians—regardless of whether they are perpetrated by states or substate actors.
“TERRORIST SANCTUARIES” IN ACADEMIC AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE

The Genealogy of the “Terrorist Sanctuaries” Discourse

It is important to note that discourses do not emerge from a vacuum. Rather, they reflect and extend existing discourses and narratives. In this sense, discourses have discernible histories or genealogies and build upon the discursive foundations laid down by previous texts.

The genealogy of the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse lies first and foremost in the language and knowledge of terrorism studies—a field with a long history that has grown extremely large and gained genuine authority since the September 11 terrorist attacks. The literature of terrorism studies provides a great many of the central assumptions, labels, concepts, terms, and narratives of the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse.

A second genealogical root of the discourse lies in Western counterinsurgency doctrine during the Cold War, which in turn exhibited clear discursive continuities with colonial “pacification” doctrines. During this phase, terrorism and insurgency were treated largely as being synonymous, and a great many countries experiencing civil war such as Vietnam, Guatemala, and the Philippines were described by Western policymakers as “terrorist havens.” Furthermore, it was frequently argued that communism itself provided ideological support and justification for terrorism, thereby acting as an “ideological haven.” A number of terrorism scholars at this time suggested that the Soviet Union was the primary sponsor and supporter of a global “terrorist network.” Claire Sterling’s popular and deeply alarmist book, The Terror Network, promoted this view, and was highly praised by Reagan, Alexander Haig, and other senior administration officials, who frequently used Sterling’s narratives in their own speeches.

It was in the 1980s however, that the language and assumptions of the broader terrorism discourse really took root in Western policy circles. President Reagan frequently referred to “state-sponsored terrorism” and along with other Western allies, employed the language of “terrorist sanctuaries” to justify a range of aggressive foreign policies. For example, Reagan justified the invasion of Grenada on the grounds that “It was a Soviet-Cuban colony, being readied as a major military bastion to export terror and undermine democracy.” Following Reagan, George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton continued to employ the language of “international terrorism,” “terrorist sanctuaries” and “state sponsors of terrorism” to justify a range of foreign policies, including the 1991 Gulf War, sanctions against Iraq and Iran, the “war on drugs” in Colombia, and the missile attacks on Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998.

In short, by the time of the September 11, 2001, attacks, the discursive foundations of the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse were well established: policymakers and the wider public were well-versed in, and fully understood, the language of “terrorist sanctuaries,” “terrorist havens,” and “state sponsors of terrorism.” Since then, senior policymakers and academics have elaborated a whole series of specific narratives about the nature of “terrorist sanctuaries,” the states and groups...
that support them, the kinds of regions they inhabit, the financial systems they exploit, the extremist ideologies they depend on, and the threat they pose to the world.

**The Central Narratives of the “Terrorist Sanctuaries” Discourse**

A review of many of the primary “terrorist sanctuaries” texts reveal a number of common narratives, many of which are linked to and embedded within the broader “war on terrorism” discourse. Due to the sheer size of the discourse, the following discussion is merely illustrative of the primary labels, narratives, and discursive constructions. The important point is not that each author or text uniformly expresses all the main narratives in the same way, or even that they necessarily agree; it is rather, that taken together as a broad body of work that has political and cultural influence, the narratives function to construct and maintain a specific understanding of and approach to “terrorist sanctuaries.”

One of the most common narratives of the discourse is that weak or failed states are primary locations for “terrorist sanctuaries.” More specifically, it is argued that lawless, geographically remote regions beyond the control of ineffectual states can function as a staging ground or “haven” for terrorism. The 9/11 Commission, for example, stated:

> To find sanctuary, terrorist organizations have fled to some of the least governed, most lawless places in the world. The intelligence community has prepared a world map that highlights possible terrorist havens, using no secret intelligence—just indicating areas that combine rugged terrain, weak governance, room to hide or receive supplies, and low population density with a town or city near enough to allow interaction with the outside world.

Within the logic of this particular narrative, the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, the Arabian Peninsular, the Horn of Africa, the Sahel and others, automatically become probable “terrorist sanctuaries.” A report by the International Crisis Group, for example, concluded that Somalia remained a real concern due to the possibility of terrorists “using the environment of the Somali collapsed state as a safe haven to operate with impunity.”

A related narrative is that poverty, unemployment, and conditions of underdevelopment are “breeding grounds” of terrorism. A British government report for example, argues that deprivation and alienation are key variables in the radicalisation process. It states: “Some young Muslims who join extremist groups or are targeted by them are poorly educated and from deprived backgrounds.” Similarly, the 9/11 Commission argues that “endemic poverty, widespread corruption, and often ineffectual government create opportunities for Islamist recruitment [and] the breeding grounds for terrorism are created.” In short, drawing on sociological theories of relative deprivation and revolution, this narrative identifies conditions of poverty as an “incubator” of terrorist violence.
A recent narrative is that “passive state sponsorship” provides a haven for terrorists—that inaction is just as significant as action. Daniel Byman, for example, argues that “For many terrorist groups, a state’s tolerance of or passivity towards their activities is often as important to their success as any deliberate assistance they receive,” and that “At times, the greatest contribution a state can make to a terrorist’s cause is by not policing a border, turning a blind eye to fundraising, or even tolerating terrorist efforts to build their organizations, conduct operations, and survive.” The implication of this discursive construction is that any state that fails to rigorously pursue terrorists within its borders is by definition providing a “terrorist sanctuary.”

Perhaps the most common narrative, however, is that terrorist groups depend upon significant state support to survive and active “sponsors” provide a range of positive and permissive forms of assistance. A prominent terrorism textbook suggests that state sponsorship of terrorism can consist of: “ideological support,” “financial support,” “military support,” “operational support,” “initiating terrorist attacks,” or “direct involvement in terrorist attacks.” Additionally, it is commonly argued that weak, totalitarian, or so-called “rogue states” are predisposed to sponsoring terrorism because:

For aggressive regimes, state terrorism in the international domain is advantageous in several respects: State terrorism is inexpensive… Even poor nations can strike at and injure a prosperous adversary… State terrorism has limited consequences. State assisters that are clever can distance themselves from culpability for a terrorist incident… and thereby escape possible reprisals or other penalties. State terrorism can be successful. Weaker states can raise the stakes beyond what a stronger adversary is willing to bear… [and] successfully destabilize an adversary through the use of a proxy movement.

In fact, much of the “terrorist sanctuaries” literature is devoted to describing those states viewed as the main sponsors of terrorism, the groups they support, and the kinds of assistance they provide.

A narrative that has become virtually ubiquitous in contemporary terrorism texts suggests that Islam, particularly militant forms of political Islam or what is often called “Islamism,” also function as a “terrorist sanctuary.” In this narrative, Islamic doctrines and practices provide ideological or religious support for terrorist activities. A great many texts, for example, assert an “inherent, even organic connection that has always existed between Political Islam and violence” due to the fact that “Islam does not separate the realms of religion and politics.” In particular, it is considered axiomatic that “Islamist,” “Wahabist” and “Salafist” groups are linked to, directly involved in or provide support for terrorism. Magnus Ranstorp, for example, refers to “the Islamist movements and their respective armed ‘terrorist’ wings” as if all Islamist groups support terrorists. The terrorism-Islamism association works to construct the widely accepted “knowledge” that certain forms
of Islam provide an ideological sanctuary or “breeding ground” for terrorism and violence.21

Within the broader narrative of the dangers posed by radical Islam, it is often argued that Islamic charities, associations, and nongovernmental organizations can also provide support for “Islamic terrorists,” either intentionally or inadvertently. Paul Pillar, for example, identifies “certain nongovernmental organizations that facilitate, wittingly or unwittingly, the activities of terrorists.”22 Similarly, Byman argues that “NGOs are a means of raising money, but they also are valuable for giving activists jobs, channelling money, and acquiring necessary documents.”23 Directly related to this, there is a frequently expressed narrative that identifies diasporas, particularly Muslim communities, as potential “terrorist sanctuaries.” In a variation of the “enemy within” or “fifth column” narrative, it is suggested that diasporic communities provide terrorists with places to hide, jobs, contacts, finance, and logistical and ideological support.24

Another popular narrative is that democracy and freedom in liberal states provides a “haven” or “sanctuary” for terrorists, as it allows them to move about, organize and generally operate without interference from the authorities. Byman, for example, notes that “Many activities related to terrorism—proselytizing, fundraising, and even recruiting—are at times protected by laws governing free speech and free association.”25 Politically, this narrative has been used as a reason for restricting civil liberties. The British Home Secretary, John Reid, stated: “Sometimes we may have to modify some of our own freedoms in the short term in order to prevent their misuse and abuse by those who oppose our fundamental values and would destroy all of our freedoms in the modern world.”26 Implicit here is the notion that freedom itself can be exploited by terrorists as a “sanctuary.”

Other common narratives of the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse include: the frequently heard notion that information technology and, in particular, the Internet, functions as a “virtual haven” for terrorists because it allows them to communicate, organize, gather information, recruit, and proselytise27; the claim that media coverage of terrorism is a kind of “media support” because it allows terrorists to reach a much bigger audience than they could reach by themselves28; and the important notion that dealing with terrorist sanctuaries involves both diplomatic and coercive instruments, including sanctions and military intervention. In much of the literature, the use of military force as a means of dealing with “terrorist sanctuaries” is uncritically assumed to be both legal and effective.29

CRITICAL REFLECTIONS ON “COUNTER-SANCTUARY” DISCOURSE

Apart from those discussed in the introduction to this volume, there are several other criticisms that can be levelled at the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse. They fall under three main headings: analytical shortcomings, political bias, and ineffectual policies.
Analytical Shortcomings

An initial analytical shortcoming of the discourse is that very few texts take the time to define or conceptualize the notion of “terrorist havens” or “sanctuaries.” Instead, the term is normally used uncritically and unreflectively, but in ways that impose a restricted meaning. Moreover, texts that do attempt to define “terrorist sanctuaries,” “havens” or “state sponsorship,” frequently do so using highly subjective measures, such as notions of “ideological support” which often assumes that because actors share a similar ideology, they are therefore allies. The problem is further compounded by texts that argue that “terrorist sanctuaries” also lie in extra-geographically defined realms such as religion, rhetoric, the Internet or civil liberties. In the end, the term is so broadly applied that every country in the world is transformed into a potential “terrorist haven” (either through action or inaction), as is virtually every aspect of modern life. Clearly, in order to retain analytical value, the term needs to distinguish between what a “terrorist sanctuary” is and what it is not, and employ a set of criterion and a threshold of evidence to determine when a particular state or social arena has become a “terrorist sanctuary.”

Related to this, the literature is characterized by an extremely poor level of empirical documentation, a great deal of innuendo and an overreliance on official sources. For example, a surprising number of “terrorist sanctuaries” texts discussed official Iraqi support for international terrorism in the lead-up to the 2003 invasion, despite the lack of any hard evidence. The primary reason for this is that state sponsorship of terrorism is rarely openly admitted and reliable information may be difficult to come by; thus, scholars tend to overrely on information provided to them by officials. However, there are two compelling reasons why official sources of information on state sponsorship of terrorism should be viewed with caution. First, states are often willing to make political judgements on the basis of very thin evidence, particularly if there are strategic interests in designating a state as a “sponsor of terrorism.” A careful examination of the actual evidence of state support for terrorism in most “terrorist sanctuaries” texts reveals that, in fact, a great deal of it is circumstantial and open to a variety of interpretations. A partial solution to this problem would be to follow the lead of Byman in carefully distinguishing between strong, weak, lukewarm, antagonistic, passive, and unwilling state supporters of terrorism.

A second reason to be wary of official information is that where foreign policy is concerned governments frequently have an incentive to employ disinformation as an instrument of influence. This is clearly what occurred in the lead-up to the 2003 Iraq invasion and a great many other cases, including Sterling’s widely quoted book about the global, Soviet-directed “terror network.” From this perspective, the continual overreliance on official sources of information, and in particular, the use of unnamed security officials, actually undermines the credibility of many “terrorist sanctuaries” texts and creates a closed system of discourse vulnerable to manipulation, error, and distortion.
Another analytical shortcoming is that the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse rests on a series of prior labels, assumptions, and narratives that are themselves highly contested. Fundamentally, it takes for granted an unproblematic understanding of what “terrorism” is and which groups are “terrorists”—as opposed to “insurgents,” for example. Seldom is it acknowledged that “terrorism” is a pejorative label designed to de-legitimize specific groups or acts of political violence rather than a social scientific category and that no widely accepted definition of terrorism currently exists. The “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse also rests on a series of contested neo-realist understandings regarding the centrality of states, the competitive nature of international politics and the indivisibility of international security. Perhaps most importantly, the discourse assumes that “terrorism” poses a serious threat to the security of nations and the wider international system—despite significant evidence to the contrary. Other implicit assumptions in the broader terrorism discourse which are equally contestable or dubious include the assumption that “terrorist” groups such as al Qaeda are cohesive, organized, and hierarchical in nature, that terrorists and “rogue states” have a natural coincidence of interests and that terrorists could not operate effectively without the assistance or acquiescence of states.

Third, and most importantly, the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse itself consists of a series of narratives which are largely unsupported by empirical research, or at the very least, are open to debate. For example, the notion that failed states provide natural sanctuaries or havens for terrorists is far from established; in fact, such environments more often pose major difficulties for terrorists. Related to this, all major empirical studies thus far conclude that there is no direct link between poverty, unemployment and alienation, and terrorism. The same studies also suggest that narratives of “Islamic terrorism” and the sanctuary that so-called “Islamic extremism” provides to terrorists are similarly contestable—not least because a large proportion of “Islamist” movements are in fact, nonviolent. There are also powerful arguments to be made against the narrative that so-called “rogue states” are eager to sponsor terrorists and provide them with weapons of mass destruction—primarily because such actions would invite overwhelming retaliation. The assertion that freedom in Western states can provide a “haven” or “sanctuary” is also arguable, because Western states usually have well-resourced capacity for tracking and responding to terrorists. Related to this, studies demonstrate that, far from being terrorist supporters, media coverage of terrorist acts is usually heavily dominated by official views and a focus on victims. Lastly, as Brachman and Forest note in their chapter on the role of “virtual camps” in this volume, the argument that the Internet provides a kind of virtual “terrorist sanctuary” is not nearly as straightforward as its proponents suggest. Information technology can be both an asset and vulnerability for terrorists. There is furthermore, no evidence that any terrorist has ever been recruited solely via the Internet.

Finally, a major analytical shortcoming of the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse is that it fails to adequately address the problem of state terror and the way
state institutions and doctrines and modes of governance, provide a “sanctuary” or “haven” for terrorism. The fact is that if terrorism refers to violence directed toward or threatened against civilians which is designed to instil terror or intimidate a population for political reasons—an entirely uncontroversial definition of terrorism fully accepted by experts such as Byman—then state terrorism is arguably a much greater problem than dissident terrorism. States after all, have killed, tortured, and intimidated hundreds of millions of people over the past few decades, and a great many continue to do so today in places like Colombia, Algeria, Myanmar, Uzbekistan, Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya, North Korea, Indonesia, and elsewhere.

More controversially, it can be argued that certain state military practices can be considered terroristic, if not terrorism, particularly if we define terrorist acts according to their effects on civilians rather than the purported intentions behind them. The physical results of such activities carry a much heavier moral weight than alleged—and notoriously difficult to prove in law—criminal intent, and bear much more heavily on the legitimacy and capital of a political leadership ultimately responsible for decisions that impact on the safety and human rights of noncombatants. The use of airpower to intimidate and terrorize civilian populations, for example, central to doctrines of “shock and awe” and strategic bombing, could be considered terrorism, as it clearly falls within the definition of civilian-directed violence designed to intimidate a population for political purposes. Similarly, counterinsurgency and low-intensity conflict practices and pacification campaigns—such as Operation Phoenix in Vietnam, Algerian counterinsurgency in the 1990s, and Colombian counterinsurgency today—are frequently oriented toward intimidating civilian populations with state violence to undermine their support for insurgents. From this perspective, some have argued that U.S. counterinsurgency training in institutions like the School of the Americas (since renamed the Western Hemisphere Institute for Security Cooperation) constituted a form of state terrorism sponsorship.

In effect, there is a pressing analytical question here of why and how so many states provide ideological justification for the practice of state terror through doctrines of “counter-insurgency,” “low-intensity conflict,” “counter-terrorism,” “national security,” “aerial warfare,” “coercive diplomacy,” “constructive engagement,” and the like (forms of ideological and rhetorical support for terrorism), and why they “harbour” and protect so many “terrorists” (the individuals who engage in bombing, murdering, disappearing, torturing, and intimidating civilians). Corey Robin has convincingly argued that the production of fear lies at the heart of liberal doctrines of the state, suggesting that perhaps the state itself is predisposed to a reliance on violence and coercion. Directing so much academic attention toward the support provided to dissident terrorists whilst ignoring the equally serious problem of state terrorism involves a considerable loss of analytical focus and intellectual credibility.
Political Bias

A related problem for the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse is that it has always been characterized by a certain political bias and selectivity. For example, an analysis of the mainstream terrorism literature during the Cold War demonstrates that terrorism experts regularly identified Iran, Libya, Cuba, the Soviet Union and many other mainly communist countries as “state sponsors” of “international terrorism,” but failed to include countries like Israel or South Africa—despite the fact that South Africa, for example, not only engaged in numerous acts of terrorism against dissidents in neighbouring states but also sponsored movements like Unita and Renamo who engaged in extensive terrorism. The “terrorist sanctuaries” literature from this period also focused heavily on the assistance provided by states like Libya and Syria to groups like the PLO, but failed to discuss U.S. support for groups like the Afghan Mujahaddin, anti-Castro groups, and the Contras, despite the fact these groups engaged in numerous acts of terrorism, including planting car bombs in markets, kidnappings, civilian massacres, and blowing up civilian airliners.51

Many would argue that from this perspective, the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse has functioned ideologically to distract from and deny the long history of the West’s direct involvement in state terrorism and its support and sanctuary for a number of anticommunist terrorist groups. Western involvement in terrorism has a long but generally ignored history, which includes: the extensive use of official terror by Britain, France, Germany, Portugal, the United States, and other colonial powers in numerous countries throughout the colonial period52; U.S. support and sanctuary for a range of right-wing insurgent groups like the Contras and the Mujahideen during the Cold War53; U.S. tolerance of Irish Republican terrorist activity in the United States54; U.S. support for systematic state terror by numerous right-wing regimes across the world, perhaps most notoriously El Salvador, Chile, Guatemala, Indonesia, and Iran55; British support for Loyalist terrorism in Northern Ireland56 and various other “Islamist” groups in Libya and Bosnia, among others57; Spanish state terror during the “dirty war” against ETA58; French support for terror in Algeria and against Greenpeace in the Rainbow Warrior bombing; Italian sponsorship of right-wing terrorists; and Western support for accommodation with terrorists following the end of several high profile wars59—among many other examples.

In short, there is no denying that the discourse has often been used in a highly selective manner to highlight some acts of terror whilst selectively ignoring others. Arguably, this political bias continues today: the Taliban forces in Afghanistan are more often described as terrorists than insurgents, while various warlords, including General Rashid Dostum, are rarely called terrorists, despite overwhelming evidence of their use of terror and intimidation against civilians.60 This situation is mirrored in Somalia, where the Islamist Al Itihad Al Islamiya group is typically described as a terrorist organization with links to al Qaeda, while U.S.-supported Somali warlords who also use violence against civilians are exempted from the
terrorist label.61 Similarly, Cuba remains on the State Department’s list of “state sponsors of terrorism,” but continued U.S. sanctuary and support of anti-Castro terrorists,62 former Latin American state terrorists63 and other assorted Asian anticommmunist groups64 is completely ignored. Most glaringly, the state terror of countries like Uzbekistan, Colombia, and Indonesia—and continued tolerance and support for it from the U.S.65—is hardly ever discussed in the mainstream “terrorist sanctuaries” literature.

From a discourse analytic perspective, it can further be argued that the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse often functions to promote a set of partisan political projects. For example, the discourse describes an almost infinite number of potential “terrorist sanctuaries” or “havens,” including: all failed, weak, or poor states; the widely accepted list of state sponsors of terrorism; a much longer list of passive state sponsors of terrorism; states with significant Muslim populations; Islamic charities and NGOs; informal, unregulated banking and economic systems; the media; the Internet; diasporas in Western countries; groups and regions characterized by poverty and unemployment; the criminal world; radical Islamist organizations; mosques and Islamic schools; insurgent and revolutionary movements; and “extremist” ideologies—among others. The identification of these groups and domains as “terrorist sanctuaries” or “havens” then functions to permit a range of restrictive and coercive actions against them—all in the name of counterterrorism. The point is that there may be other political reasons for taking action against such groups which the “terrorist sanctuary” label obscures.

From this perspective, the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse can be shown to support a range of discrete political projects and interests, including: limiting expressions of dissent; controlling the media; centralizing executive power; creating a surveillance society; expanding state regulation of social life; retargeting the focus of military force from dissident groups and individuals (which privileges law enforcement) to states (which privileges the powerful military-industrial complex); legitimating broader counterinsurgency programmes where the real aims lie in the maintenance of a particular political-economic order66; de-legitimizing all forms of counterhegemonic or revolutionary struggle, thereby functioning as a means of maintaining the liberal international order; and selectively justifying projects of regime change,67 economic sanctions, military base expansion, military occupation, military assistance for strategic partners, and the isolation of disapproved political movements. In short, the discourse functions—in its present form—to permit the extension of Western state hegemony both internationally and domestically.

Ineffectual Policies

A final criticism of the “terrorist sanctuaries” discourse is that it has proved in its prescriptions to be largely ineffectual and in many cases, counterproductive. In particular, the policy of employing military force against “terrorist sanctuaries” or
“havens,” a reasonable policy within the confines of the discourse, actually has an astonishing record of failure. For example, Israel has mounted military strikes and targeted assassination against “terrorist sanctuaries” in the Palestinian territories and surrounding states for over fifty years without any significant reduction in the overall level of terrorism. The apartheid regime in South Africa adopted a similarly futile policy against its neighbours during the 1980s. U.S. military strikes on Libya in 1986, Sudan and Afghanistan in 1998, and the use of force in the current War on Terror against Afghanistan and Iraq, have also failed to noticeably reduce the overall number of terrorist attacks against U.S. interests. More broadly, the use of military force against “terrorist sanctuaries” in Colombia, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Turkey, and elsewhere has in every case failed to appreciably affect the level of antistate terrorist violence.

It could be argued that the attempts since September 11 to eliminate “terrorist sanctuaries” in Afghanistan, Iraq, and South Lebanon in particular, have in fact, had the opposite effect. In many respects, these military interventions have solidified and greatly strengthened various Middle Eastern insurgent and “terrorist” groups, reinforced new militant movements and coalitions, provided new regions of conflict where dissident groups can gain military experience and greatly increased overall levels of anti-Western sentiment across the region. It is probable that the price of these policies will be many more years of insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an ongoing international terrorist campaign against U.S. interests and its allies. The main problem of course, is that the discourse focuses on the symptoms and enablers of dissident terrorism, rather than its underlying drivers and poses a palliative remedy rather than a curative one. From this viewpoint, it is actually an impediment to dealing with terrorism because it functions as a closed system of discourse, preventing discussion of the political grievances which cause individuals and groups to seek out places of sanctuary from where they can launch attacks in the first place.

CONCLUSION

There is a need for researchers and public officials to be far more reflective and critical of the language they employ and the “knowledge” they produce, because discourse and knowledge is never neutral; it always works for someone and for something. In this case, the language and knowledge of the “terrorism sanctuaries” discourse frequently works to maintain the hegemony of certain powerful states and a particular international order which is beneficial to a few, but violent and unjust to many more. It also works to obscure the much greater violence and suffering caused by current Western counterterrorism policies (which have cost the lives of well over 40,000 civilians and caused incalculable material destruction since September 11, 2001), the double standards and selectivity of Western approaches to terrorism and the ongoing problem of civilian-directed state terror.
A more humanistic and intellectually honest approach to “terrorist sanctuaries” would begin with an exploration of the ways in which states and their accompanying doctrines of “national security,” “counter-insurgency” and “counter-terrorism” frequently provide a “haven” for wholesale terror inflicted on civilian populations. It would also involve an honest appraisal of the ways in which many modern democracies have sponsored, supported, tolerated, and given sanctuary to some forms of terrorism while simultaneously decrying others. It has been argued that the level of terrorism in the international system is directly related to the extent that the great powers—who set the standards of acceptable conduct—practice, condone, and support terrorist behaviour themselves. Moreover, dissident terrorism can sometimes be a reaction to prior state terror; certainly, a number of contemporary terrorist groups have their origins in the “environment of impunity created by state terror during the late Cold War.” From this perspective, all forms of terrorism—“theirs” and “ours”, dissident and state-directed—can be understood as part of a single historical-political process. The issue of how to deal with “terrorist sanctuaries”, therefore, goes far beyond narrow conceptions of national security, deterrence, or pre-emption. Instead, it calls for a profound reevaluation of both the theory and practice of counterterrorism and an appreciation of the need to construct a more just and equitable international order based on a morally consistent notion of human security.
Netwar, the Modern Geopolitical Imagination, and the Death of the Civilian

Colin Flint

There are still villages that aren’t clean and from where there is resistance, and in the coming days we will apparently have to continue to clean them.1

—Alon Friedman, head of Northern Command headquarters to Israel’s Channel One television

The contemporary geopolitical landscape is one of terrorism and counterterrorism. As the above quote suggests, geopolitics is a matter of practice and representation. Allegedly, the geopolitical theories and axioms of the twentieth century, developed in the late 1800s, have been relegated to history; part of the rhetoric that “everything has changed” since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Instead, the Bush doctrine and the practices of the War on Terrorism have promoted preemptive attacks as a necessary and effective means to combat terrorism. Such statements and actions, along with the administration’s questioning of the continued relevance of the Geneva Conventions, have added the weight of U.S. foreign and military policy to the already blurred lines between combatants and noncombatants. Prior to the current rhetoric of the Bush administration, the change in warfare had been identified by Mary Kaldor as a distinction between “New and Old Wars.” The War on Terrorism has reemphasized the role of states, especially the United States, in the problematic definition of legitimate military targets.2 The identification of terrorists as the number one security threat in the world altered the geopolitical landscape in a way that built upon some aspects of New Wars but posed additional problems as well. Terrorist sanctuaries became the target of the overwhelming military might of the United States and the new raison d’etre behind its construction of military alliances across the globe. But, as the saying goes, as everything changes things stay the same.
To understand the geopolitics of terrorist sanctuary and its policy implications, we must first briefly review the content of geopolitics to note how the seemingly new and unprecedented context of the War on Terror has retained the essence of modern geopolitical thought. The remaining sections of the chapter will concentrate upon two separate but related aspects of geopolitics: the construction of political spaces and the representation of those spaces. In discussing these two aspects we will see that though the construction of political networks may well be new, though not as new as claimed, the tools of representation remain indebted to the geopolitical rhetoric of the civilized versus savage that was used in the imperial geopolitics of the late nineteenth century.

The emphasis upon rhetoric in the final section is in no manner a denial of the existence of spaces in which terrorists operate and can be meaningfully called sanctuary. Indeed, the chapter provides a framework to conceptualize the material political geography of such spaces. The point of combining a discussion of the rhetoric of terrorist sanctuary is to illustrate the potential for counterproductive counterterrorism. In a final caveat, the primary focus in the criticism of the rhetoric of terrorist sanctuary is upon mainstream statements used to justify military actions rather than academic analyses.

What has this got to do with policy and the counterterrorist response to terrorist sanctuary? Simply put, terrorist networks create and operate in nuanced spaces that are finely differentiated; the distinction between terrorist and civilian spaces is one of small geographical distance. On the other hand, the representation of terrorist sanctuaries is carried out with a broad rhetorical brush as whole swathes of territory, up to and including whole states, are deemed sanctuaries and, hence, combat zones. The moral of the story is that counterterrorist policies that target large expanses of territory are counterproductive: they diminish the moral authority of the counterterrorist actors, and provide rhetorical fuel for movements recruiting terrorists in the name of anti-imperialism. The one side creates images of barbarian and fanatical terrorists, the other freedom fighters resisting a new empire.

THE NEW GEOPOLITICS OF TERRORIST SANCTUARIES

Geopolitics is both a matter of territorial practice and representation. In a traditional sense it is the practice of competitive statecraft, the calculation of the strategic value of territory, and the means by which to control it. In this definition geopolitics is the preserve of statesmen and their diplomatic and military institutions. But contemporary understandings of geopolitics require a more critical and inclusive perspective. The emergence and continued vitality of critical geopolitics has cast a skeptical eye on the rhetorical representation of the territories and other spaces that are adopted by policymakers to justify the actions of states. Parts of the world are represented as threats by labeling them, and hence their inhabitants, in variations on the theme of civilized/noncivilized. Samuel Huntington’s *Clash of Civilizations* and its identification of Islam as a violent religion, and denial of violence committed in the name of Christianity, is especially germane here.
Feminist scholars have also emphasized that geopolitics is a way of “seeing” the world: a white-male vantage point that deems the world “knowable.” In other words, the labels given to political spaces by policymakers have authority and legitimate action. The quote from the Israeli military commander at the beginning of this chapter requires an understanding that the village can be “known” as “dirty” and in need of “cleaning.” In contrast, an antigeopolitical eye would emphasize the complexity of the village, or any other political space, and the sense that its occupants have multiple and nuanced identities that are subjective and ever changing; the village and its inhabitants are never fully known. However, such an anti-geopolitical eye does not foster the simple and concrete images that are required to construct and justify the military policies of states.

Geopolitics has always relied upon four axioms: that the world as a whole can be envisioned; that the world can be classified into a hierarchy of spaces, essentially along a line of modern and backward or undeveloped and the associated identities of civilized and uncivilized; the world political map is one of territorial states that encompass unitary societies; that states are competitive and seek primacy by achieving the status of most powerful state. Together these axioms constitute the modern geopolitical imagination.

The modern geopolitical imagination has displayed all four elements since its inception in the late 1700s, but their actual form has changed through three distinct periods. The 1800s were a period of Western exploration and discovery of “new” lands that were to be colonized. The seizure of territory and the enslavement of its inhabitants required a binary representation of the world divided between the civilized Christian and the barbarian. The subhuman status of the barbarian allowed for the fiction that the lands were “empty,” so colonialism was not grand larceny, and gave the Western powers the legitimizing cloak of a “civilizing” mission. We will return to this era of geopolitics later, because it has the greatest saliency for the contemporary geopolitics of terrorist sanctuary.

The buildup to the First World war and through to the end of the Second World War was the period of naturalized geopolitics in which a scientific racism was used to create a hierarchy of populations, with the Jews suffering grotesque consequences. Also, the combination of environmental determinism and Social Darwinism led to an organic theory of the state, in which borders would “move” as a natural consequence of cultural superiority. In other words, the eastern expansion of Germany was a “natural” outcome of the belief that Slavs were an inferior race. The agency of the statesmen designing and implementing territorial conquest was then rhetorically finessed. The era of ideological geopolitics lasted from the end of the Second World War to the end of the Cold War. The binary in this conflict was represented as the “free world” versus the Communist bloc; both sides defined the other as imperialist. For the most part, the geopolitics of deterrence prevailed.

The modern geopolitical imagination frames our understanding of terrorist sanctuary. The problem is that the political geography of conflict has changed, but some of the same exercises in representation are rehearsed. Similar to previous eras, geopolitics is seen as a global enterprise: The War on Terror involves all the
countries of the world. Also, the rhetoric of both al Qaeda and the United States is driven by the latter’s role as a hegemonic or dominant world power; the one challenging that role and the other trying to maintain it.\textsuperscript{11}

The continuation of other elements of the modern geopolitical imagination is, however, more ambiguous and ultimately problematic for counterterrorist policy. The following two sections of the chapter will concentrate on the two main ambiguities and their relationship to each other. The core of the problem lies in the dominant perception of the world political map being one of territorial states, and the consequent “territorial trap”: the manner in which social scientists and policymakers view the world as a mosaic of territorially bounded states and equate these geographic units with “society.”\textsuperscript{12} Simply put, states realize that they are fighting an enemy organized in the form of networks rather than a territorial state, but must still act territorially in their counterterrorist policies. In order to justify such actions, geopolitical rhetoric, both from policymakers and the image makers in the media, is heavy with labeling territories and their peoples in a binary of civilized and uncivilized. However, there is one key difference: the adversary is not a territorial state. The threat is not a state seeking strategic territorial advantage (i.e. access to resources) or jockeying for primacy. The threat is the vague yet ubiquitous existence of “terror” that is practiced by terrorist groups and manifest in isolated and seemingly random attacks. Rather than a geopolitics of states versus states, the conflict is states versus terrorist networks. It is because of the difficulties that such a conflict brings to states that the concept of terrorist sanctuary has become so vital: it has enabled an aterritorial conflict to become reterritorialized. The implications are however, counterproductive for the pursuit of security will be elusive as long as terrorist sanctuary is defined in terms that demand territorial representations that do not reflect the reality of terrorist organization.

To show the implications of the changing geopolitical imagination for policy toward an understanding of terrorist sanctuary we must show the dynamic relationship between discourse, policy, and practice. John Lynn’s cultural model of warfare demonstrates the interaction between “Discourse on War” and the “Reality of War”: The one being the “[P]reconceptions, values, ideals and so on concerning conflict” and the other being the “objective facts of conflict.”\textsuperscript{13} The relationship between the two is of the utmost importance. On the one hand, cultures may try to reform the reality of war to fit their conception of war; in other words war is modified to try to meet cultural perception. For example, conventions and laws are made to construct a “civilized” conduct of war. On the other hand, changing realities of war may be recognized by the culture and demand an adjustment of the discourse. For example, ideas of heroic warfare were adjusted in light of the realities of World War I trench warfare.\textsuperscript{14}

An intriguing part of Lynn’s feedback system is the process of rejection and the construction of an alternative discourse. In this process

there are times when the nature of warfare is so at odds with the discourse that Adjustment is unacceptable; the result is “Rejection” of the violence as outside the
conceptual boundaries of war. Such Rejection can engender an “Alternate Discourse,”
which can then justify a more “Extreme Reality” of conflict, because the formalities
and limitations that often circumscribe the war within the dominant discourse lose
their validity. Violence outside the conceptual boundaries of war becomes not heroism
but “evil” to be thoroughly condemned and utterly destroyed.15

Lynn argues that the contemporary threat of terrorism has forced a neces-
sary rethink of the discourse on war. This may well be an inevitable outcome of
the series of al Qaeda attacks that became most salient on September 11, 2001.
However, the implications of the changing discourse can only be fully addressed
if the changing geographic imagination of the evolving discourse is given ex-
PLICIT attention. The term terrorist sanctuary plays a key role in these changes.
Attention to the geography of terrorist sanctuary is an important factor in deter-
mining whether a new discourse fostering effective counterterrorism results, or
whether an alternative discourse, is constructed that facilitates practices that will
be counterproductive.

The first task is to conceptualize the reality of war in the face of terrorism
by engaging the concept of Netwar, a model constructed by scholars from the
RAND organization.16 For the purposes of this essay I will use Netwar as a
model to help us conceptualize the political geographic reality of the War on
Terrorism. The following section explores the connection between the geography
of territorial nation-states and the geography of terrorist networks. The connection
is a complex intertwining of the physical spaces of terrorism and counterterrorism,
and the disruption of the spatial imagination underlying established geopolitical
frameworks. The section concludes by illustrating how Netwar has made terrorist
sanctuary a matter of “domestic” politics and, simultaneously, a foreign policy
imperative of military intervention. What is defined as “terrorist space” does not
always coincide with what is labeled “battlespace,” as the former relies on a
geography of nodes and the latter is more closely related to state territories.17

The final section explores the formation of an “alternative discourse” of war-
fare as a result of the reality of Netwar. Again “reality” is a problematic term here,
but I hope to remain within the observable manifestations of terrorist networks and
counterterrorism. The relationship between the construction of “evils” outside the
constraints of warfare and the discourse of terrorist sanctuary is one that has the
potential for reviving the binaries of civilized and barbarian that were a feature of
civilizational geopolitics. It is argued that such an alternative discourse will only
foster more terrorism in the wake of counterterrorist pursuit of “sanctuary.”

NETWAR AND TERRORIST SANCTUARY

The idea of Netwar has been propagated by researchers at the RAND Corporation.
Netwar may be defined as the use of network forms of organization, doctrine,
strategy, and technology to engage in conflict.18 The definition implies that there
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is a spatial manifestation of the network, but also a manner of thinking and implementing conflict. Predating the War on Terror, the concept was originally designed to discuss the vulnerability of computer networks to attack by individual hackers as well as hostile states. The language of nodes, connections, and “swarm attacks” was readily translatable once the term terrorist network became firmly embedded in security discourse.

Considering the War on Terror within the framework of Netwar challenges some of the views that had become “common sense” through the application of the modern geopolitical imagination. Most importantly, the model defines a new sense of the spatiality of conflict, however the policy response to the concept of Netwar has focused upon the geography of the terrorist threat rather than the response.

A network is constituted of nodes and the connections between them. The networks facilitate flows between the nodes. The nodes are sites for different functions, and together the network has goals and purpose. Nodes can be either individuals (such as a suicide bomber) or places (such as a training camp). The flows between them can consist of information, money, supplies, or people. Though the geography of the network is very different from the geography of territorial nation-states that has dominated the modern geopolitical imagination it is incorrect to see networks as having no geography.

Nodes are located within territorial spaces that are under sovereign control. Some nodes will be located in spaces where the sovereign power is hostile to the terrorist network, and other nodes will be situated where the sovereign power is supportive or, at least, sympathetic. The concept of terrorist sanctuary is applicable to all of the nodes in the network, though the type of sanctuary provided, and the behavior of the terrorist that is permissible, varies greatly. In a political and territorial context of a “failed state” a semipermanent node such as a training site may be possible. A suicide bomber is, by definition, a temporary node—but one that must find a degree of sanctuary from scrutiny by security forces to fulfill the terrorist act. The task of the terrorist is to establish nodes and a degree of connectivity that allows for the completion of acts of terror, and this requires locating some nodes in places where security forces are active and other nodes in places where the threat of security forces is minimal. It is the latter that are normally referred to as “terrorist sanctuary,” though the former should also be considered.

The different functions of nodes correspond to both their degree of permanence and connectivity. For example, the suicide bomber will be one of the least connected nodes as they are highly vulnerable to capture and interrogation. On the other hand, nodes responsible for finance will demand a much higher degree of connectivity and stability to ensure efficiency. This also implies differences in network structure. The suicide bomber is more likely to be passed off from connection to connection along a linear network, while the financial node is situated at the center of a “hub and spoke” model. Further complexity comes from considering the consequences of the terrorist act. For example, the suicide bomber could also be conceptualized as the center of his/her own hub and spoke model: the suicide act at the center, with spokes out to the targets of the act and also the
perpetrator’s family and friends. This complication, in turn, speaks of temporal
sanctuary, the classic endurance or patience of the guerrilla, and the need for so-
cial networks of support. Hence, conceptualizing the spatial setting of nodes also
requires consideration of the longitudinal dimensions of the problem and how the
activity of terrorists in creating cells is enabled by particular social settings. In
turn, the presence of terrorist cells can recreate or modify social settings. On the
other hand, the counterterrorist strategy of “winning hearts and minds” is aimed
at denying social settings, or geographies, that facilitate the maintenance of ter-
rorist cells.\textsuperscript{21} It should also be noted that the permanence of the node does not
necessarily mean stability in space. The personnel and function of the node may
remain, as it moves from place to place. However, the connectivity of such a node
demands that it remain within spaces of “sanctuary” from security authorities.

The necessity of the connectivity of the network is often perceived as its most
vulnerable element. Movement requires departure from the sanctuary of one node
until it is reobtained in another. The visibility of the movement may manifest itself
in the form of cell phone or e-mail messages, shipments of weapons, financial
transactions, or the passage of an individual through border checkpoints or other
places where documents may be examined, biometrics analyzed, and questions
asked.\textsuperscript{22} (See Alice Hills’ essay, in this volume, for a discussion of the role of
border security in defining and countering terrorist spaces.) Similarly, the targets
of terrorist activity are often spaces of decreased sanctuary for the terrorists—
airports, military bases, diplomatic buildings, etc. The immediate goal is to note
two things: sanctuary has different meaning for the terrorist given the location and
function of the node, and the spatiality of the terrorist network coexists with the
geography of territorial states and the political mosaic of sovereignty.

First, we will discuss the implications of Netwar being conducted over the ex-
sting political geography of territorial nation-states. Counterterrorist policies are
now a global project: the goal is to “disrupt terrorist infrastructures worldwide.”\textsuperscript{23}
If this is considered solely within the framework of Netwar then nodes are detected
and eliminated, either by judicial or executive means. But once the coexisting
geography of territorial nation-states is considered then it becomes clear that such
a global offensive against networks requires intrusions of sovereignty of varying
scale and dimension. This may occur in the form of cooperation between police
forces, diplomatic pressure, the training of military and police units by U.S. Special
Forces, or the ongoing military occupations of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.

Security forces are part of the sovereign state and hence their jurisdiction is
organized through the mosaic of territory. This political geographic reality must be
related to the theory of Netwar and the rhetoric of the War on Terror. Netwar has
identified the “swarm” as the mode of network attack, a sudden burst of activity
from hidden nodes causing large-scale disruption and damage. Though initially
referring to attacks on computer networks, the language has been transferred
to the actions of terrorists. The terminology of Netwar has been at the center
of the rhetorical definition of new situations of warfare and the justification of
preemptive attacks. The pragmatic focus of counterterrorism means that applying
overwhelming force in foreign sovereign spaces is perceived to be a necessary part of denying terrorists the ability to organize attacks: nodes must be identified and eradicated to prevent “swarms.”

Such a strategy has detrimental implications. First, it requires disregarding the norms of political sovereignty and setting a precedent for preemptive invasion. Second, the emphasis upon the detection and annihilation of nodes that are located across a broader territorial extent requires a blanket use of force; the saturation of a whole territory to deny the operation of nodes with specific locations. Third, a global projection of power requires alliance with countries with suspect human rights records leading to charges of hypocrisy that limit the legitimacy of the geopolitical actions. In combination, charges of empire and immorality are easily leveled, and provide the grounds for resistance to military occupation and global power: resistance that is likely to take the form of terrorist actions. Counterterrorism that is cavalier with sovereign political spaces breeds resentment and further terrorism. One side’s “global reach” is another side’s “invasion.” One side’s “policing role” is another side’s “occupation.”

An emphasis upon terrorist sanctuary requires us to move beyond the constraints of the “territorial trap”; but sadly the rhetoric of the War on Terror remains within the modern geopolitical imagination. Netwar provides an important alternative conceptualization of political spaces. The geography of the nodes of a terrorist network force a break from the notions of inside/outside that have predominated in geopolitical thought. Threat is no longer a matter of a foreign territorial entity having designs over one’s own territory. It is a matter of identifying a network of nodes that transcend sovereign spaces.

A terrorist network is a series of terrorist sanctuaries located in different countries. Sometimes international cooperation allows for the identification of these nodes and their removal. The August 2006 arrest of suspects in a large-scale plot to blow up a number of transatlantic flights is a good illustration of the manner in which different countries can cooperate to find the connectivity of the network and make arrests. An arrest in Pakistan led to raids and arrests in Great Britain. Such successful operations require a continued international cooperation, and it is still an interstate diplomacy that makes this possible.

The societal dimension of terrorist networks disruption of the “territorial trap” is equally important. The modern geopolitical imagination maintained assumptions of homogenous national societies defined and delimited by state borders: there existed a French society and a British one for example. Political geographers and other scholars have long identified the fiction of such a belief and ethno-nationalist conflicts have also challenged the myth of the nation-state. However, the discourse and reality of war was embedded within the commonly held understanding that threats emanated from an external and territorially defined enemy. In fighting a Netwar politicians must now wrestle with the reality that the enemy is sometimes within the society. Sending troops to deny terrorist sanctuary in Afghanistan is one thing, seeing the police cordon off a neighborhood street and conduct an antiterrorist raid is quite another.
The existence of terrorist nodes “next door” disrupts a sense of civilian sanctuary that has been the bedrock of the doctrine of nationalism. Xenophobic politicians can use the context to challenge the loyalty of ethnic minorities and promote fundamentalist perceptions of nationhood that are based upon race. In such rhetoric, areas of the United Kingdom where, as an obvious example, British Muslims are a majority of the population are portrayed as terrorist sanctuaries. The potential for interracial strife is high. Using Lynn’s model, this is a case where the reality of conflict differs from the established discourse of inside = security/outside = threat.\textsuperscript{25} British Home Secretary John Reid’s plea for a national unity by calling for solidarity “across all sections of the community,” illustrates the social and political minefield that must be negotiated.\textsuperscript{26} Solidarity is still desired at the scale of the nation, but the term “nation” seems no longer applicable and the less territorial term “community” is used instead. The “community” is somehow singular, but it is comprised of “sections,” the less threatening cousin of “schism.”

I do not intend to be alarmist. The construction and maintenance of multi-ethnic nation-states is clearly within the realms of human possibility. The point to make is that the political geography of terrorist networks and the pursuit of Netwar have disrupted the dominant discourse of the modern geopolitical imagination: the assurance of the inside/outside dichotomy. One possible consequence of this rupture is internal ethnic strife and xenophobic politics. Politicians must enact policies that deny sanctuary to terrorists in nodes located within certain “sections of the community,” to use Secretary Reid’s words. However, they must simultaneously enact policies and adopt rhetoric that do not deny the populations of such “sections” membership in the national community. One of the challenges of fighting Netwar is effective antiterrorist policing within multiethnic nations.

This section has introduced the political geography of Netwar and noted its coexistence with the political geography of nation-states. We have characterized different nodes of the network in terms of their function, permanence, and location in territories with varying degrees of counterterrorist presence. Though all nodes can offer some sort of sanctuary to a terrorist the degree is context specific. Netwar is a new reality of warfare that disrupts the established rhetoric of warfare within the modern geopolitical imagination, with the need for interstate cooperation and the potential for domestic unease and tension. The next section concentrates upon the way that rhetorical constructions of “others” are a necessary component of foreign military operations aimed at denying terrorist sanctuary. It is in this section that the counterproductivity of military counterterrorist actions is most evident.

THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE TERRORIST SANCTUARY IN FOREIGN MILITARY INTERVENTION

Terrorist sanctuary is, in part, a matter of geographical imagination: It is a representation of a geographical space. The geopolitics of representation is a crucial
aspect of contemporary politics for two related reasons. First, policies are made on the basis of understandings of a political geography of what and who is where. Second, policies are justified to the public and international community through particular depictions of places. The connection between the form of these representations and the political geography of Netwar is that the geography of terrorist networks has provoked territorial counterterrorist policies that must be justified through the negative representation of swathes of territory and their inhabitants. Counterterrorist policies that include military invasion and large-scale bombing campaigns, ostensibly targeting cells or nodes, can only be legitimized if the territory as a whole is seen as deserving of military action, or at least undeserving of our concern and sympathy.

The seminal work on the geopolitics of representation was Edward Said’s *Orientalism*, and its identification of the literary construction of the subordinate Other in the colonized sections of the world. The Other was at times savage but at others childlike and naïve; sexually dangerous but also sensual and alluring. In addition, the construction of the backward, uncivilized, and untrustworthy Other created a sense of a modern, civilized, and just West acting on behalf of God for the improvement of all humanity. Empire was, in other words, a civilizing mission, in which savages and other beings deemed inadequate in a variety of ways were to be brought into the Christian fold and a global economic system dominated by metropolitan interests. The hierarchy of spaces and cultures at the heart of the modern geopolitical imagination was cemented during this time, and remains, though not as strong, in popular sensibility today. Though the sentiments are less overtly racist and fundamental as they were in the 1800s, the Orientalist argument is still rehearsed with geopolitical effect with some purpose and success.

The study of geopolitical representation has grown since Said’s work, and the body of work known as critical geopolitics is a significant component of modern geography. Broadly following the imperatives of postmodernism and post-structuralism, critical geopolitics deconstructs policy statements and geopolitical agendas to illuminate underlying assumptions and power relations. In general, the assumptions are usually based within the elements of the modern geopolitical imagination and the power relations reflect the hierarchy of state power. Realist assumptions dominate, as do a belief in the territorial nature of politics and the supremacy of Western thought and practice. Threat is seen as constant and imminent, and society is pressed to be in a constant state of vigilance and preparedness. Many critical geopolitical studies were written at the close of the Cold War period. However, it is interesting to note that the same tropes of vigilance, imminent threat, and so on, that are clearly evident in the rhetoric of the War on Terror, were prominent in the Cold War.

Scholars have noted the visibility of human beings as a key change in geopolitical rhetoric from the Cold War context to the War on Terrorism. Civilizational geopolitics had a particular focus on human beings. They were to become subjects of the civilizing mission, made “better” though retaining their subaltern status, of course. In other words, the populations within the territories that were being
targeted by the imperial powers were to be reconstructed and made into members of the British or French or other imperial project. Without denying the physical violence that accompanied imperialism, the general goal was not to eradicate peoples but to make them productive and, largely, willing participants in an imperial system. The rhetoric of imperial geopolitics contained both the identification of “savages” but also the “childlike” native who could be made into a Christian workman. People were identified as potential imperial subjects.

In the War on Terror there remains an element of the civilizing mission in the accompanying rhetoric of democratization. For example, in the immediate policy statements after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, then Secretary of State Colin Powell said

... the war on terrorism starts within each of our respective sovereign borders. It will be fought with increased support for democracy programs, judicial reform, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, economic reform and health and education programs. All of these together deny the reasons for terrorists to exist or find safe havens within those borders.30

However, the difficulties witnessed in the aftermath of regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq has weakened such rhetoric in the face of the material challenges of war. As suggested by Lynn’s model, as the reality of conflict changed so did the rhetoric.31 It is in this dynamic context that the trope of terrorist sanctuary has become dominant.

Terrorist sanctuary was given contemporary salience through the “you are either with us or against us” rhetoric of the Bush doctrine. The geographic referent of “you” is important as the language remains within the assumptions of the modern geographical imagination and hence “you” is readily equated with territorial states. Sanctuary becomes not a matter of nodes located within both the spaces of networks and territories, but primarily a matter of territory. In the case of the post-9/11 invasion of Afghanistan the geopolitical rhetoric moved quickly from seeking the death or capture of Osama bin Laden, a key strategic node in the al Qaeda network, to the occupation of a whole national-territorial space to deny the possibility of terrorist training and the sanctuary for launching future attacks. The invasion of Iraq was justified, partially and with minimal success, through the idea that the national-territorial space of Iraq provided sanctuary to terrorists. Such language remains with regard to Syria, Iran, and south Lebanon. The rhetoric categorizes a national-territorial space as a terrorist sanctuary and therefore a threat and legitimate target. The political geography of terrorist networks is a reality that belies such rhetoric, and so legitimating military activities requires a particularly odious form of Orientalism.

The implication is what has been interpreted as the “death of the civilian.” Simply by inhabiting a territorial space that has been deemed terrorist sanctuary, whole populations have become targets of bombing, shelling, and other military actions.32 Though military officials are eager to talk of the pinpoint targeting
of carefully identified targets, the reality is often different. The Israeli military
offensive in Lebanon in the summer of 2006 is, perhaps, the most egregious con-
temporary example. From the perspective of the Israeli Defense Forces, the
targeting of Hezbollah cells in southern Lebanon required the bombing of bridges
far from the Israeli border and the bombing of the southern suburbs of Beirut. The
consequences of targeting the nodes in a terrorist network, admittedly difficult
targets, became a war against a national territory and its population. However
this matter is complicated in cases such as southern Lebanon, where Hezbollah
has broader political legitimacy, partially due to its control of territory. This is
evident in Alice Hills’ discussion (in this volume) of the construction of terrorist
spaces at the scale of the neighborhood to ensure the safe location of strategic
terrorist cells. However, we must also be aware that such spaces are never simple
or one dimensional, and that to see them simply as terrorist spaces finesse the
multiple roles of the residents who remain. Complicity cannot be inferred simply
from continued residence as there are many reasons why people may “choose”
to remain in what can be defined academically as a terrorist space. In the case of
southern Lebanon it is clear that some people were unable to move even before
Israeli airstrikes meant fleeing was a very risky business. Hence we can see “gray
areas” where the distinction between a terrorist group, guerrilla group, and pseudo-
state complicates matters of counterterrorism. On the one hand, the construction
of terrorist spaces provides a more secure location for cells and blurs the neat
distinction between cell and territory. On the other hand, terrorist spaces remain
multidimensional and are simultaneously strategic targets for counterterrorism
and the home for those with little connections to terrorists.

This also raises the thorny issue of complicity and the ability of citizens to
resist authority. Both anti-Hezbollah citizens of southern Lebanon and anti-Zionist
Israelis are defined as legitimate targets through their geographical presence rather
than their personal beliefs and actions. But the example of the Israeli bombing of
Lebanon also illustrates how such a situation allowed for the depiction of a whole
state as a legitimate target. The same can be said for the victims of Hezbollah rocket
attacks as in the case the perpetrators see a civilian as a “settler” or “occupier.” The
military use of Israeli reservists (morphing individual identities between soldier
and civilian in time and space) also complicates the matter.

Since the practice of the mass and deliberate bombing of civilian targets in
the Second World War, the civilian in modern war has become a blurry category.
The “you are either with us or against us” language is discursively connected to
the Second World War definitions of civilian working in strategic towns, such as
Dresden, being legitimate targets. The identification of key railroad yards was
used to legitimate the intentional construction of a firestorm to raze the city: the
citizens of Dresden were not “with us” and hence they had become legitimate
targets. Justification for the Dresden bombing lay in the city’s strategic role,
though official documents are clear in seeing the purpose to be the spread of
terror across the German population to weaken their morale. As dubious as the
resort to strategic necessity was in justifying the bombing of Dresden there was
an attempt to identify the civilian victims as cogs in the German “war machine.” Contemporary aerial bombing employs an alternative geopolitical representation as the existence of civilian victims is denied.

In the War on Terror, the discursive connection between terrorist sanctuary and aerial bombing campaigns is made through an effacement of place: places are depopulated. This is done in two separate but related ways. One strategy is simply to deny that places being targeted are populated. The imagery of modern warfare is increasingly empty of human beings. The news shows are eager to show the images of missiles traveling unerringly from warplane to the building in the crosshairs, images readily supplied by the military. Such images are devoid of human beings. Newspapers, such as the USA Today, publish stylized maps of Baghdad showing the strategic geography of a place, but the streets in the map are empty. These rhetorical devices are matched by the U.S. military’s new policy not to count those killed by its actions. In contrast to the Vietnam War, where estimates of enemy dead were essential in constructing the kill ratio that was hoped to legitimate the military campaign, counting bodies is deemed no longer useful. It is a task left to nongovernmental organizations, a matter of Web sites and blogs.

The second strategy is to efface places by denying their complexity: the fact that the populations residing within places are diverse and not solely populated by violent terrorists. For example, the constant images of flanks of marching, flag-waving, gun-toting, and masked Hezbollah troops makes it hard to think of Iran as anything other than the home of terrorists and religious fanatics.

Theoretically, social scientists have embraced the work of Giorgio Agamben and his identification of the “state of exception”: the categorization of some groups as beyond the protection of the law and the sacred. Defined in Roman law, members of such groups may be killed wantonly with no fear of punishment from secular authorities and no ultimate and negative judgment from deities. It is such states of exceptions that Lynn identified as alternative discourses. However, the categorization of groups of people as being the legitimate target of bombing and shelling requires the negotiation of an established feature of the discourse and practice of war: the distinction between civilian and combatant.

As Derek Gregory points out, the term civilian is a recent construction, emerging in the 1700s but only receiving a careful definition with the addition of the 1977 Protocols of the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Two aspects of the definition are crucial in exploring the lines between new discourses of war and Lynn’s alternative discourses. Article 44:3 states that combatants need only distinguish themselves from civilians during military deployment and engagement. Article 51:3 states that civilians are not entitled to protection while engaged in hostilities. Such distinctions are problematic enough in a conflict such as that between Israel and Hezbollah when reservists fight guerillas. To plot in time and space when a member of either of these categories is a combatant or not is mainly a matter of discourse, but it is within the parameters of Adjustment in Lynn’s model.
The issue of terrorist sanctuary is most pertinent though in the manner in which the term civilian has come under threat by some arguments, and the possibility that an alternative discourse based on a state of exception is being constructed.38 I will first discuss the discourse and then conclude the section by showing that the discourse is necessarily territorialized through the concept of terrorist sanctuary.

In a commentary supporting the actions of the Israeli Defense Forces in southern Lebanon, Harvard Professor Alan Dershowitz introduced the notion of the complicity of civilians. Instead of the combatant/civilian binary he suggested a continuum of “civilianity”—from the pure innocents on the one end (babies, for example) to civilians willingly harboring terrorists (or offering them sanctuary) at the other end.39 Dershowitz claimed that the new realities of war required such recalibration of the civilian, but whether this is a matter of creating an alternative discourse of war depends upon how it is interpreted by those in charge of the material realities of conflict. The Israeli Minister of Justice was quick to claim that all those remaining in south Lebanon had become complicit.40

When such discourse is constructed, a large swathe of territory can become classified as a terrorist sanctuary. In other words the scope and scale of sanctuary is switched from terrorist cell to terrorist space, and thence to the ulterior and much more destructive configuration of battlespace, in which the finer distinctions are muted by perceptions of strategic necessity and military culture.41 The fine distinction of spaces of terrorist nodes next to family homes and the dual function of bridges as conduits of rockets and food, medicine and those wishing to flee the fighting can be blurred, missed, minimized, and even ignored. Sanctuary is given a broad and ill-defined territorial meaning that categorizes terrorist spaces as homogenous, following the “they are either with us or against us” viewpoint. The manner in which the whole of Lebanon was susceptible to Israeli attacks illustrates how quickly the territorial scope of terrorist sanctuary can move from terrorist cell through terrorist space to the national scale.

How does this become counterproductive counterterrorism? Military actions against chunks of territory, even whole countries, which are deemed terrorist sanctuaries will have an unavoidable air of imperialism. From the eyes of the military powers, primarily the United States and Israel, the actions will be couched in the name of self-defense and preemption, sugared with the rhetoric of democratization and development. For those in the invaded countries the actions will easily be seen as occupation of sovereign territory and the imposition of neocolonial administration. Resistance is likely to follow, and whether this is deemed an anticolonial struggle or terrorism is a matter of the justifying discourse of the warring parties.

The danger is that the territorialization of terrorist sanctuary creates an alternative discourse in which whole populations become “complicit” and in need of a spectrum of policing efforts—from political administration under the firm control of the United States or other external power or the unleashing of military power. If we are not careful with delimiting the geography of terrorist sanctuary, and allow it to be seen as a territorial expression rather than one of nodes in a network, whole populations can be seen as “complicit” in providing sanctuary to terrorists.
In the words of Paul Gilroy, the result is a construction of “infrahumanity”: a category of people not beyond the law, in Agamben’s terms, but deemed unable to govern themselves and in “need” of martial law or other emergency, and colonial, powers.42

CONCLUSION

A cavalier definition of terrorist sanctuary will produce counterproductive counterterrorism in two ways. The first is through the occupation of territory, in order to deny the operation of terrorist nodes, that will be interpreted as invasion and the establishment of neocolonial control. As evident from Alice Hills’ essay in this volume, counterterrorism requires recognizing finely differentiated spaces. The second is by relating terrorist sanctuary to categories of people who are deemed in need of subjugation. Both of these related processes will generate continued “resistance”: terrorists and motivations for terrorist attacks will be perpetuated. The irony is that the territorialized discourses of sanctuary will generate more terrorists, but the terrorists will continue to operate within terrorist networks that transcend territorial spaces. Labeling Iraq, Afghanistan, Lebanon, and other locations as unqualified sanctuaries will generate the nodes for terrorists plotting within the United States, Great Britain, and other countries. It is to these nodal sanctuaries that attention should be paid.43

Consideration of the practice and representation of the geopolitics of terrorist sanctuary provides both positive and negative policy recommendations. The positive recommendation is to maximize international law enforcement cooperation in order to identify terrorist nodes and the movement between them. This has been done with some success since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The emphasis should be upon the geographic scale of the node through the application of human and electronic surveillance. Such actions must be undertaken with political sensitivity as sections of diverse nations can be easily alienated. The negative policy recommendation is to avoid territorial wars in the name of targeting terrorist networks. Satellite and drone surveillance, surgical missile strikes, and special forces operations are a more precise means to target nodes, and prevent the loss of life and political legitimacy that result from invasion and occupation.
The Failure of al Qaeda Basing Projects from Afghanistan to Iraq

Brian Glyn Williams

The pious Caliphate will start from Afghanistan.

—Osama bin Laden

The Taliban and Bin Laden are pushing to establish their caliphate, and what they call their emirate. This is a total contradiction to what we want.

—Massoud the Lion of Panjsher, Head of the Northern Alliance Opposition

SHEBERGHAN PRISON-FORTRESS, NORTHERN AFGHANISTAN, AUGUST, 2003

As our convoy of armed SUVs arrived in a cloud of dust at the massive gates of this prison for captured foreign jihadi fighters and Taliban volunteers, I sensed the magnitude of what I was doing. General Rashid Dostum, the Northern Alliance Uzbek warlord who had recently shattered the spine of the Taliban, was allowing me unprecedented access to the hundreds of prisoners of war he held in this almost medieval prison in the inaccessible deserts of northern Afghanistan.

As the massive iron doors creaked open and we entered the courtyard of the prison-fortress I was led to one section with the words “Pakistan Block” painted above it indicating that those in this packed cell were Pakistani jihadists. Approaching the bars to the long cell-block which housed hundreds of filthy Pakistani volunteer Taliban fighters, I found myself face to face with a group of bearded militants who stared at me with a mixture of curiosity, fear, and hatred.

I informed them that I’d come from the United States and was interested in hearing their stories. As none volunteered to assist me, the Uzbek fortress
commander had several of them, unceremoniously, dragged out into the sunlit courtyard for most of the prisoners’ first conversation with a real life American “infidel.”

It was to be a meeting of two worlds and it provided me with considerable insight into the mind frame of those who answer the call of jihad and leave their homes to wage holy war in others’ lands. It was also to give me insight into the jihadis’ concepts of territoriality, something that we in the West rarely attribute to the “nihilistic” transnational jihad movement that has been simplistically defined as al Qaeda.

Commencing my interviews I found that the disheveled prisoners of war spanned the spectrum from Taliban die-hards to rank-and-file Baluchis, Sindhis, and Pashtuns with varying degrees of global vision. While the prisoners were hardly united in their backgrounds and opinions on such issues as bin Laden, all of them were united in strongly criticizing America for attacking Afghanistan.

When I asked them why Pakistani nationals felt compelled to fight and die on behalf of an Afghan state they enlightened me. I was told that the Islamic Amirate of Afghanistan was not an Afghan state per se; it was a pan-Islamic state for all members of the umma, the global community of Muslim believers.

I began to understand that many of the prisoners had a worldview that saw their faith as under siege and in need of a state from which to defend itself. To demonstrate their point the more articulate ones took me on a “tour” of the threatened frontiers of the Dar al Islam (Realm of Islam). The tour took me to all the well-known hot spots where Muslims had indeed been victimized by non-Muslims. It included “stop-overs” in Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, Palestine, Kosovo, and finally Afghanistan.

When I pointed out that I had been to several of these lands mentioned and that none of them had been sanctuaries for global jihadi terrorism like Afghanistan, a Taliban mullah offered an explanation “That is because only the Taliban had unity of purpose with the true believers from throughout the world.”

This explanation provided me with something akin to an epiphany when it came to understanding the global Salafite-militant movement’s difficulties in finding a base for its pan-Islamic project. As the bearded Pashtun mullah indicated, the Taliban Amirate of Afghanistan was indeed unique. For in no other “zone of jihad” where the transnational jihadi militants had sought to build their state had they had such convergence of interests with their local hosts. Never before had the rootless brotherhood of jihadis known as the Afghan-Arabs, Azzam Brigades, Ansars, or al Qaeda had such success in grafting their macro notions of a global Caliphate to a micro-regional ethnic movement.

But for all the uniqueness surrounding the symbiotic nature of the internationalist jihad movement’s ties with the Taliban (which stemmed largely from the fact that the Taliban hosts were themselves a uniquely unrooted, non-Afghan madrassa-based movement), this was of course not the first time the global jihadis attempted to attach themselves to a local host. As will be demonstrated, prior to 1998, the year bin Laden established the appropriately named “World Islamic
Front,” the transnational jihad movement had attempted to establish jihad bases, *amirates* or *caliphates* in other frontline Muslim regions.

This chapter will follow the *mullah’s* “tour” along the threatened borders of the *Dar al Islam* with the aim of analyzing the jihadis’ basing successes and failures in these ethnic regions. This journey will have obvious implications for the assertion that if America disengages from Iraq it will become a bastion for macro-scale jihadi terrorism.²

But before one can truly understand the basing efforts of al Qaeda and other “fellow travelers” on the path of jihad, one must have background familiarity with the military state of Mohammad at Mecca, *Zengi* in Mosul, *Saladin* in Egypt, *Abdullah Azzam* in Peshawar, *bin Laden* in Jaji, *Amir Barbaros* in Zenica, *Amir Khattab* in Serzhen Yurt, and *Amir Zarqawi* in the Sunni Triangle. For the story of the jihadi commanders’ efforts to build a house of holy war is an unfolding story that begins in the deserts of Medieval Arabia and continues today in the wreckage of Baathist Iraq.

**DAR AL HARB (ABODE OF WAR): ORIGINS OF THE JIHAD STATE**

Islamic precedent tells jihadis that Mohammad the Prophet was not only a warrior, he was a state-builder and his holy works are to be imitated. When his community of followers was threatened, Mohammad, like bin Laden, went into exile to live with the *Ansars* (Supporters) in Medina. From his exile base, Mohammad built a military-state from which to overthrow the Qureish unbelievers who had exiled him from Mecca.

The idea of a tranethnic state devoted to jihad, however, comes from a later period in history, namely the crusades of the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. It was *Zengi* the *Atabeg* (Governor) of Mosul, Iraq, who first galvanized the faithful of all races for a countercrusade known as jihad. Zengi called upon Muslims of all ethnicities to set aside their differences and imitate the transnational crusading orders (such as the Templars and Knights Hospitaller) in waging holy war. His mission was taken up by his son Nureddin and finally achieved by his governor, *Saladin*. Leading an army of Arabs, Turks, Circassians, Egyptians, Sudanese, Kipchaks, and fellow Kurds, Saladin defeated the Crusaders at the Horns of Hattin in 1187. In so doing Saladin became the quintessential state-building warrior of God.

The paladins of the post-1980s international jihad movement also look with nostalgia to the era of the Umayyad and Abbasid Caliphates in Damascus and Baghdad for inspiration, for these Arab religio-military states expanded the frontiers of Islam. All subsequent Western-imposed borders in the post-Mandate modern Middle East are seen as deliberate efforts on the part of the Western (Christian) victors in World War I to divide the trans-ethnic *umma*. Narrow, territorial nationalisms of the sort espoused by Saddam Hussein, Yaser Arafat, Kemal Ataturk, and Gamal Nasser are seen as *bidhat* (religiously forbidden innovations).
The rejection of Western-inspired nationalism ("tribalism") that began in Hassan al Banna’s Egypt (1920s–1950s) with the founding of the transnational Muslim Brotherhood flew in the face of Nasserism and Arab nationalism. But it was not until the 1980s that Arabs, perennial losers on the battlefields of the Middle East, finally experienced success on the battlefield. Only on this occasion it was not under the narrow flag of Nasserism, Baathism, or Pan-Arabism, but in Afghanistan under the black standard of pan-Islamic jihadism.

ALLAH’S CITADEL: FORGING A BASE FOR THE AFGHAN–ARAB BROTHERHOOD

No individual was more influential in reviving the obligation of *jihad* than the Palestinian Sheikh, Abdullah Azzam. Salvation and victory, Azzam preached, lay in the forgotten *fard* (obligation) of Muslims to wage holy war to protect the *umma*. And Azzam ultimately called for the creation of an *amirate* (military state) in Afghanistan from which frontline fighters could defend endangered Muslim communities.

But Azzam’s project began in Pakistan. As scores of Arab jihad volunteers began to arrive in Peshawar, Pakistan, to fight the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan it was clear that Azzam needed to create some sort of structure to organize them. Thus was born the safe-house organization known as *Maktab al Khidamant* (the Services Office) that would institutionalize Islamic holy war and seek to create bases for its “jihad-relief” operations.

In my interviews, the followers of the legendary Afghan *mujahideen* leader Shah Massoud, spoke with contempt of the Arab jihad “tourists” such as Azzam and bin Laden. But this did not stop the foreign fighters, subsequently known as Afghan-Arabs, from developing grand plans for the lands of the Afghans. With the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989 the Afghan-Arabs called for the transformation of Afghanistan into a jihad state.

It was with the aim of fulfilling this territorial ambition that bin Laden subsequently founded an organization called *Al Qaeda al Jihad* which was to become a sort of *Jihad Internationale*. His initial aim was to transform post-communist Afghanistan into an Iranian-style base for the export of Sunni militancy (at a time when the United States still defined *Shiite* Islam as the main threat).

But as events were to demonstrate, the unity of purpose that kept the local Afghan *mujahideen* and Arab volunteers together frayed when the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989. This was to have a profoundly disruptive effect on the Afghan-Arabs’ basing efforts in Afghanistan and to set a pattern that would be duplicated in other “zones of jihad” from Bosnia to Iraq. For as history would show, the greatest threat to foreign jihadi basing plans was the indigenous Muslim populations of the lands the extremists settled in. Time and again the local Muslims found their marriage of convenience with the international jihad volunteers to be inconvenient the day their common “infidel” enemy departed.
SETBACK IN AFGHANISTAN: THE FAILURE OF THE AFGHAN PROJECT

While many Afghan-Arabs migrated from Afghanistan to other zones of holy combat, after 1989 a large portion stayed on in Afghanistan to continue the battle against the indigenous Afghan Communist government. Their dream was to make Afghanistan a “Caliphate” and springboard for spreading the Salafite-fundamentalist revolution across Eurasia.

Among the jihadis’ most implacable enemies in this grand basing project were the pro-Communist rapid reaction forces of the fierce Turko-Mongol Uzbek tribesmen of northern Afghanistan. Led by a bear-like commander named Rashid Dostum, the secular Uzbek militias fought off several mujahideen assaults and propped up President Najibullah’s Communist regime for three long years.

With the eventual fall of the Afghan Communist government in 1992, however, the Afghan-Arabs finally moved on Kabul to seize the capital and institute harsh shariah law. At this time there were reports of Afghan-Arabs entering the Afghan capital and attacking Shiite “heretics” (local Hazara tribesmen) and veil-less “Communist” Afghan women who lived there. In many ways the foreign, predominately Arab and Pakistani jihadis, attempted to force their Saudi-Wahhabism-Deobandism on the Sufi population of this comparatively urbane city.

Thankfully for the population of Kabul, the moderate Tajik-Persian mujahideen commander, Massoud the Lion of Panjsher, expelled the Islamist factions and their unruly Arab allies from the capital with General Dostum’s Uzbek help. With the defeat of their fundamentalist Afghan sponsor, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the basing ambitions of the Arab jihadis in Afghanistan were to be thwarted by local Afghans. That is until 1996 when the foreign extremists finally found a suitable Afghan-Pasthun host in the form of the fundamentalist-Deobandi Taliban from Pakistan.

FROM AFGHANISTAN TO KASHMIR: JIHAD IN THE MOUNTAINS

While the local Sufi Muslims of the Indian portion of the disputed Himalayan territory known as Jammu and Kashmir had been chaffing under Indian rule, the struggle for Kashmiri independence (Kashmiriyat) did not assume the aspect of full-blown religious war until the end of the Afghan conflict. With the expulsion of the Soviets from Afghanistan in 1989, thousands of Arab, Afghan, and Pakistani volunteer jihadis migrated to the Vale of Kashmir to defend the local Muslim Kashmiris from marauding Hindu jawans (security forces). This gave them an entry into a local Muslim society that was hardly known for its Islamic fanaticism.

In so doing the foreign jihadis revealed their underlying agenda for Kashmir which, like their macro ambitions for Afghanistan, was much greater in scope than
local Kashmiri objectives. According to an Indian intelligence source:

They (the jihadis) look upon Jammu and Kashmir as the gateway to India and repeatedly underline the “liberation” of J&K would be only the first stage of their jihad against India . . . and the final stage would be the “liberation” of the Muslims in the rest of India as a prelude to the formation of an Islamic Caliphate in South Asia.3

In the process of waging an increasingly bloody holy war against the “infidel-Indian occupiers of Kashmir,” the Kashmiri jihadi organizations, such as Lashkar e Toiba, sought to forcefully spread their alien form of Salafite-Islam among the easy-going Sufi Muslims of this region. The foreign jihadi groups in Kashmir also attempted to establish bases of operation that resembled bin Laden’s tunnel complex at Jaji and the more famous complex at Zawhar Kili in eastern Afghanistan.

But for all the short-term success the Pakistani-sponsored jihadi organizations achieved in Kashmir, many ordinary Kashmiris came to detest the foreign jihadi extremists. Jihadi actions, such as the forced closing of cinemas and throwing acid in the faces of local Kashmiri women who did not wear veils, created a well of resentment that the Indian military exploited. Local Kashmiri moderates were wooed away from the foreign jihadis and India backed up its local security forces by flooding the valley with troops and transforming Jammu and Kashmir into a militarized security zone. The Indian case demonstrates that an “infidel occupier” can use brute force to thwart the jihadis’ basing ambitions. But only if there is sufficient local resentment against the foreign extremists and unity of purpose with the “infidel occupying force.”

JIHAD IN BOSNIA: THE SEARCH FOR A EUROPEAN BASE OF OPERATIONS

It was in 1992 that a red-bearded jihadi field commander named Amir (Commander) Abul Azziz Barbaros led a reconnaissance unit to this European Muslim land that was a veritable terra incognita for most Afghan-Arabs.4 There he found Muslim Bosnian women being systematically abused in Orthodox Serbian rape camps, burnt mosques, mass graves filled with Bosnian Muslims, and Christian expulsion of Muslims from a land that had been Dar al Islam for 500 years. It was everything a jihadi foot soldier looked for in a potential holy war zone.

Amir Barbaros quickly began to organize the transfer of Afghan-Arab jihadi defenders to Bosnia where they were headquartered near the old Ottoman provincial capital of Travnik and the central Bosnian city of Zenica. These Arab fighters formed the fanatical Kaatebat al Mujahideen (Holy Warrior Brigade) which was used by the Bosnian 7th Army as a shock unit (in many ways a precursor of al Qaeda’s 055 International Brigade deployed by the Taliban). Serbian paramilitaries in the Bosna Srpska army soon came to fear this fanatical unit, which was known to engage in beheading, suicidal mass assaults, and Afghan-style guerrilla warfare.
But for all the fact that the Bosnian army appreciated the Afghan-Arabs’ bravery, they resented their efforts to purify Bosnian Sufi Islam and refusal to join the Bosnians’ tactical alliance with the Catholic Croats against the Orthodox Serbs. Once again the rift between moderate local Muslim populations and the foreign volunteers also stemmed from the fact that the jihadi fundamentalists had a greater agenda than simply helping local Muslims build a moderate mini-state. As the Amir of the Bosnian jihadi volunteers, Commander Barbaros, explained:

I have come out of Bosnia only to tell the Muslims that this time offers us a great opportunity... Allah has opened the way of jihad, we should not waste it... This is a great opportunity now to make Islam enter Europe via jihad. This can only be accomplished through jihad. If we stop the jihad now we will have lost this opportunity.5

Like the Kashmiris and Afghans before them, the secular Bosnians were unhappy about the prospect of bearded Salafite-Wahhabi fanatics transforming their country into “a staging area and safe haven for terrorists.”6 As Evan Kohlman states in his insightful work, “The friction between the (foreign) mujahideen and local Bosnian Muslim authorities underscored that there were still critical ideological, political, and strategic differences between the two loosely allied forces. In the end, the Bosnians were much less concerned with jihad than fighting for a just peace.”7 When the foreign jihadists began a policy of attacking Croat civilians and “infidel” UN peacekeepers, Bosnian military commanders even contemplated “purging” the “Arab guerrillas” to keep them in line.8

Clashes between the moderate Bosnian Muslims (whom I found to be nostalgic for their Communist leader Tito, enamored of plum brandy and soccer, and Europeanized on many levels), and the foreign jihadi extremists were headed off by NATO’s intervention in Bosnia in 1995. After the Serbs had been bombed to the negotiating table by NATO, peace was finally signed between the Bosnians, Croats, and Serbs in Dayton, Ohio in 1995.

As a result, the moderate Bosnian government of President Ilija Izetbegovic was finally free to build an ethnically “Muslim” state in the portion of Bosnia that had been granted to the Bosnians at Dayton. This was welcome news for the foreign fighters who had begun to plant roots among the local populations.

But far from creating a fundamentalist beachhead in Bosnia, the Afghan-Arabs were once again to be deprived of their dreamed-of base of operations. One of the stipulations of the Dayton Peace Accords called for the expulsion of all foreign fighters, a proviso the local Bosnian moderates were only too happy to implement.9 Thousands of Afghan-Arab fighters in Bosnia thus found themselves evicted from the very lands they had shed their blood to defend.

Not surprisingly, many of those Afghan-Arabs involved in the Bosnian jihad grew to resent the West and the Bosnian “hypocrites” for denying them the fruits of “their” victory. One claimed, “Look at the infidels. They are thinking of us and then they are laughing because they have their own state. But look at us, the Muslims, we do not even have a state yet but we continue to laugh!”10
The militant firebrand Imam Abu Hamza of London (the al Qaeda recruiter who recruited Zacharias Moussaoui, the twentieth 9/11 hijacker) and his followers also expressed their bitterness to me during my visit to the notorious Finnsbury Park Mosque.

“NATO intervened not to protect the Bosnians, whom they had allowed to be massacred to the point of extinction, but to destroy our efforts to build an Islamic state,” one of Hamza’s followers explained. I realized that the jihadi militants did not perceive NATO’s military intervention on behalf of the Bosnian Muslims (against Christian Orthodox Serbia) as a humanitarian gesture. Rather they saw it as an attack on Islam designed to deprive them of their amirate in Europe.

**THE JIHADIS ACHIEVE A VICTORY (OF SORTS) IN CHECHNYA**

Following their eviction from Bosnia, the Chechen highlanders’ historic struggle for independence from Christian Russia caught the attention of the pan-Islamic jihadi brotherhoods. Although the secessionist Chechen leadership of General Djohar Dudayev (an ex-Soviet air force general who had actually fought against the mujahideen and Afghan-Arabs in Afghanistan in the 1980s) was fighting for national self-determination, it had no qualms about playing the Islamic card to gain desperately needed foreign support.

This pragmatism on the part of the out-gunned Chechens gave the Arab jihadists an entry into Chechnya, a land of Russified Sufi Muslims who were more inclined to drink vodka than quote the Qur’an in Arabic. Many of the jihadi fighters who answered the call to wage holy war in Chechnya dreamed of building an Islamic state where they would not be persecuted. Ayman al Zawaheri, the number two in *Al Qaeda al Jihad*, for example, dreamed of turning the Muslim north Caucasus flank into “an Islamic republic in the Caucasus, from which they could wage jihad throughout Central Asia.”

While the conversion of Chechen secessionists into jihadis might have seemed far-fetched in light of the Caucasian highlanders’ moderate form of Sufi Islam and long experience with Sovietization, there were grounds for hope. Most notably, with the withdrawal of Russian forces from Chechnya in 1996, the most powerful Chechen field commander, Shamil Basayev, had expressed his desire to expel the Russians in their entirety from the Muslim Caucasus.

The story of the epic volunteer holy war of the jihadis in the Caucasus presents an interesting case study in jihadism’s ability to plant roots in areas where the right conditions prevail. The “Chechen jihad” began in the first Chechen War for independence (fought from 1994–96) when a Saudi Afghan-Arab named Amir Khattab led a reconnaissance unit to Chechnya to assist his “Muslim brothers” in their break away war with the Russian “infidels.” While few in number, Khattab’s wealthy Arabs soon impressed their scrappy Chechen comrades-in-arms with their ability to wage “holy war” against their former Soviet-Russian neighbors.

But this marriage between Shamil Basayev’s local Chechen fighters and foreign jihadis was resented by the vast majority of Chechens who were more an
example of *Homo Sovieticus* than *Homo Islamicus*.

As in Kashmir, Bosnia, and Afghanistan, the dreams of perpetual holy war on other people’s lands clashed with the indigenous Sufi population’s more limited aspirations. As in other “zones of jihad,” the local Muslims in Chechnya (who had jobs, families, homes, and dreams) found that jihadi professionals with visions of “martyrdom” made bad neighbors.

Former Chechen Foreign Minister Ilyas Akhmadov explained to me, “We would never have let the foreigners into our lands if the Russians had not attacked us; we were working for recognition from the West . . . not Saudi Arabia! When the West offered us no assistance, Khattab’s Arabs came to us and we eagerly accepted their help. When the (first) war was over (in 1996) we tried to expel him.”

But the Chechen moderate leadership was unable to evict Khattab and he was able to hatch his plans for creating a macro-Caliphate for all Caucasian Muslim ethnic groups. By 1997 Khattab and his local Chechen ally, Shamil Basayev, had begun to build jihad training camps at Serzhen Yurt in the inaccessible mountains of south-eastern Chechnya. As thousands of militants from throughout the Caucasus passed through these camps, the Chechen secular leadership fought to expel them with Russian help. But subsequent events would show that Russia was more interested in undermining Chechen independence than destroying Khattab’s terrorist bases.

Full-scale war between Khattab’s jihadists and the secular government of Chechnya, was actually headed off by the fateful return of Russian Federal forces in the fall of 1999. Russia used a provocative raid into the neighboring Russian province of Dagestan by Khattab and Basayev as a pretext to crush Chechnya’s short-lived independence. In so doing the Russian invaders played into Khattab’s hands and empowered jihadis in the region (the exact opposite of the Bosnian model). Russia’s brutal invasion drove the Chechen secular-moderates into a tactical alliance with their former jihadi enemies.

While the Russians destroyed Khattab’s mountain base, wider excesses of the Russian Federal forces (such as their *zachistki*—“cleansings” and “filtration centers” like the infamous Chernokozovo prison camp), served as recruitment drives for foreign extremists. With the help of foreign money, local jihad *cemaats* ("congregations" or "platoons") sprang up in the neighboring Russian-Muslim republics of Dagestan, Ingushetia, Karachai-Cherkasii, and Kabardino-Balkaria, to help the Chechens and foreign jihadis fight the Russians.

Many jihad insurgents in the Caucasus are now fighting not for a Chechen micro-state but for a transnational *Imamate* that will include all Muslim highlander groups. This can be seen as a clear cut victory for Khattab and Zawaheri’s macro state-building visions for the Caucasus. While the prediction that Chechnya will become “an Afghanistan on Europe’s doorstep” appears to be somewhat exaggerated (due to the fact the Chechens and other highlander Muslims have not engaged in al Qaeda-style terrorism against the West), the fact that Khattab’s jihad has
spread across the ex-Soviet north Caucasus flank points out the pitfalls of fighting terrorism through military means.\textsuperscript{14}

\textbf{THE TALIBAN AMIRATE OF AFGHANISTAN}

In 1996 the Saudi exile Osama bin Laden found himself under pressure to quit his sanctuary in Hassan al Turabi’s Sudan. One of bin Laden’s aids ascribes Turabi’s decision to expel bin Laden from Sudan to the latter’s unsettling macro-agenda. He states, “Maybe he (Turabi) was afraid Sheikh Osama would take over the leadership of Sudan someday in the future, at his own expense, especially because bin Laden was at that point looking at Sudan as the backbone of the international Islamic movement, as an important extension of the Islamic movement in the Horn of Africa and East Africa in general.”\textsuperscript{15}

Bin Laden’s search for a base was to be temporary, however, for al Qaeda’s \textit{Amir soon} thereafter returned to Afghanistan. Bin Laden settled in Afghanistan at a most fortuitous juncture in history. As he returned to his old jihad stomping grounds, the Taliban was sweeping through the land crushing the very Afghan ethnic \textit{mujahideen} commanders who had deprived al Qaeda of its base back in 1992.

As the Taliban overwhelmed three-fourths of Afghanistan, bin Laden made a tactical alliance with this Deobandi fundamentalist movement. But bin Laden’s agenda far exceeded the local ambitions of his largely illiterate Taliban hosts (who were Pashtun tribesmen). In bin Laden’s master plan, Afghanistan would serve as a launching pad for a Eurasian war of conquest that would sweep through the weak ex-Soviet republics of Central Asia and into Russia.\textsuperscript{16}

As bin Laden set about building his training camp archipelago in eastern Afghanistan, the Taliban Amirate became the “Bekka Valley” of Sunni Islamic extremists. According to James Dunnigan:

\ldots for seven years, al Qaeda had a place to set up shop. This included training camps, support activities and a safe place for terrorists to rest up between missions. The support activities included a forged document operation that had a store front outlet, in plain sight\ldots Bin Laden understood how effective a base was to the success of a world wide terrorism campaign against the West.\textsuperscript{17}

And bin Laden worked to protect and secure his Afghan investment as he had previously done in northern Sudan. This meant involving himself in the Taliban’s struggle to overcome Dostum’s Uzbeks and Massoud’s Tajiks in the north of Afghanistan. By 1998 bin Laden had organized an Islamic Foreign Legion made up of jihadis from across the globe to provide a military backbone for the Pashtun-Taliban. The local Taliban appreciated his contributions and the al Qaeda 055 “Ansar” (international “Supporter”) fighters increasingly formed the cutting edge of the Taliban sword.
At this time al Qaeda was granted control over training camps such as Darunta, Khalbani, Farouq, Tarnak Farms, and Ansar in eastern Afghanistan to support extremist groups like the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and Harkat ul Mujahideen.

In the process, bin Laden succeeded in gaining a degree of influence over the local Muslims that had never been achieved by other jihadi organizations in Indian Kashmir, Bosnia, or Chechnya. By 2000 the Taliban’s reclusive leader, Mullah Omar, increasingly listened to bin Laden’s counsel on such issues as the need to extend the Taliban revolution to other lands. The al Qaeda “parasite” was increasingly controlling the actions of its “host.” Far from being a “state sponsor of terrorism” the Taliban had become a state sponsored by terrorism.

Thus for the first time a local Muslim movement began to view the world through the internationalist lenses of jihadism. By 2000 the Taliban were openly offering moral support to the Chechen resistance, sponsoring IMU raids into Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, running training camps for Kashmiri jihadi groups, and providing al Qaeda with further facilities despite the international outcry.

But not all Pashtun-Talibs accepted al Qaeda’s growing influence. Many moderates in the Taliban Shura (Council) decried the “Arabization” over their movement. While the foreigners “were men with a vision that didn’t recognize borders but sought to unite all Muslim countries under the banner of radical Islam” the Pashtun Taliban’s agenda was originally more localized. Many Talibs wanted to return to these Afghan roots.

One moderate Taliban mullah expressed the more limited objectives of many Taliban when he proclaimed, “The Pakistanis and the Arabs built mosques, talked about all Muslims everywhere coming together. It wasn’t Afghanistan anymore. My thinking was that they would destroy my country.” And even some Taliban hawks, “advocated the mass expulsion of Afghan Arabs who had become a local and international liability.”

But the efforts to expel bin Laden from Mullah Omar’s inner circle were in vain, for the Saudi exile’s hold on the “Commander of the Faithful” had become too firm. With the conquest of Massoud’s Northern Alliance capital in 2000 by Taliban troops whose core was made up of hardened al Qaeda 055 fighters, bin Laden’s influence soared to new heights. It is difficult to predict whether the Taliban would have been further subsumed into bin Laden’s global al Qaeda project or whether he would have eventually been expelled. By 9/11 the point was mute for, by attacking the USA, bin Laden provided the Northern Alliance opposition and Pashtun dissidents with a superpower sponsor to help it rid Afghanistan of both al Qaeda and its Taliban host.

OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM: THE DESTRUCTION OF BIN LADEN’S BASE

By October 2001 the Americans had arrived on the ground in Afghanistan in the form of U.S. Army Green Beret A-Teams and CIA paramilitaries to support
the opposition Northern Alliance ethnic elements. The elite U.S. fighters were to exploit America’s greatest asset in Afghanistan, the unbridled hatred Dostum’s Taliban-killing Uzbek horsemen felt for their al Qaeda foes. In so doing, the American A-Teams and their proxy “hoofs on the ground” allies would bring down the Taliban regime while leaving a minimal U.S. “footprint.”

In 2003 and 2005 I lived with the Northern Alliance Uzbek warlord General Dostum. Over the course of several weeks I coaxed from him the story of his spectacular horse-mounted military campaign against the Taliban.

Dostum recalled, “When we heard about the attacks on the USA we knew the Americans would finally come to help us rid the land of the foreign filth who’d tried making our lands their own. For us it was a long awaited opportunity to fight alongside Americans to free our country from the terrorists.”

Riding alongside a twelve man American special forces team led by Captain Mark Nutsch and two CIA officers (David Tyson and RJ aka “Baba Jan”), General Dostum’s riders poured out of the Hindu Kush and attacked Taliban-occupied Mazar i Sharif on November 9, 2001. With close air support rendered by the American air forces, Dostum’s cavalry took this vital city and the unstable Taliban house of cards began to crumble. By the following week the Taliban were on the run across the country and the glorious “Caliphate” envisioned by bin Laden was no more. With the destruction of his bases and killing of his military chief (Muhammed Atef, aka “Abu Hafs”) and hundreds of his 055 Ansar fighters, bin Laden had been deprived of his state-within-a-state in just over a month of fighting.

In seeking to explain the underlying reasons for bin Laden’s stunning reversal, Oliver Roy writes, “The international agenda of bin Laden simply had no appeal in Afghanistan. He probably did not expect the sudden collapse of his Taliban allies or the thirst for revenge of the non-Pashtuns, for ethnic issues were always downplayed by bin Laden, who renounced his ethnic and national background to fight for a universalistic cause.”

As events would later demonstrate, even the Pashtuns (that is the ethnic group that made up the Taliban) had also become dissatisfied with the arrogant foreign fighters in their lands. Thousands of them would defect to the Northern Alliance or join Karzai’s “Southern Alliance” to wipe out the foreign jihadis who had lorded it over them for so long.

And bin Laden’s al Qaeda was not the only jihad group to suffer serious disruption in the following months. By the end of 2002 the international jihad movement’s fortunes had sunk to its lowest point. In Chechnya, the Russians “martyred” the jihadi Amir Khattab and disrupted his “Chechen-Arab” network; in Pakistan President Musharraf closed the jihadi bases in Pakistani Kashmir and began to clamp down on the Inter-Services Intelligence and the Kashmiri jihad groups it had sponsored; in Afghanistan IMU leader Juma Namangani was killed in a U.S. air strike and his jihad fighters scattered; in the distant Philippines the extremist Abu Sayyaf jihad group lost its bases in Mindanao and Basilan to U.S.-backed Philippine forces; and across Eurasia from Yemen to Inner China the transnational jihadis were put on the defensive.
By the end of 2002 George Bush was able to triumphantly welcome the new president of Afghanistan, Hamid Karzai, to Washington and to lay the foundation for the implementation of a fateful military campaign code-named Operation Iraqi Freedom.

It was this U.S.-led military campaign to remove the Baathist dictator of Iraq that would boost jihadism’s flagging fortunes. For the unexpected destruction of their secular-nationalist enemy, Saddam Hussein, was to give the jihadi fundamentalists the opportunity to move from the periphery of the Dar al Islam to its symbolic heart, Baghdad.

**BAGHDAD: JIHADISM RESURGENT**

As the U.S.-led Coalition invaded Afghanistan in 2001 a Jordanian-Palestinian jihadi commander who went by the laqab (nom de guerre) of Abu Musab Zarqawi evacuated his independent Jund al Sham (Army of the Levant) group from Herat, Afghanistan to a lawless enclave in Iraqi Kurdistan near the town of Halabja.23 This area, which lay beyond Hussein’s reach in the autonomous Kurdish north, was controlled by a Taliban-style Kurdish extremist group known as Ansar al Islam. This jihadi group sought to overthrow Saddam Hussein’s “secular apostate” regime.

Ansar al Islam’s agenda was universalistic and its leader, Mullah Krekar, claimed, “Ansar al Islam is neither regional nor ethnic. It is based on the laws of Islam and is preparing jihad. Its goal is the return of the Caliphate.”24 As such, Mullah Krekar was more than willing to offer sanctuary to Zarqawi’s band of jihadi refugees when they began to be arrested by Hussein’s security forces in 2001–2002.

Zarqawi’s group might have subsequently been confined to the periphery of the Arab world waging a lonely jihad against the local infidel nationalists (i.e., the Peshmerga Kurdish parties and Hussein’s Baathist regime) had the Americans not done part of their work for them by toppling Hussein in April 2003.

As the Sunni-dominated Baathist Party was atomized by the U.S.-led Coalition, Iraqi Sunnis in conservative tribal towns such as Baquba, Samarra, Ramadi, and Fallujah, united with ex-Baathist “Saddam Fedayeen” to wage guerilla war against the invaders.

This provided Zarqawi, whose bases in the Kurdish Ansar al Islam enclave in the north were destroyed, with an unexpected entry into the heart of secular-Baathist Iraq, the Sunni Triangle. With funding from the same Wahhabi-Salafite charities that had sponsored Khattab, Barbaros, and bin Laden before him, Zarqawi began to draw foreign recruits from such places as Kuwait (!), Saudi Arabia, Syria, Jordan, Turkey, and Lebanon to wage a jihad against the U.S.-led Coalition in Iraq.

By 2004 Zarqawi’s men had also found a new base for their operations in the Sunni stronghold of Fallujah. When the U.S. Marines subsequently took Fallujah after a bloody siege, Zarqawi’s fighter-terrorists scattered throughout the towns of
the Sunni Triangle and western Anbar Province. There they began to extend their influence over the local Sunni insurgents much as Khattab had in Chechnya.

As in Russian-occupied Chechnya, resistance to the U.S.-led occupation gradually came to be defined as a “jihad,” not a war of national liberation. This provided Zarqawi with what bin Laden called “his Golden Opportunity.” The “jihadification” of the Iraqi resistance meant that many ex-Baathist security formations (such as the “Special Republican Guard” or the “1920 Revolution Brigade”) began to cooperate with Zarqawi’s fundamentalist fighters.\(^{25}\) One U.S. counterterrorism officer described the increasingly radical resistance that appeared in Iraq at this time as “an insurgency hijacked by a terrorist campaign.”\(^{26}\)

By the spring of 2005, Zarqawi’s influence in central Iraq reached new heights. In the process his jihadis took control of cities on the Syrian border, such as Tal Afar, in order to open the jihad route for volunteers from the Levant. His fighters also symbolically staked their claim to Hussein’s former capital of Baghdad by lining its main streets with black jihad banners on one occasion. Most alarmingly Zarqawi demonstrated his wider ambitions by striking at U.S. targets in Jordan via a series of bombing of American-owned hotels.

As with many other jihadi exiles Zarqawi was committed to striking at his own country. Zarqawi’s lack of attachment to the narrow \textit{watan} (his “homeland” of Jordan) resembled that of other members of the jihadi brotherhood who renounced their citizenship in the places of their birth. In many cases the only residual linkage a jihadi has to his home place is his \textit{laqab} as seen in such jihadi figures as Abu Hafs “Al Urdani” (the Jordanian), Seif ed Din “Al Turki” (The Turk), Abu Faraj “Al Libi” (The Libyan) Azzam “Al Amriki” (Adam Ghadan the American), or Abu Musab “Al Zarqawi” (the Man from the town of Zarqa).

The sense of disconnect with his natal land and extra-territoriality demonstrated by Zarqawi is certainly a hallmark of the larger jihad movement and it was not surprising that he targeted his former “countrymen.” It was clear that Zarqawi intended to use his safe haven in Iraq as a springboard not just for dismantling secular Iraq, but destroying neighboring “infidel-imposed apostate” states including his former homeland of Jordan.

At this time Zarqawi’s jihad group, initially known as \textit{Tawhid wal Jihad} (Unity and Holy War), belatedly declared its allegiance to bin Laden’s al Qaeda and renamed itself “Al Qa’ida in Mesopotamia.” Ironically the White House’s 2002 warnings that Baathist Iraq harbored al Qaeda had by this time become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Iraq was now clearly a full-blown jihad incubator that gave extremists from all the surrounding lands “hands on” training on how to kill thousands of Americans with IEDs, car bombs, and sniper rifles. Porter Goss, the Bush-appointed head of the CIA, presciently warned that “Those jihadists who survive will leave Iraq experienced and focused on acts of urban terrorism. They represent a potential pool of contacts to build transnational terrorist cells.”\(^{27}\)

But for all the fact that Zarqawi had achieved stunning success in galvanizing jihad in secular-Baathist Iraq and the surrounding regions, he faced the
same problems with the locals in Iraq that had bedeviled his jihadi counterparts in Sudan, Chechnya, Afghanistan, Kashmir, and Bosnia. This stemmed in part from the fact that the vast majority of the Iraqi insurgents/terrorists thought locally and acted locally. This was best demonstrated by the fact that many of the insurgents still fought under the Iraqi flag not the black international jihad standard.

There is nothing unusual in this localism. In his analysis of the motivations behind terrorism, Robert Pape points out that “What motivates them (terrorists) primarily is independent, local issues. At its core its is about political control of territory.” According to this source a full 95 percent of terrorist acts are “motivated by the presence of foreign combat troops.” In the Iraqi theater of operations most jihadi groups are motivated by the objective of expelling the latest crop of “foreign invaders of the Iraqi homeland” not attacking the West.

Zarqawi by contrast announced, “I am global and no land is my country.” He was actually at war with the very idea of narrow secular Iraqi nationalism of the sort espoused by most ex-Baathist insurgents. Zarqawi even launched a terror campaign against Iraqi Shiites with the aim of destroying any hopes for a unified Iraqi opposition to the United States on Arab nationalist grounds.

Examples of tension between Zarqawi’s foreign terrorists and the locals, not surprisingly, soon began to emerge, even in Fallujah. One report claimed, “People in Fallujah, known as the city of mosques, have chafed at the stern brand of Islam that the newcomers brought with them. The non-Iraqi Arabs berated women who did not cover themselves head-to-toe in black—very rare in Iraq—and violently opposed local customs rooted in the town’s more mystical (Sufi) religious tradition. One Fallujah (Sufi) man killed a Kuwaiti because he said could not pray at the grave of an ancestor (in Sufi fashion).”

When the Americans and Iraqi Army retook the Syrian border town of Tal Afar from Zarqawi’s fighters in 2005 the villagers thanked them and spoke of a reign of terror by the foreign jihadi fundamentalists. Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar Province formed the Anbar Salvation Council and fought back against Zarqawi’s jihadis when they executed members of their clan for “collaboration” with the American “infidels.” On several occasions Iraqi Sunni insurgents also guarded voting stations against al Qaeda attacks so that Sunnis could safely participate in elections.

The divisions between Zarqawi’s jihadi extremists (the majority of whom subscribe to the universalistic Wahhabi or Salafite creeds) and the local insurgents were exploited to their fullest in June 2006 by U.S. intelligence services. With the help of Baathist insurgents who had become increasingly disenchanted with Zarqawi’s viciousness and undermining of Sunni tribal authority, the Americans were able to pin-point his position and kill him.

It remains to be seen how successful “Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia’s” Amir has been in co-opting local Iraqi Sunni extremists to his international vision. But one suspects that his hate-filled global message will have little resonance with most local Sunni insurgents. As Kenneth Pollack aptly put it, “the vast majority of the
(Iraqi) population doesn’t like Al Qaeda in the country and even the Sunnis aren’t thrilled with them.”

If history is any indicator, the Iraqi people (specifically the Sunni portion that utilized Zarqawi then betrayed him) will have a say in whether or not their lands are transformed into a global base for jihadi terrorism. History would also indicate that the comparatively secularized Iraqis will similarly reject plans for turning their homeland into a Wahhabi-dominated jihad “Caliphate” of the sort espoused by the “Islamic State of Iraq,” a foreign insurgent group tied to al Qaeda.

While it is difficult to predict the future for jihadi basing projects in the Sunni Triangle, the examples from other “zones of jihad” offer some useful precedents. History tells us that:

(A) The longer foreign jihadis fight shoulder to shoulder with regional Muslim fighters against a common enemy the deeper the inroads they make into the local political-religious-military culture (i.e., convergence of interest of the sort seen in the North Caucasus, Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and in the recent borrowing of al Qaeda tactics and rhetoric by Iraqi extremists in Ansar al Sunnah).

Furthermore, the bad public relations that inevitably comes from waging war against local Muslims (i.e., human rights catastrophes like Haditha, Abu Ghraib, the Russian filtration camp at Chernokzovo, and the massacre of Bosnian Muslims at Srebrenica) become recruitment bonanzas for jihadi terrorists.

(B) When “infidel” occupations come to an end, the overlooked differences between foreign Salafite-jihadis and local Muslims (such as their macro- or micro-state building goals or local Sufism as opposed to Wahhabi universalism), however, become more obvious. The common enemy brings together strange bed fellows. Remove that “infidel” enemy and the unity between the foreign extremists and locals frays.

While some Iraqi extremists may be expected to expand their vision and partake in global terrorism against the “Distant Enemy” (the West), history would indicate that dire predictions that Iraq will automatically become a base of global terrorist strikes on the American mainland if the U.S. withdraws from Iraq seem to be overblown. This is in part due to the fact that Kurdish leaders, such as Talabani and Barzani, and Iraqi Shiite leaders, such as Moqtada al Sadr and Ayatollah Sistani, will certainly prevent their lands from being used by their Sunnis al Qaeda enemies.

But it also stems from the fact that xenophobic Sunni tribal leaders in Anbar province, ex-Baathists, and Iraqi nationalists can also be expected to move against the Salafite-Wahhabi outsiders should the Americans withdraw their forces. It is therefore hardly a forgone conclusion that the foreign fighters (who represent no more than 5–10% of the Iraqi insurgents) will be successful in subsuming the regional aspirations of the local Iraqi Sunnis into their global basing project.
But the Chechen example would seem to indicate that a prolonged U.S. occupation runs the risk of facilitating the aim of the jihadis by transforming local POI insurgents (i.e., in U.S. Army terms, “Pissed Off Iraqis”) into globe-trotting al Qaeda terrorists. The secret to winning the war against the global terrorists in Iraq lies in recognizing the “cost-benefit” tipping point. That is the point where military operations cease to be a successful means for preventing Iraq from becoming a terrorist-safe haven and instead become a call for action for would-be-jihadis and arm-chair terrorists.

As for AQI, the first generation of bin Laden’s al Qaeda jihadists, the mounting differences between the Taliban and “Araban” (Arab fighters) that emerged prior to 9/11 appear to have been glossed over by their common goal of regaining power in Afghanistan. The two movements have merged into one terrorist-insurgent movement based in Waziristan, Pakistan.

Although hundreds of foreign Ansar and al Qaeda fighters were killed in Operation Enduring Freedom, many more evaded Coalition forces and escaped over the mountains at Tora Bora and Shah i Kot into Pakistan’s untamed Pashtun tribal agencies. While those who ended up in Pakistan’s cities soon found themselves compromised, those jihadis in the uncontrollable Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered Tribal Agencies found safe haven among the local Pashtuns.

According to one source, “Local pro-Taliban tribes arranged for their accommodation. Within a few months, these foreign fighters not only received residential status in the tribal areas, but in places such as South Waziristan they established proper bases to not only fight in Afghanistan but also to restore their communications for global operations. By mid-2002, displaced foreigners had largely revived themselves and were ready for global operations.”

Al Qaeda’s surviving leadership thus appear to have taken advantage of the Pashtuns’ tradition of melmastia (duty to protect guests) to establish a fall-back sanctuary in the tribal agencies of Pakistan. By 2006 AQ had regained much of its operational capabilities in the so-called “Taliban State of Waziristan.”

The increasingly radicalized “die-hard Talibs” in Pakistan have recommenced a guerilla war against Karzai in the south Afghan-Pashtun provinces of Uruzgan, Kandahar, and Helmand. By 2005 it was apparent that the foreign AQ jihadis were adding a terrorist element to this mounting insurgency (as best demonstrated by the rising use of Iraqi-style suicide bombers).

While Pakistani security forces launched full-scale invasions of Taliban-AQ bases in Waziristan in an effort to flush out the foreign fighters, they ended their campaign in September 2006 and declared a truce. Most tellingly, al Qaeda’s top leaders, Ayman al Zawaheri and bin Laden, feel comfortable enough in their new sanctuary on the Pak-Afghan border to issue death threats against both Karzai and Musharraf. While bin Laden has lost much of his infrastructure and followers in the destruction of his Afghan base, he continues to play an important role as “chief incitor” for homegrown terrorism from New Delhi to London.
But for all his success in avoiding capture and instigating global terrorism, it is clear that bin Laden has been somewhat relegated to the role of jihadi icon by the United States-Pakistani counterterrorism campaign. Bin Laden is clearly living on the periphery of the main struggle. As important as the mounting Taliban insurgency in southeastern Afghanistan is, the great “clash of civilizations” that bin Laden planned for Afghanistan is, ironically enough, now playing out in the failed state of Iraq. The real front line of the global jihad is no longer to be found on the frontiers among such obscure ethnic groups as the Pashtuns, Chechens, Kashmiris, and Bosniaks, but in the streets of such Iraqi towns as Mosul, Baquba, Ramadi, Samarra, Fallujah, and Baghdad.

And thus the jihadists’ battle for an *Al Qaeda al Jihad*, a Base for Holy War, goes on. And it will continue for as long as the Muslim world continues to produce roaming warrior-terrorists who believe that carving out shariah-states with Kalashnikovs is God’s will. Or until those Muslims who have always opposed them let the jihadi extremists know that building grim, Taliban-style theocracies on their lands hardly represents their Islamic beliefs or political aspirations.
As you know the jihad started without planning or coordination... each member of the movement is fanatically attached to his tribe... There is no true desire in the leadership... [There is] lack of secrecy in the movement in managerial and military issues... Leave it, it is rotten Tribalism.

—Translation of report by Omar Taj al Bin abd Allah, “Abu Belal” to al Qaeda leadership, on the state of Somalia’s Islamist movement, circa 1992, Harmony Project, AFGP-2002-800640

Kenya is not a good place... the cost of living is high, plus corruption is dangerously prevalent—there is theft, house break-ins, no political stability, and it is possible there will be an explosion in the country.

—Translation of al Qaeda report, circa 1993, Harmony Project, AFGP-2002-800597

To what extent do “ungoverned spaces” facilitate the activities of international terrorist organizations? And which particular terrorist activities are more or less likely to flourish in zones of state collapse or state weakness?

The general link between failed states and transnational terrorist networks has been invoked repeatedly since 9/11. “Illicit transnational networks, particularly terrorist and criminal groups, target weak and failed states for their activities,” concludes the Report of the Commission on Weak States and U.S. National Security.¹ The 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States notes as well that “weak states, like Afghanistan, can pose as great a danger to our national interests as strong states...” [P]overty, weak institutions, and corruption can make weak states
vulnerable to terrorist networks and drug cartels within their borders.”2 The link between state failure and terrorist threats has been seized upon by multilateral and bilateral aid agencies to promote greater levels of funding for capacity-building and state-building in “fragile states,” which, according to the latest count by the World Bank, now number twenty-six—sixteen of which are in Africa.3

The challenge to analysts and policymakers is to push beyond the obvious bromides about the dangers of ungoverned spaces and assess more specifically what kinds of dangers they do and do not pose, and under what specific conditions of state failure. To that end, this chapter reviews publicly available evidence on the activities of terrorist networks in the Horn of Africa, a region which by most accounts features both the largest and most diverse array of ungoverned space in Sub-Saharan Africa.4 It is based on several sources of information: fieldwork conducted between 1998 and 2006 by the author in Somalia, Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, and Eritrea; review of secondary sources; and newly available, declassified primary documentation on al Qaeda activities in Africa, made available via the U.S. government’s Harmony Project.5 The study catalogs the variety of “ungoverned spaces” in the Horn of Africa; discusses the key security and governance features of areas beyond effective government authority; inventories different types of terrorist activities; maps known terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa; identifies patterns of terrorist activities in specific types of ungoverned spaces; and assesses the significance of those patterns and their implications for ungoverned spaces in southern Africa. It concludes that the most ungoverned spaces—zones of complete state collapse—are only suited for a limited number of terrorist activities. Many other terrorist activities appear better able to thrive in a weak or compromised state setting. Terrorist cells will seek to mix and match the opportunities afforded by different governance settings within a region to maximize their likelihood of success and minimize the risk of detection and betrayal.

UNGOVERNED SPACES

“Ungoverned space” is a term meant to connote a general condition of weak to nonexistent state authority in a defined geographic area. It is a relatively recent addition to the lexicon of the study of failed states, and like other terms used in that field of research it is imprecise and value-laden. The fact that it is an expression preferred by the U.S. Department of Defense adds to the baggage the term carries; some critics of U.S. foreign policy see it as an attempt to justify unilateral counterterrorist actions in weak or failed states. Use of the term in this study is simply intended to describe a particular range of political conditions. As such, it describes a political condition along a spectrum which includes complete state collapse; intermittent, predatory state presence, usually in the form of a garrison state; partial state collapse, wherein a state authority exists but has no writ in certain regions within its territory; and weak or failed states, which maintain only a cosmetic and ineffective presence in frontier zones or large urban slums.
Constraints and Opportunities in Ungoverned Spaces

that are essentially beyond the control of government authorities. Theresa Whelan makes the distinction between physical ungoverned spaces—those hinterlands beyond the effective reach of a weak state and “nonphysical” ungoverned spaces, domains within a state where the government is unable or unwilling to exercise authority. These distinctions matter a great deal, as they present very different local operating environments for potential criminal and terrorist activities.

All of these variations on state failure can be found in the Horn of Africa. South-central Somalia has been a zone of complete state collapse for most of the past sixteen years. Most of southern Sudan, portions of northern Uganda, and the easternmost region of Somaliland have all been beyond the authority of governments which claim jurisdiction over them; northern frontier regions of Kenya and the Karamoja areas of eastern Uganda enjoy only a weak and in some cases nominal presence of government authorities; neighborhoods in the large urban areas of Nairobi and Mombasa in Kenya are also beyond the reach of effective government policing; and peripheral regions of Ethiopia and Sudan exemplify the garrison state presence.

In all of these areas, state presence is, in varying combinations, weak, sporadic, predatory, and/or ineffective. Such conditions often correspond to chronic levels of local insecurity, including armed criminality, communal clashes, and warlordism. Remote border areas are especially susceptible to this condition of “not peace not war” as locals often describe it. The ubiquitous presence of inexpensive semiautomatic weapons through the Horn of Africa renders insecurity much more lethal than in the past. New pressures on populations—resource scarcity, government use of paramilitaries, commercialized cattle raiding, political manipulation of ethnic tensions, refugee flows—all combine to increase the likelihood that ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa are exceptionally prone to armed violence.

Not surprisingly, ungoverned spaces in the Horn of Africa have been sites of chronic humanitarian emergencies and widespread displacement, and hence the target of long-running international relief operations. International NGOs and UN specialized agencies often confront in these complex emergencies high levels of insecurity and enormous logistical and operational problems. Somalia and Sudan in particular have constituted among the most expensive humanitarian operations in the world, due to the complex security and logistical problems they present. And security for relief agencies is poor. Relief aid and employment is often a major resource over which local militias and factions fight; aid agencies often unwittingly become captive to a particular ethnic group or faction, and risk being target by rival groups; extortion and kidnapping are at times serious threats; and logistics and security issues dominate both time and budgets. In short, many humanitarian crises in ungoverned areas are labeled “nonpermissive environments” by aid agencies.

Governance in Ungoverned Spaces

But ungoverned spaces are not anarchic, and in this sense the term “ungoverned spaces” is misleading. Even zones of complete state collapse like
south-central Somalia feature a variety of local arrangements and systems of “government with a small g.” These local security and governance systems typically involve hybrid arrangements drawing on a combination of traditional authorities and customary law, civic and religious groups, business interests, neighborhood watch groups, private security forces (of business groups), and tribal self-defense units. These local systems of governance are overlapping, fluid, fragile, and vulnerable to spoilers, and generally illiberal, but they do provide a measure of security, predictability, and rule of law in the absence of state authority.

Where governments in the Horn of Africa maintain a physical presence but are weak, we have seen the rise of “mediated state arrangements” in northern Kenya and southern Sudan. There, provincial state authorities have at times ceded authority to either traditional authorities (as with the Government of South Sudan’s decentralization of Boma court jurisdiction to tribal chiefs) or hybrid community governance structures, such as the “peace and development committees” which have done much to improve public security in northern Kenya.

Regional governments and international aid agencies in the fields of peacebuilding and rule of law are only beginning to systematically examine the possibilities of working with these local governance systems in areas where the formal state is at least temporarily unable or unwilling to function effectively. Local governance systems have proven relatively effective at conflict management and at dispensing justice on disputes which easily lend themselves to applications of customary law. It is much less clear whether these local governance and security arrangements, which are generally ad hoc coping mechanisms by local communities facing often new and overwhelming security threats, have a role to play in monitoring or discouraging activities of transnational criminal and terrorist groups seeking to exploit ungoverned spaces. In the Horn of Africa, the United States has resorted to forging relations with militia leaders in Somalia in hopes they will serve as eyes and ears against al Qaeda activities, while regional states routinely use tribal paramilitaries (or self-defense forces) to extend their capacity to monitor zones beyond their direct control. Tribal elders are also on government payrolls across the Horn of Africa and are at times expected to report on suspicious activities, though their capacity to do so is often limited. Generally, civic groups and leaders are much more likely to report suspicious behavior to state authorities when state–society relations enjoy at least some degree of trust and legitimacy. Where local communities view the state as a threat or an enemy, foreign terrorist activity is much more likely to go unreported by local communities.

**TERRORIST ACTIVITIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA**

The following inventory of recent, publicly documented cases of terrorist activity in the Horn of Africa since the early 1990s includes only activities of al Qaeda or radical Islamist groups believed to have some link to al Qaeda. Ethnic and other non-Islamist insurgencies which are considered terrorist organizations by
the governments they attack—such as the Lord’s Resistance Army (Uganda), the Oromo Liberation Front (Ethiopia), and the Ogaden National Liberation Front (Ethiopia)—are not considered in this study, though it should be stressed that in many parts of Africa domestic insurgency movements using terrorist tactics are a greater concern to African governments than is the threat of international terrorism (which mainly targets Western and U.S. interests in the region). In practice, this means coverage of the activities of foreign and local al Qaeda operatives; the jihadist cells in the now-dormant Somali Islamist group Al-Ittihad al-Islamiyya (AIAI); the jihadist shabaab militia in the now-dissolved Union of Islamic Courts (UIC), including both Somalis and foreign mujahideen; Eritrean Islamic Jihad (EIJ); the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Oromia (Ethiopia); Takfîr wal-Hijra (Sudan); Gamaa Islamiya (Egyptian, but based in Sudan); and the Government of Sudan itself from roughly 1991 to 2001 (the only instance of state-sponsored terrorism in the Horn).10

**Terrorist Attacks**

Since 1991, no other region of Sub-Saharan Africa has been the site of as many international terrorist attacks and attempted acts of terrorism as has the Horn of Africa. These attacks include the 1998 US embassy bombings in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, by al Qaeda operatives; the Paradise Hotel bombing in Mombasa in December 2002 by al Qaeda-affiliated operatives; the attempted downing of a chartered Israeli tourist plane in Mombasa in December 2002 by al Qaeda-affiliated operatives;11 and the series of bombings of government buildings and transportation infrastructure in Ethiopia in the mid-1990s by the Somali group Al–Ittihad al-Islamiyya.12 The embassy bombings were part of a carefully planned reconnaissance by an East African al Qaeda cell initiated as early as 1993.13 Fazul Abdulla Mohammed, a Comorean with Kenyan travel documents, headed this cell, while a Kenyan, Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan, headed the Mombasa cell which planned the Paradise Hotel attack and the surface-to-air missile firing on the Israeli charter flight. The planning and reconnoitering for the Nairobi embassy bombing attacks was done in Kenya, with two Islamic charities, Help Africa People and Mercy International Relief Agency, used to front the terrorist activities.14 The two embassy bombings resulted in 225 dead and 4,000 wounded, the vast majority of whom were Kenyans and Tanzanians. Measured in human lives, these were the worst terrorist incidents on the continent on record.

In addition, a number of planned terrorist attacks in the region have been preempted. For instance, an al Qaeda plot to bomb the U.S. Embassy in Kampala, Uganda, was thwarted in September 1998, only a month after the Nairobi and Dar es Salaam embassy bombings.15 A plot to fly a light aircraft from Somalia into the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi in 2004 was uncovered, leading to a temporary ban on all flights between Kenya and Somalia. Security alert warnings of plans by the Fazul cell to launch a missile attack at aircraft leaving Nairobi’s Kenyatta airport in May
2003 led to suspension of British Air flights to Kenya. That same year, Kenyan and American intelligence picked up “chatter” that led to the discovery of a safe house in Mombasa where five antitank weapons were stored, apparently intended for use against soft targets along the coast. In September 2005, a plot to bomb polling stations in an effort to sabotage elections in Somaliland was uncovered days before the elections were held, and Somalis linked to jihadist cells based in Mogadishu were charged and convicted.

Al Qaeda leadership also expressed intent to target American peacekeeping forces deployed to Somalia in 1993, sending several missions into the country to investigate possibilities for providing training to clan factions or jihadists. Available evidence suggests that these forays by al Qaeda did not amount to as much direct involvement in subsequent clashes between the militia of General Aideed and UN forces as some reports have claimed. Crisis Group’s assessment of al Qaeda’s inflated claims that it was partially responsible for the “Black Hawk Down” firefight which claimed the lives of eighteen U.S. soldiers in October 1993 concludes that the al Qaeda role was “marginal.”

Political Assassinations and Threats

The Horn of Africa has seen a considerable number of political assassinations and attempted assassinations allegedly by jihadist movements. The most famous of these was a failed attempt on the life of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during his visit to Ethiopia in 1995 by the Egyptian *Gamaa Islamiya*. That assassination
attempt was clearly linked both to the Gamaa Islamiya cell operating out of Khartoum and to officials in the government of Sudan. The incident led to targeted UN sanctions on Sudan and diplomatic isolation of the country, as well as a power struggle inside the government which eventually produced a change of policy and an end to Sudan's sponsorship of foreign terrorists, including Osama bin Laden himself.

Islamic jihadists have used assassination as a tool of choice in a variety of other settings in the Horn, especially in Somalia. There a small cell or cells which have come to be generically referred to as the shabaab (youth) militia, some of whom are led by a young radical Aden Hashi ‘Ayro, is responsible for dozens of political assassinations since 2003. Most of those targeted for assassination were Somalis suspected of collaboration with Western counterterrorism monitoring—mainly former military and internal security officers—but leading civil society critics have also been among the victims of these attacks. This has had a chilling effect on public criticism and opposition to Islamist movements in Mogadishu. Several assassination attempts aimed at the TFG President and Prime Minister have been launched but failed since 2005, including two suicide car bombings in the provisional capital Baidoa in 2006, one of which narrowly missed injuring President Yusuf. Suicide bombings were previously unheard of in Somalia and represent a new form of terrorist technology in the country.

A number of foreign aid workers and journalists have also been assassinated by these jihadi cells since 2003, beginning with the death of American Deena Umbarger in the Lower Jubba region in 1999. Most of those targeted worked in Somaliland, and their assassinations appear designed mainly to undermine Somaliland's bid for secession. Messages and warnings posted on Somali Web sites known to be outlets for jihadi figures conflate all UN and Western aid agencies with a conspiracy led by the United States against Islam, and in one instance accused UN humanitarian aircraft delivering food aid to food victims of providing Ethiopia with aerial reconnaissance. Specific threats against internationals led to the temporary relocation of all UN international staff from Somalia in October 2006. The head of UN security in Somalia and other foreigners reporting on Somalia have received threats as well, sometimes prompting their relocation out of the region. There is every reason to believe that assassinations and death threats will continue to play a worrisome role in Somali political life, and that most, though not all, of those threats are emanating from jihadist cells.

Jihadi assassinations have occurred in other parts of the Horn of Africa but are far less common than in Somalia. The AIAI attempted to assassinate an Ethiopian minister in 1995 in Addis Ababa; news of an assassination plot by the Somali jihadist cell responsible for the deaths of several foreign aid workers in Somaliland prompted the cancellation of a visit to Djibouti by the German President; and the radical Sudanese splinter group Takfir wal-Hijra launched a series of assassination attempts against Islamist rivals in the 1990s. The group may even be responsible for an attempt on the life of Osama bin Laden in Khartoum in 1994. In another example of radical Islamist infighting in Sudan, the well-known editor of the
Islamist daily al Wifaq, Muhammad Taha, was beheaded in September 2006. Taha had been accused by Islamist militants of “dishonoring the prophet” and while the killers remain at large, militant Islamists, possibly linked to al Qaeda, are thought to be behind the assassination.23

In contrast to the terrorist attacks, most of the political assassinations carried out in the Horn have been executed by local jihadists, mainly directed at local rivals or international targets operating in their home areas. Somalia has been home to the vast majority of these targeted killings. Most of the assassins have never been brought to justice, suggesting that targeted killing is an effective, and low-risk tactic in ungoverned spaces.

**Operation of Training Bases**

Only a few al Qaeda-affiliated training bases have been established in the Horn of Africa, but they have been cause for considerable concern. By far the most worrisome and large scale of these training opportunities were those sponsored by the government of Sudan from 1991 to 1996, at a time when Hassan al Turabi helped to turn Sudan into what one U.S. government official called a “Holiday Inn for terrorists.”24 Osama bin Laden himself financed several terrorist training camps in Sudan, and the government sponsored a series of conferences under the aegis of the “Popular Arab and Islamic Conference” that the U.S. government claimed constituted planning sessions for terrorist plots.25 Officially sanctioned terrorist training facilities in Sudan dried up after 1996 with the shift in government policy there.

Somalia has intermittently hosted small jihadi training sites at Luuq, in the early 1990s; at the remote coastal site Ras Kamboni in the late 1990s; and in at least two sites in Mogadishu, one of which was a former Italian cemetery desecrated by jihadi leader ‘Ayro, under the control of the hardline wing of the Union of Islamic Courts in the 2004–2006 period.26 Evidence from recently released al Qaeda documents implies that other attempts to conduct training took place indoors in Mogadishu to avoid detection, as well as at least one preliminary attempt to establish a training site in a remote area of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia.27

Training sites, in sum, have tended to be set up either in locations sponsored by a state authority or in remote areas of state collapse. Though Kenya has attracted many other terrorist activities, al Qaeda cells appear to have judged training camps to be too risky to place inside Kenya.

**Recruitment**

The Horn of Africa has been an uneven source of recruitment for al Qaeda and other jihadist cells. On the one hand, all of the major terrorist attacks which have occurred in the region in the past fifteen years have included at least a
few individuals indigenous to the region. The U.S. embassy bombings in 1998 implicated a Sudanese (Tariq Abdulla “al-Sudani”) and several Kenyans (including Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan), and were provided logistical support inside Somalia by Somali Hassan Dahir Aweys. Coastal Kenya has been the main source of local recruits into al Qaeda-affiliated cells; that region’s unhappy history of political marginalization and loss of land to powerful Kenyan interests from the high country may be a partial explanation for this trend. The assassinations and terrorist attacks inside Ethiopia by AIAI and the Somali shabaab cells have been conducted entirely by Somali jihadists.

On the other hand, the Horn of Africa has proven nowhere near as fertile ground for al Qaeda recruitment as has Egypt, Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan. Few Sudanese, Somalis, Kenyans, and Ethiopians figure prominently as leaders in the al Qaeda network, and none served as suicide bombers in the 9/11 attacks. This is especially significant in the case of Sudan, where residents had occasion to enjoy close contact with a range of terrorist groups in the first half of the 1990s. Some of the several hundreds of Horn residents who did opt to join the mujahideen in Afghanistan accrued dangerous skill sets and ideological convictions—including Somalia’s Adan Hashi ‘Ayro—but as a group have not returned to their home countries prepared to wage jihad. Despite conditions which appear to make the region fertile ground for recruitment, including an increasingly angry, marginalized, and radicalized Muslim population, the Horn of Africa has generally been unreceptive to recruitment into jihadi movements.

That may change in the future, however. As has occurred in many parts of the Islamic world, various salafist missionary and charity movements such as Tabliq have aggressively moved into predominantly sufi areas and have established new mosques, schools, and social services. Though most of these salafist schools and mosques do not espouse jihadi violence, they render adherents more susceptible to radical, intolerant interpretations and have proven to be excellent sites for recruitment by jihadi groups. Across the Horn of Africa, including in Muslim communities in Ethiopia, these movements have moved in to fill gaps in social services left by dysfunctional or weak states.

Recruitment of Horn residents into terrorist groups must include mention of the diaspora. Most of the countries of the Horn are now, to varying degrees, diasporic nations, with a significant portion of their population living outside the country. To date, the Horn of Africa diaspora has been somewhat more susceptible to recruitment by terrorist or jihadi movements than the resident population in the Horn of Africa. The most notable case in this regard was the involvement of a number of Eritrean and Ethiopian youth in a botched copycat bombing attempt in London in 2005. Several Somalis have been arrested in the United States and Canada and charged with conspiracy to commit terrorist acts as part of police sweeps there. Finally, a considerable number of Somali diaspora members returned to Somalia to join the shabaab militia, where they acquired skills in explosives and war-fighting.
Establishment of Safe Havens

The Horn of Africa has served at times as an important site for safe havens for al Qaeda and other terrorists. The most overt case was the state-sponsored haven provided to a half dozen or more terrorist networks, including al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden, by the government of Sudan from 1991 to 1996. Once the costs of hosting foreign terrorists grew too high for the government of Sudan to bear, however, the radical Islamist wing of the government (the Turabi wing) was marginalized and the more pragmatic leadership of President al-Bashir evicted the foreign terrorists. Somalia has been an intermittent safe haven for a small number of foreign al Qaeda-affiliated terrorists, namely the leaders of the East Africa cell led by Fazul and al-Sudani. Hardline Somali Islamists Hassan Dahir Aweys, Hassan Turki, and Aden Hashi ‘Ayro are directly implicated in providing safe haven to these individuals, and in the case of Aweys he has been their primary contact in Somalia over the past decade, as recently released al Qaeda documents demonstrate.

Interestingly, the weak state of Somaliland appears to have served as safe haven to a larger number of foreign terrorist elements than has stateless Somalia to the south. The town of Burao—Somaliland’s second largest city after the capital, and an important commercial center for goods transiting from the interior to the port of Berbera—has only come gradually and partially under the administrative control of the government of Somaliland. In recent times, it has been a known center of often radical Islamist activities, mainly involving Somalis. In 2001, considerable numbers of foreigners linked to Tabliq, Da’wa, and al Qaeda concentrated in the town, so much so that it generated attention and infiltration by concerned governments as far away as Iraq and Libya.29

But the most important safe haven for al Qaeda operatives, al Qaeda-affiliated jihadists, and al Qaeda sleeper cells in the region has been Kenya. Court testimony, documents of the Harmony Project, and other open sources point clearly to the fact that al Qaeda dispatched cells to set up a base in Kenya as early as 1993. Multiple cells operated unimpeded throughout the country (mainly in Nairobi and Mombasa). Foreign al Qaeda operatives were able to enter the country freely, set up businesses, establish and operate Islamic charities, marry into local communities, rent light aircraft to come and go from Somalia, hold meetings, communicate with al Qaeda figures outside the country, transfer money, stockpile weapons, and engage in years of reconnoitering possible targets for terrorist attacks. A review of the “USA versus Osama bin Laden” court proceedings and all available documents on Somalia and Kenya in the Harmony Project paints a remarkable portrait of al Qaeda cells freely operating in Kenya, with no expressed concerns about being monitored or detained by Kenyan police or security forces. The ease with which they chartered small planes to fly in and out of Luuq, Somalia, in 1993, during a period when that town was controlled by AIAI, with no hint of authorities checking on their activities, is especially revealing. Indeed, the only anxiety expressed in publicly available al Qaeda communications is a complaint in 1993, during the
worst moments of political crisis in Kenya, that “Kenya is not a good place . . . the cost of living is high, plus corruption is dangerously prevalent—there is theft, house break-ins, no political stability, and it is possible there will be an explosion in the country.” These were identical worries for Kenyan citizens at the time as well.

Police corruption and incompetence in Kenya made the country all the more appealing for al Qaeda affiliates. In several instances, top leaders in the East African cells were detained by Kenyan police only to either be released or escape. Former U.S. Ambassador to Kenya, Johnnie Carson, recounts these missed opportunities.

It is widely believed that during his first arrest [use of stolen credit card, July 2002], Fazul succeeded in bribing low-level Kenyan police officers into setting him free, and that during his second arrest, improper police procedure and sheer incompetence (not thoroughly searching the two suspects) led to his escape. Sloppy police procedures also may have allowed Saleh Ali Saleh Nabhan to escape on at least one occasion.

Even with reforms which are believed to have reduced corruption in the Kenyan police, Kenya’s security sector struggles to monitor much higher rates of international transactions in and out of Kenya than do neighboring countries. The fact that Kenya has played such a robust role as a safe haven compared to neighboring, stateless Somalia is significant, a reminder that ungoverned zones may be less attractive than weak states for certain terrorist activities.

**Procurement of Weapons and Explosives**

Terrorist groups in the Horn of Africa have had little difficulty procuring weapons on the private market, in large part because the region is awash in small arms and more sophisticated arms. Where special orders need to be placed, Mogadisuh has been the most useful arms bazaar. The explosives and detonation devices used in the 1998 embassy bombings were mainly acquired in Somalia; the surface-to-air missiles used in the failed attempt to bring down the Israeli chartered plane in Mombasa in December 2002 were acquired in Mogadishu and transported overland to Kenya. It is worth noting however that both small arms and heavier weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, can be procured throughout the region. Orders can also be placed with international arms traffickers who fly weapons into remote landing strips undetected.

**Smuggling of Men and Materiel**

Some Horn of Africa ports of entry and borders are less porous than others. In some locations, there is virtually no capacity on the part of weak or collapsed
states to effectively patrol their borders or even who enters the country by plane or ship. Somalia’s long coastline is almost entirely unpolicied, and hundreds of dhows and light boats come and go freely from beaches and small harbors. The border areas of Somalia and Kenya have been extremely difficult to patrol, though Kenya has recently been making more vigorous attempts to control flows of people across the border. Goods and people generally move unimpeded (or pay a small bribe to police and customs officers) across most of the border areas in the Horn of Africa.

Terrorist cells based in Kenya have found Somalia to be especially useful for transshipment of goods and men. Somalia was used as a transshipment site in the 2002 terrorist attacks in Mombasa.

Establishment of Businesses or Charities for Cover and Income Generation

Kenya has been a preferred site for the operation of businesses and charities by terrorist cells in the Horn of Africa. Most Islamic charities in both Kenya and the broader region are entirely legitimate, but a handful have been misused by jihadist cells. The almost limitless amount of humanitarian crises in the region creates a natural attraction for charities and NGOs, most of which prefer to use Nairobi as a regional base for logistical and other reasons.

A number of businesses in Somalia, Sudan, and Kenya have been accused or suspected of having al Qaeda links. These range from small businesses like fishing enterprises designed mainly to provide a sleeper cell with a revenue flow and a pattern of movement between Kenya and Somalia that does not appear unusual, to larger firms which generate a revenue flow for al Qaeda. Much of the Horn of Africa relies on diaspora remittances, making remittance companies a critical part of the economy; these companies can unwittingly transfer funds for criminal and terrorist activities as well as legitimate enterprises. Likewise, most of the region depends on the United Arab Emirates (UAE) as a de facto financial and commercial capital, where businesses place orders, secure loans, and forge partnerships. In the course of these deals, some companies acquire business relations with al Qaeda-affiliated firms, either wittingly or unwittingly.

CONCLUSION

On paper, the Horn of Africa appears to be an ideal location for terrorist activities. Much of the region’s territory qualifies as a zone of state failure, where central state authority is weak to nonexistent and where terrorist cells can presumably operate with impunity. Where state authority is robust, it is generally experienced as a repressive and predatory force to be evaded or resisted, stoking deep resentments that erode the willingness of local communities to cooperate with counterterrorist
monitoring. Borders are porous and poorly patrolled throughout the Horn of Africa, fueling robust smuggling networks that facilitate cross-border terrorist and criminal operations. The Horn of Africa is one of the poorest and most underdeveloped regions of the world, and is also the site of multiple, protracted armed conflicts; the region’s desperate poverty and militarization has the potential to produce a ready supply of recruits into terrorist cells. Corruption is endemic in most regional governments, compromising the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations by police and security forces.

In addition, the Horn of Africa also possesses a number of specific features which make it susceptible to the particular form of terror activity of special concern to the United States—namely, Islamic jihadism. Five of the region’s seven states are divided between Christian and Muslim communities, and as such constitute potentially fertile ground for sectarian tensions and religious extremism, especially in Kenya and Ethiopia, where Muslim populations have historically been politically marginalized. Portions of the region—especially Kenya—are rich in soft Western targets. Muslim communities throughout the region have been penetrated and resocialized by aggressive salafist missionary efforts from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, rendering the practice of Islam more radicalized in some quarters. Somalia’s prolonged period of state collapse has allowed salafist organizations to carve out strategically targeted niches in social services, businesses, and local government, providing a favorable network within which jihadists can operate. Large numbers of the region’s Muslim populations have traveled to the Gulf states to work or study, where they have been exposed to salafist interpretations of Islam. Throughout the region, post-9/11 government crackdowns on Islamic charities, remittance companies, and other organizations suspected of linkages to al Qaeda have been viewed by many Muslims as misguided, discriminatory, and anti-Islamic policies, and as such have stoked anti-American sentiment. Extensive and critical media coverage of the war in Iraq has fueled anti-Americanism still further. Because almost every government in the region is to varying degrees cooperating with the United States in the War on Terror, popular anger at repressive or unresponsive regional states is easily conflated with anti-Americanism.

Yet evidence of actual terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa points to the fact that the region has not been especially conducive to certain types of terrorist activities. Moreover, the region’s zones of complete state collapse—“ungoverned spaces” in the purest sense—are only attractive for a relatively limited number of terrorist activities. Many of the most important, substantial, and long-running terrorist activities in the Horn of Africa have either been situated where they enjoy state sponsorship (Sudan, circa 1991–1996) or in a weak, multiethnic state (Kenya). Kenya was the principal site for multiple, major terrorist attacks, in part because it sports the greatest number of soft targets but also because it has porous borders, large, largely unpolicied, and multiethnic urban settings where foreign jihadists can go unnoticed, and a police force and service sector that historically has been quite corrupt. It is easy to imagine how al Qaeda operatives rented private light aircraft to fly them from Wilson airport in Nairobi to known radical Islamist
centers in Somalia with no questions asked in Kenya; it is impossible to imagine that same scene at an Ethiopian airport. The ease with which foreign al Qaeda operatives set up shop in Kenya—from establishing charities or businesses to marrying into local families—contrasts sharply with the difficulties faced by al Qaeda operatives seeking safe haven in Somalia.

In the one instance when Islamist terrorist groups were given sponsorship by a state in the Horn of Africa (Sudan in 1991–1996) their host government quickly found the costs of sponsoring foreign terrorists too high and evicted them. The Sudan experience may have immediate relevance in Somalia, where the Union of Islamic Courts paid a heavy price for allowing a small number of radicals in its umbrella movement to provide safe haven for three or more foreign al Qaeda operatives wanted by the U.S. government for the 1998 embassy bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam. If and when Somali Islamists regain power in Somalia, the costs and benefits of sponsoring foreign terrorists will no doubt be weighed more carefully.

The Horn of Africa region’s many ungoverned spaces are, it turns out, difficult and dangerous not only for international relief organizations but for international terrorists as well. There, logistics are a constant challenge; communication is poor; maintenance of health and access to clean water can be problematic; secrecy of movement is difficult because so few foreigners are present; conflicts over the movement’s resources can become part of local tribal or clan conflicts; armed conflicts are endemic; and the threat of extortion, blackmail, and kidnapping is very real. Recently declassified and publicly available trip reports by foreign al Qaeda operatives hoping to establish a training base in remote areas of Somalia and eastern Ethiopia are litanies of complaints about lack of potable water, poor shelter, lousy food, biting flies, disease, and ungrateful, suspicious locals—not unlike what one would expect from the journal of a twenty-five year old aid worker sent out to his first post in the hinterlands of any Horn of Africa country.36 Remote, ungoverned spaces are, in sum, “nonpermissive” for everyone.

The actual number of foreign al Qaeda operatives using Somalia as a safe haven has remained quite small (though also quite dangerous) since the late 1990s, nowhere near as large as those suspected of residing in or transiting through Kenya. U.S. government officials regularly cited concerns about no more than three to five al Qaeda suspects believed to be enjoying protection in Somalia. Where they did enjoy safe haven, these individuals opted to reside in Mogadishu, not remote rural areas. Interestingly, the largest buildup of foreign Islamic radicals in Mogadishu coincided not with the city’s greatest period of anarchy, but rather with the its greatest period of law and order—in 2006, when the UIC defeated the coalition of U.S.-backed militia leaders and imposed Islamic law on the city.

What terrorist activities are likely to occur in ungoverned zones? Somalia, as the most ungoverned of the “ungoverned spaces” in the Horn, did serve a critical niche role as a major source of weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, for terrorist attacks in Kenya. Importantly, procurement and smuggling of weapons into Kenya did not require a committed local partner of al Qaeda. Any and all local
businessmen are happy to sell weapons and transport them. Somalia also served as a convenient transit point for al Qaeda figures who moved between Somalia and Kenya by boat, overland, or flight. When actively sought by U.S. and Kenyan authorities in Kenya, al Qaeda operatives often opted to flee to Somalia, where they were generally—though not always—beyond the reach of the law.

Terrorist training centers also tend to be based in ungoverned spaces, with the notable exception of the state-sponsored training camps in Sudan. But even where no state existed, al Qaeda affiliates required the patronage and protection of some local authority to establish and operate a camp. Setting up shop without that local protection would have been too risky in Somalia.

Ungoverned spaces in the Horn also provide unscrupulous charities with the opportunity to operate with little accountability about how funds are spent. This is a problem that reaches far beyond Islamic charities, but is especially problematic if a relief agency is used as a front for terrorist activities.

Political assassinations by jihadists also occurred disproportionately in ungoverned zones of the Horn of Africa, especially Somalia. Nowhere else are political rivals to jihadists routinely targeted; nowhere else have international aid workers been the targets of so many fatal attacks. This suggests that targeted attacks on individuals is less risky in areas where rule of law is nonexistent, and assassins can act with impunity—especially if they have succeeded in effectively intimidating local authorities. The impressive nonstate systems of governance in ungoverned zones are poorly equipped to stand up against trained and committed jihadi killers, even those in their own tribe or lineage.

Garrison states in the Horn—especially Ethiopia’s presence in portions of its troubled frontier—appear to have been relatively successful in raising the risks too high for aspiring al Qaeda cells to maintain a presence inside their borders. In the long run, however, repressive policing may actually fuel extremism and sympathies toward terrorist movements.

Recruitment patterns present an unexpected pattern. Despite extremely high levels of unemployment and armed violence in zones of state collapse in the Horn, those zones tended to produce fewer recruits into al Qaeda-affiliated groups than did areas of at least modestly effective governance.

Beyond the specific findings gleaned from an examination of Islamic terrorism in the Horn of Africa, this study also demonstrates the utility of disaggregating both the notion of “ungoverned space” and the broad rubric of “terrorist activities.” There are important variations in ungoverned spaces, some of which are more conducive to terrorist activities than others. Likewise, by breaking down the terrorist portfolio into a range of discrete activities (from actual attacks to training camps to safe havens), we are better able to see how jihadist cells prefer to conduct certain types of activities in certain political settings. If afforded a range of security and governance environments, terrorist cells will seek to exploit the “comparative advantage” that each context offers. The Horn of Africa case also helps to reinforce the argument that risk assessments of terrorist threats are better served by taking a regional rather than country-based approach to the subject, since terrorist
cells do not confine themselves to a single country but seek to exploit regional opportunities to conduct their operations.

Finally, the observations made in this study point to a troubling feature of state-building enterprises in collapsed states like Somalia. The shift from collapsed state to fully functional central government—one which can provide an enabling environment for development, public security for its citizens, and a security sector which can monitor and prevent terrorist activities—necessarily involves a long transitional period during which the state is no longer a zone of complete collapse, but one which presents many of the features of a weak state. Given what we think we know about how terrorist organizations exploit different types of political environments for different purposes, the transition catalyzed by state-building efforts may actually render the state more vulnerable to certain types of terrorist activities even as it renders it less vulnerable to others. This can include the prospect of terrorist cells infiltrating key institutions within nascent governments.
Iraq and the Edges of Terrorist Space

Alice Hills

Accounts of terrorist sanctuaries that ignore developments in Iraq’s cities since 2003 are incomplete. Not only are conventional notions of sanctuary as a hiding place misleading—cities are terrorists’ preferred battlespace—but also the urban operating environment plays a more significant role in the physical, psychological, and cognitive space that terrorists inhabit than rural areas. Above all, the record of U.S.-led denial operations in Iraq emphasizes that sanctuary is only one, albeit critical, aspect of terrorist space.

Despite the centrality of denial of sanctuary operations in Iraq and in the War on Terror more generally, little is known about the nature and boundaries of terrorist space. This matters because policy assessments that misunderstand the multidimensional nature of terrorist space and the extent to which it is built on complex relationships often result in undesirable strategic consequences. In a speech in March 2006, for example, President Bush (for whom denial of sanctuary is a priority) described U.S. troops as having denied insurgents (that is, terrorists) sanctuary in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar: it was “liberated from insurgent control.” To the contrary, U.S. operations probably led to an increase in sectarian violence and a resurgence of al Qaeda.¹

Misunderstanding also encourages the use of counterproductive tactics, which exacerbate the challenges of successfully conducting urban-based denial operations. Even when U.S. forces can identify their adversaries—and they usually cannot—sanctuary cannot easily be denied where there is no front, and no control, or when the target is a tactic or information network. Indeed, an observation made by the French strategist Roger Trinquier nearly fifty years ago remains apposite: “The conduct of military operations in a large city, in the midst of the population, without the benefit of the powerful weapons it
possesses, is... one of the most delicate and complex problems ever to face an army."\(^2\)

Using the cities of Tal Afar and Ubaydi in the northern Iraqi province of Ninevah as my context, I argue that understanding the nature and purpose of sanctuaries depends on a nuanced understanding of terrorist space. In particular, the idea of sanctuary as primarily a matter of physical space is inaccurate, and notions of a flow of individuals and groups across political spaces, social constituencies, and legal categories better convey its multidimensional and fluid boundaries.

Based on open source material, this chapter is organized in four sections. The probable characteristics of terrorist space are identified first. Second, the difficulties of marking the edges of terrorist space are noted in relation to the filtering effect of Iraq's border with Syria. Third, the empirical and conceptual parameters of sanctuaries and denial operations are discussed by using Tal Afar as an example.\(^3\) Fourth, I conclude that conventional notions of sanctuary are misleading, and that Iraq is best perceived as an easily accessible battlespace.

**CHARACTERIZING TERRORIST SPACE**

There are many obstacles to accurately characterizing terrorist space. For most of the last three years, for example, the U.S.-led forces conducting denial operations in Iraq have not known the identity of their adversaries, or whether to categorize them as terrorists, insurgents, jihadists, or foreign fighters—the terms tend to be used interchangeably. As the International Crisis Group (ICG) observes, “the U.S. fights an enemy it hardly knows. Its descriptions have relied on gross approximations and crude categories (Saddamists, Islamo-fascists and the like) that bear only passing resemblance to reality.”\(^4\)

Accurate categorization provides legal and operational indicators, aids transitioning between operational phases, and can avoid under- or overreaction. It is also notoriously difficult. Broadly speaking, insurgency describes the actions of a minority group that wants to force political change “by means of a mixture of subversion, propaganda and military pressure... Typically, the insurgent forces will seek to avoid conventional engagements between large forces while seeking the active support of the population at large.”\(^5\) Such campaigns are likely to be protracted, and often involve terrorism, which is understood here as the premeditated and unlawful use of politically or religiously motivated violence to coerce or intimidate governments or societies for political, religious, or ideological purposes. Terrorism is traditionally used to inspire resistance, destroy government capacity, and mobilize support.

Reality is seldom so clear-cut. Not only are distinctions between terrorists and insurgents subjective—much depends on the perspective of the observer—but also Iraq’s terrorists are involved in multiple interwoven conflicts. One conflict is drawn on sectarian and tribal lines, and involves a battle for the political power currently held by Shia militia leaders. A second involves Sunnis fighting both the
foreign occupiers and the Shia-dominated government, while a third centers on jihadist attempts to create an Islamist state.

Categorization is further complicated by the all-embracing nature of Washington’s War on Terror, al Qaeda’s transition into an insurgency, the desire of many terrorists and/or insurgents to replace Western values with an extreme Islamic code, and the activities of an unknown number of foreign terrorists/insurgents, which, until his death in 2006, included Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Iraq’s most wanted terrorist. American military spokesmen usually inflated the number of foreigners involved, but the ICG’s assessment is probably realistic: there are “relatively few groups, less divided between nationalists and foreign jihadis than assumed, whose strategy and tactics have evolved (in response to U.S. actions and to maximize acceptance by Sunni Arabs).” An estimate by Jane’s Intelligence Review in mid-2006 suggests that most foreign jihadists are Saudi (61%), with some 10 percent Syrian.

The resultant strategic and operational incoherence is undesirable, but probably does not make much difference to Western orthodoxy regarding the physical, psychological, and cognitive space terrorists and fighters inhabit. For ease of reference, all the parties mentioned so far are described as terrorists here.

Provided such complexities are acknowledged, the broad characteristics of terrorist space can be identified.

**Traits**

Some idea of what terrorist space means can be gained from terrorist operations and from what is known of terrorist sanctuaries, for sanctuaries—literal and psychological—lie at the heart of terrorist space. A number of strong traits are now evident, but a caveat must first be noted: terrorist space incorporates a physical and literal element, but should not be framed solely in physical spatial terms.

Influenced by successful U.S. operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2001 and 2002, most commentators assume that terrorists require significant physical and temporal space in which to plan, train, and assemble resources, and that this is best achieved in states with weak governments or low-population densities. This was the message given, for example, by Christopher Kojm and Susan Ginsburg, two senior members of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, to the House of Representatives’ International Relations Committee in August 2004. However, like many such evaluations (Congress’s Removing Terrorist Sanctuaries: The 9/11 Commission Recommendations and U.S. Policy is another), Kojm and Ginsberg’s assessment had two important omissions: the psychological and cognitive elements of terrorist space were not fully addressed, and neither was the increasingly important role played by cities.

Admittedly, their statement acknowledged the multidimensional nature of terrorist space; they accepted the need for a range of operational options. Further, the increasingly vicious and urban nature of the Iraqi insurgency from 2005 onward
enhanced awareness of cities as terrorists’ preferred battlespace. Even so, terrorist space remains understood in predominantly physical terms, and safe houses and strongholds are seen as its literal focal points. This may be because sanctuary conventionally implies a physical space that can be targeted and physically destroyed. In contrast, the virtual sanctuaries associated with electronic infrastructure such as the Internet, global media, and satellite communications are more difficult for U.S. forces to control, while many of the psychological or cognitive elements underpinning Islamist terrorism are inaccessible to non-Muslims.

In fact, the various elements of terrorist space are linked, though they tend to be treated as separate. As a result of their spatially based understanding, for example, U.S. forces are skilled at targeting terrorist houses and, increasingly, the electronic infrastructure terrorists exploit. In contrast, their targeting of cognitive issues is less assured, coherent, and successful. A physically based interpretation of terrorist space is then reinforced by poor human or cultural intelligence that downplays the overlapping relationships underpinning terrorism in Iraq, and by superficial cognitive targeting techniques similar to those employed in postcolonial campaigns. This is significant because Western military doctrine requires its practitioners to think in terms of cognitive depth, which is best assessed in terms of how terrorists adapt to their adversaries. Understanding how insurgents adapt is also necessary if successful tactical actions are to achieve the desired operational effects and strategic end state.¹¹

For such reasons framing terrorist space in terms of physical sanctuaries alone is understandable but also misleading. It is also potentially costly, for assessments of terrorist space based on physical location may neglect that the destruction of a building can actually increase the availability of other sanctuaries. Terrorists fleeing from one city are likely to move to the next one with a supportive or acquiescent population. By March 2005, for instance, a string of sanctuaries existed along the Euphrates from towns such as Hit and Haditha toward Syria and through Ubaydi and Qaim to the Syrian border.¹²

That sanctuaries are flexible phenomena is further evident from several cities in Al Anbar province where terrorists left their sanctuaries before U.S. denial operations began but returned once they were over. Even in Falluja, which U.S. forces effectively destroyed in 2005, militarily successful operations could not stop insurgents creeping back once fighting died down.¹³

Such examples emphasize the strength of the following seven traits:¹⁴

1. Terrorist space is dangerous. Consequently it is ruled by operational security, and is studded with safe houses. Terrorists must be smuggled into cities, given cover, provided with weapons, and trained before being used in operations that rely heavily on local logistics and intelligence. The position of foreigners (who are kept in safe houses and used for suicide missions) is particularly difficult in that they are more dependent on sanctuaries than local terrorists even if they have come to Iraq to fight and die.
This suggests that leaders and foot soldiers probably experience terrorist space differently. Knights and Neumann, for instance, believe that “a class of highly entrepreneurial and operational security-minded network and cell managers has developed,” whereas the space inhabited by foot soldiers is physically and psychologically constrained. Jihadist accounts stress the need to stay indoors with the blinds closed during daylight hours; prayer and Koranic readings are the only distraction.

(2) Terrorist space is heavily urbanized, and most sanctuaries are in towns and cities because opportunities for action and resources are greater where there is considerable population density, a developed infrastructure and a complex man-made environment. Cities offer cover and support, even if they limit training opportunities and exercise grounds.

(3) For these reasons, terrorist space is shaped by the need to build secure relationships and develop a network of experienced facilitators capable of supporting operational networks. Ordinary Iraqis are the eyes and ears of terrorists, and most aspects of terrorist space depend on collusion with its host society. Iraqi middlemen or facilitators provide logistical support (food, directions, weapons, and ammunition) to sponsored and unsponsored individuals crossing the border, and making their way to their destination cities, while local sympathizers are a source of intelligence, and increasingly provide the specialists to whom the placing of improvised explosive devices is contracted. In an insightful comparison, Puchala notes that terrorists are much like pirates in this respect. Both require “sympathizers, protectors and customers… ready, willing and able to provide sanctuary.” In other words, terrorism, like piracy, is “a complex system dependent for its functioning on mutually supportive arrangements between agents and abettors.”

(4) Terrorists thus experience a marked degree of social exclusion even as they exploit partial or localized inclusion in order to undermine the exclusion enforced by U.S. forces. In this way, terrorists are effectively located in a separate social domain that can (to paraphrase Coutin) “take the form of a prison but [one] that is also produced and reproduced through social interactions that deny [terrorists] particular rights and services.” Coutin notes too that when social exclusion is incomplete, individuals can use their “participation in ‘legitimate’ social activities to challenge their location in a domain of criminality.”

(5) Inevitably, sanctuaries play a critical part in such an environment. However, terrorists need hiding places and strongholds, rather than sanctuaries in the traditionally negative sense of a recognized sacred or safe place. In reality, no public or private space in Iraq seems to be totally sacred. An indication of the extent to which the end justifies the means can be gained from the regularity with which American forces and Sunni and Shia insurgents accuse each other of violating the sanctity of holy places.
One reason for violation is that mosque complexes often hide weapons or hostages, are torture centers, or are themselves targets in sectarian conflict. Thus insurgents used the catacombs and mausoleums of the Wadi Al Salam cemetery at Najaf (which is adjacent to a holy shrine) as an operational base even though this violated an agreement between Iraqi militant cleric Muqtada al Sadr and Najaf civic officials that its grounds were off limit for military operations.19

(6) Sanctuaries are often proactively and aggressively created as part of internecine warfare. For example, a letter believed to have been written by al Qaeda in Mesopotamia advises that neighborhoods should be ethnically cleansed using intimidation in order to ensure secure bases for jihadist cells.20 Certainly, the terrorists controlling Tal Afar in early 2005 were barbaric, beheading, and executing anyone questioning their brand of fundamentalist Islam. Similarly, terrorists across Iraq perform their own denial operations against “collaborators”; checkpoints in the so-called Triangle of Death, south of Baghdad, executed anyone identified as a government employee. Meanwhile, Coalition forces take refuge in their own air-conditioned sanctuaries.

(7) The seemingly fragmented and brutal nature of terrorists’ operating space is offset by the comparative clarity and cohesion of their cognitive space. Despite considerable setbacks (including the loss of high-profile leaders such as al-Zakawi, and urban sanctuaries such as Falluja), terrorist groups appeared to gain coherence in 2006. Certainly, their networks display a high degree of operational and ideological cohesion despite the lack of a centralized and hierarchical leadership. Thus the battle for Falluja in November 2004 led to a number of lessons-learned commentaries that resulted in a marked evolution in terrorist tactics and doctrine.21 The strategic relevance of defending a besieged town was discussed, as were the optimal tactics for defence. Appropriate weapons were identified, and ambush techniques, sniping, and counterair tactics evaluated. The need to take into account factors such as popular support and the availability of weapon stockpiles was acknowledged. Analyses included videos on how to make, camouflage, and detonate explosive devices, while videoconferences considered the daily chain techniques required for multiple, interspersed, and interconnected detonations. More recently, communication networks have been used as a tool to state official positions, standardize tactics, recruit new members, and generate sympathy among the target audience.22

In other words, terrorist space is not chaotic. It may be fragmented but it is shaped by the activities of a small number of well-organized groups that possess sophisticated communications, produce regular communications and publications, and react rapidly to political developments.23 And their morale is high, for there is a conviction that the jihad’s legitimacy is now beyond doubt, the institutions established under the occupation are
fragile and irreparably illegitimate, and the war of attrition against U.S. forces is succeeding. 24

These traits offer some simple guides for mapping terrorist space. They suggest that a combination of social networks, ample weapons, a powerful message, and adequate funds allows Iraq’s terrorists to maintain an unknown number of physical sanctuaries, and a relatively unified and coherent psychological and cognitive space.

**BORDERING SPACE**

The terrorist space focused on Iraq incorporates geographical, psychological, and cognitive elements, and contains safe houses, caches, contact points, safe routes, dangerous places, exit routes, destinations, and the like. It is a battlespace (rather than battlefield) in which terrorists acquire and engage their enemy on a number of levels, and its operational edges are the border regions Iraq shares with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. Syria plays a dominant role, and a critical percentage of Iraq’s foreign terrorists congregate there before moving through Iraq’s border regions to cities such as Tal Afar, 40 miles from the border and some 180 miles northwest of Baghdad. They include an unknown number of Arab nationalists, unsponsored religious extremists, Palestinians who feel a duty to fight, Saudis with cash, and Syrian volunteers with close tribal and cultural links to Iraq. Syria effectively offers such terrorists a sanctuary, and as such plays an important role in shaping terrorist space.

The notion of the Syrian border marking the edges of terrorist space is, of course, a metaphor. Rather than being contiguous with geopolitical borders, terrorist space is nonlinear, noncontiguous, and nonterritorial. Even so, the flow of men and resources between cities and sanctuaries on both sides of the border is suggestive. The extent of Damascus’ support for the members of the former Ba’ath regime allegedly controlling the insurgency from Syrian territory remains debatable, as is the resilience of networks originally developed to elude sanctions in the 1990s, but it is widely accepted that Syria acts as a transit point for money and fighters.

The border regions between Syria and Iraq thus represent a hurdle, filter or gateway to the operational space that is Iraq. Most importantly, the Syrian border marks the territorial edges of the Iraqi battlespace. Terrorists wishing to reach Iraq’s cities must not only leave the protection and security offered by Damascus, but also they must have the skills, money, connections, and psychological resilience required to travel to their destination in Iraq; they need contacts to facilitate their journey, and some form of protection against agents who might challenge their organization and its protectors.

The obstacles preventing entry into Iraq are minimal. In 2003, terrorists-cum-fighters swarmed into Iraq aboard buses that Syrian border guards waved through
open gates. After Washington exerted intense pressure on Damascus in late 2004, Syria’s domestic intelligence services swept up scores of insurgent facilitators—before quietly releasing many a few days later. This may have resulted in minor adjustments to the operational borders of terrorist space, but it did not shift or harden them. It did not mean that Syria wanted to stop infiltration and confine terrorists in Iraq either. More probably it meant that Damascus did not want trained fighters operating outside its control. Similar considerations no doubt applied to Iraq’s border with Iran in May 2006 when the two governments agreed to form a joint commission to oversee border issues and block “saboteurs.”

Iraq’s border with Syria marks an edge of terrorist space primarily because borders are now seen as barriers against terrorism. The theoretical function of the Iraq–Syria border has therefore changed from a porous administrative line to a security filter. The shift has been marked on the Syrian side, for example, by the construction of 557 border posts, the introduction of a new integrated computer system for all crossing points, and the redeployment of troops to the border following Syria’s withdrawal from Lebanon. The border security force currently numbers some 10,000—in contrast to the prewar figure of 700. The system is, however, inefficient. There is a complete absence of communication, let alone intelligence sharing, between Syrian and U.S./Iraqi border patrols, while poor training and inadequate equipment ensures that Syria’s two-man patrols do not challenge either suspected terrorists or the big and well-equipped groups of smugglers crossing at night (Iraq is now a transit point for illicit drugs bound for Europe via Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.)

Border security means little on the 700-km-long border. The border was “sealed” after the Falluja operations of late 2004, and the Rabiyah border crossing was closed in an attempt to stop the flow of foreign fighters from Syria at the time of a crackdown on terrorists in Tal Afar in September 2005, but this did not stop the trickle of terrorists: “Only a two-foot embankment or a $2 bribe stand in the way of a Syrian insurgent wishing to wage jihad in Iraq.” A series of new border forts, spaced about 20 miles apart have been built as bases for patrols and observation, but Iraqi guards do not have enough heavy weapons or ammunition to fight off terrorist attacks. They do not have enough cash either. American officials say that local commanders do not understand how they can access the Ministry of Interior’s budget system, so recruits in desert training camps sleep without blankets and patrol with empty ammunition magazines. Iraqi commanders repeatedly say that they had only a fraction of the manpower, vehicles, and fuel needed to control cross-border infiltration and smuggling. Also, the border region is, like most such areas, marginalized, and cross-border traffic represents a valuable resource for local inhabitants. Once in Iraq, terrorists move to towns such as Hussabayah and Ubaydi. Hussabayah, for example, is less than 20 miles from the Syrian border, and is typical of the area in that its inhabitants make a living in the town’s two factories and from licit and illicit border trade. However, unlike larger towns along the Euphrates, its tribes do not compete for influence with radical mosques that might sympathize...
with terrorists. This helps to explain events when an influx of foreign volunteers affiliated to al Qaeda took over the town in 2004. In mid-2005 some of the original insurgents turned against the foreign fighters, forming a militia of their own, and fighting broke out. When it died down, the militia provided the 2,500 U.S. marines in the area with intelligence that enabled them to break the foreigner’s hold. Groups linked to al Qaeda continue to operate, but 2006 saw fewer roadside bombs and booby traps.

In such places, terrorist space is shaped mainly by the presence or absence of U.S. forces. For the U.S. response to a Hussabayah is to destroy strongholds and manipulate what it cannot control; it relies on short-term punitive operations (increasingly featuring Iraqi troops), which are sometimes followed by civil-affairs offensives. Typical operations in the region include Operations Steel Curtain and Sayaid that took place in Ubaydi, a town on the banks of the Euphrates River that is 12 miles from the border, during November 2005.

Operation Steel Curtain, which aimed to prevent al Qaeda operating in the Al Qa’im region of the border, involved more than 2,500 U.S. marines, soldiers, and sailors, and some 1,000 Iraqi soldiers. F-15 Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons, and MQ-1 Predator unmanned aerial vehicles flew air strikes against known or suspected fighter positions near the border. As Marines moved into Ubaydi, F-15s dropped precision-guided bombs against enemies hiding in a grove of trees, and a Predator unmanned aerial vehicle fired a Hellfire missile at a building from which shooting came. Later that day, the Predator fired another Hellfire missile against terrorists entrenched in a tree line.

Operation Sayaid (Hunter) also took place in Ubaydi. It, too, was designed to prevent al Qaeda from operating in the Euphrates River Valley and Al Anbar province. Additionally, it was intended to facilitate a permanent Iraqi army presence in the Al Qa’im region. American troops cleared Old Ubaydi, while the Iraqi Army and unnamed “coalition forces” cleared what was described as an al Qaeda stronghold in New Ubaydi. Significantly, many of the terrorists were thought to have fled to Ubaydi from Hussabayah and Karabilah, which had been cleared earlier.

In the event, Ubaydi did not offer terrorists sanctuary. Indeed, U.S. officials attributed the sporadic but heavy fighting to the terrorists believing they were trapped and had nowhere to go. An estimated 80 terrorists were killed and some 150 captured in the three weeks that followed. Most casualties were caused by air strikes, though some were killed in small-arms fire; several were captured trying to leave the area by crawling in a flock of sheep. Ubaydi was cleared house-by-house (some of which were booby trapped), and a number of weapons caches were seized, including several that contained suicide vests and bomb-making material.

Hussabayah and Ubaydi illustrate two strong trends. They show how terrorists seek to develop strongholds and sanctuaries in border towns, exploiting security vacuums and societal rifts. They also suggest the limited capacity of U.S. troops
to shape terrorist space, for successful denial depends on U.S. saturation of an area.

Iraq’s border with Syria thus marks the edge of the Iraq battlespace, rather than the edges of terrorist space, or a sanctuary as such. It is a bridge for terrorists, as well as well as for oil and drugs, rather than a genuine filter. The number of terrorists returning is unknown.

URBAN SPACE

Once in Iraq foreign terrorists must move to their destination through areas where U.S.-led forces have a strong but often uneven presence, and sectarian factions operate. Most will head for the towns and cities that not only make good sanctuaries, but also are their preferred battlespaces. As Algiers and Aden showed in the 1950s and 1960s, manmade structures in cities and maze of alleys and slums represent opportunity for terrorists and confusion for conventional militaries. Not only do physical and social structures in cities negate the advantages of the sophisticated technologies U.S. forces rely on, but also terrorists, like defenders, usually have the advantage.

Domestic constituencies play an influential role in shaping this space, particularly for foreigners who depend on Iraqis for resources, intelligence, concealment, and assistance in creating the logistical infrastructure necessary for successful operations. Iraqi support is essential because foreigners cannot bring sufficient weapons and explosives over the border, nor blend in with the local population. Additionally, domestic constituencies are important because public safety is absent; urban areas are controlled by various sectarian militia, which fill any security vacuum.

Such an environment offers clever terrorists multiple havens and strongholds—and those who survive are, like successful criminals, usually more nimble and adaptable than the conventional militaries chasing them. It is probable that terrorists map cities in the same ways that criminals and security forces do too. They undoubtedly monitor U.S. movements and mark their environment accordingly. Further, U.S. operations tend to be predictable, especially when they involve Iraq troops. And, as Ubaydi shows, they are usually short-term; terrorists have only to survive in order to return. American forces cannot deny terrorists sanctuary in the long term because they cannot control complete towns; they lack the necessary manpower, and their Iraqi allies are unreliable.

This suggests that terrorists regard the identification of a network of sanctuaries as critical. It also suggests that the main feature of terrorists’ operational space is a number of aggressively developed strongholds, hiding places, and munitions caches, rather than sanctuaries with a purely protective purpose.

All these strands are evident in Tal Afar, which is one of two major transit zones for foreign terrorists entering into Iraq. The other route is through the Euphrates River Valley, farther south.
Tal Afar

By mid-2003, Tal Afar, a city of approximately 200,000 inhabitants, was a reservoir or staging post for what U.S. commanders consistently called “the terrorists.” The city sits astride key infiltration and smuggling routes from Syria to Mosul and the north, and terrorists used it as a training camp and housing area. Some foreign jihadists entered the city in the aftermath of the invasion, but most terrorists were Iraqi. All were brutal; beheaded victims were usually left at a busy traffic circle in the heart of the city.

The terrorists were able to act with impunity because the U.S. presence in the town was temporary. However, early September 2005 saw a turning point in U.S. operations, and on September 16, 2005, Gen George Casey, commander of coalition troops, described “an extremely successful tactical operation” in which U.S. and Iraqi troops effectively cleared Tal Afar of foreign fighters. The impact of such events on terrorist space is best seen looking back from March 2006, when Bush announced that Tal Afar was no longer a key base for al Qaeda.

Bush recalled how “terrorists and insurgents” moved into Tal Afar soon after the war ended, using propaganda to recruit, and intimidation and violence to divide the city’s various ethnic and religious groups. By September 2004, they controlled the city. American forces drove them out after three days’ heavy fighting, but the momentum was not sustained. Sectarian conflict may have been influential too. Bush did not refer to it, but a self-appointed council of Ninevah province claimed that U.S. operations were used as a distraction from ethnic cleansing by Kurdish and Shia militia incorporated into the Iraqi army. Whatever the case, Iraqi forces could not maintain order, and within weeks the terrorists (“al-Qaeda and its associates”) returned.

The U.S.’s response in early 2005 was to adopt an approach known as clear, hold, and build. Instead of entering Tal Afar, removing the terrorists, and moving on as they had in 2004, Iraqi units were left behind to hold the city once U.S. forces had cleared it. Programs designed to rebuild Tal Afar’s economic and political infrastructure were then implemented in May 2005, when, according to Bush, Operation Restore Rights gave “residents confidence the terrorists would not return.”

Bush neglected to note the heavy loss of life that car bombs caused in late May, stressing instead that embedding Coalition forces into Iraqi police and Army units enabled the Iraqi’s to “become more capable and professional.” He said that “by focusing on securing the safety of Tal Afar’s population [rather than denial operations alone], Iraqi and Coalition forces won the trust of the city’s residents—which was critical to defeating the terrorists.” In fact, both denial operations and terrorist activities were aggressive, limited in scale, and heavily dependent on local support.

The operation “to crush the insurgency” in Tal Afar was typical of its kind. More than 20 suspected insurgents were detained as U.S. and Iraqi soldiers moved house-to-house, looking to capture or kill insurgents and/or foreign fighters—no distinction was made. Despite this, the operation was, according to U.S. spokesmen, a precision show of force. Also, it was not a stand-alone operation, for it
followed on from two earlier offensives in May when troops conducted Operation Matador near Qaim along the Euphrates River and Operation New Market in Haditha, both of which were designed to thwart suicide car bombings and attacks in Baghdad.

However, such operations failed to seriously limit terrorist space in Tal Afar, and terrorists continued to intimidate and punish local inhabitants. Indeed, the U.S. commander in the city (Col H McMaster), claimed that they were headquartered in a neighborhood of the city called Sarai, and “had a very sophisticated strategy for taking over the city.”

It was not until several months later that McMaster was able to claim that the terrorists had been driven from Tal Afar, and that reconstruction was under way, that is, that denial operations had been successful. The turning point occurred in September 2005, he said, when U.S.-trained Iraqi forces took the operational lead in driving most of the terrorists out of the area. The implication was that terrorist space contracted, as new sewers were dug, destroyed shop fronts replaced, Sunni police hired, and 2,000 goats distributed to farmers. Tal Afar then slipped from the headlines until Bush’s speech.

Tal Afar illustrates the extent to which terrorists exploit Iraq’s security vacuum, but it is important for three additional reasons, too.

First, both terrorists and U.S. forces understood terrorist space literally: terrorists needed territorial space to survive, while U.S. troops sought to destroy it. Consequently, both prepared the battleground carefully. American forces built a high dirt wall around the city, some three miles by three miles in size, and blocked roads to isolate suspect areas. The fact that Tal Afar is relatively remote, self-contained, and compact for an Iraqi city, made it practical to wall off the area, and systematically work through its streets. About 20,000 local inhabitants were then funneled down a controlled route to a holding camp, leaving a combined U.S.-Iraqi force to clear a 600-by-800-meter section in the city center that had been identified as a terrorist sanctuary. Troops conducted house-to-house searches, using pinpoint artillery and air attacks where they met resistance. Real-time video from unmanned aerial vehicles was combined with intelligence from householders. The resulting destruction of their sanctuaries undoubtedly destroyed segments of the terrorist’s operating space. On the other hand, American tactics had become predictable, and the more successful terrorists had no doubt developed alternative plans, escaping with the evacuees to regroup in the isolated towns east of the River Tigris.

Second, Tal Afar emphasizes that sanctuaries both support and frame terrorist operations. By October 2005, for instance, groups such as Tandhim al Qaeda had designated the “internal enemy” as their priority target. In other words, Tal Afar offered physical—and presumably psychological—sanctuary to terrorists whose goal was to deny sanctuary to both their sectarian adversaries and U.S. forces.

Third, U.S tactics for limiting terrorist space have improved, partly as a result of experience, and partly because of improved tactics and technology. In September 2005, troops carried out a model operation, patrolling on foot, looking for human
intelligence, and emptying Tal Afar of civilians before giving Iraqi soldiers the lead in the offensive, but their previous deployment in western Anbar province had involved aggressive house-to-house searches, mass arrests, and thuggish crowd control. Such tactics turned the population against them and probably allowed terrorists to reoccupy the city. In Tal Afar, improved sniping and the introduction of new IED jammers facilitated efficient operations.

As a result of Tal Afar’s outcome, most Western commentators continue to define terrorist space primarily in relation to U.S. operations, and understanding remains partial in all senses of the word. Terrorist attacks have increased in sophistication and effectiveness, yet the places where such attacks are planned and practiced are rarely identified. Thousands of suspected insurgents have been killed, and more than 100,000 Iraqi men detained, yet Iraq is as violent now as at any time since 2003. The location of the places where terrorists plan their operations continues to be discovered by chance or betrayal as often as by targeted intelligence. At the same time as 4,000 U.S. troops in tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles and Apache helicopters reentered Tal Afar in early June 2005, a patrol looking for weapons caches north of Falluja accidentally discovered a 503,000-square-foot underground insurgent hideout containing large stores of weapons, ammunition, and supplies.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter places terrorist sanctuaries—and, by extension, denial operations—in the broader context of terrorist space. Based on developments in Iraq since 2004, it offers four key findings. First, terrorist space is studded with sanctuaries, but sanctuaries are only one aspect of terrorist space. Second, terrorists aggressively establish sanctuaries as strongholds; sanctuaries are weapons caches, holding centers and safe houses, rather than merely hiding places. Third, Iraq is better understood as an accessible battlespace than as a series of sanctuaries with a defined edge. Fourth, cities represent the most significant areas of terrorist space.

These findings suggest that notions of sanctuary based on operations in Afghanistan in 2001–2002 are misleading, particularly in relation to the Middle East. Further, although military-based denial operations are appropriate in the short term, they cannot fully justify the Bush administration’s reliance on denial, decapitation, and disruption. Terrorists may seek to intimidate Iraqis in Tal Afar, and U.S. troops may claim to liberate them, but conventional denial operations cannot destroy the domestic constituencies on which terrorists depend.

Military-based denial is a temporary affair because there are insufficient U.S. troops to control a Tal Afar for more than a matter of weeks, and because terrorist space is built around a resilient network of routes, resources, and sanctuaries that extend beyond any one city. Terrorism feeds on religious, family, tribal, or local loyalties, with allegiance to a cause rather than to specific individuals, and is increasingly embedded in Iraq’s sectarian and politicized security governance.
Further, although terrorists depend on Iraqis for logistical support, intelligence, protection, and sanctuary, they themselves form part of a virtual, nonstate based community that is able to draw on the database that is al Qaeda. Internet sites offer a cognitive and psychological sanctuary where terrorists can discuss acceptable methods of combat, tactical priorities, and strategic objectives.

Given that terrorist space is rarely linear, contiguous, or territorial, a policy based on physical destruction is unlikely to be strategically successful. A coherent strategy of obstruction and interdiction aimed at denying terrorists legitimacy is more likely to result in political achievement. Destruction alone cannot work because the combination of social networks, plentiful weapons, a powerful message, and sufficient funds that allow terrorists to sustain relatively constant levels of violence also enables them to maintain sanctuaries. Indeed, Iraq’s terrorists are superb at integrating the physical, cognitive, and psychological features of their environment into a coherent and focused space. Terrorist space is more accurately characterized as a constellation of overlapping and complex relationships than a fragmented and temporal series of places or events.
Terrorist Finance and the Criminal Underground

Rohan Kumar Gunaratna and Arabinda Acharya

Today, a variety of transnational terrorist groups threaten an unusual range of regimes and interests.1 With the September 11, 2001, attacks, Osama bin Laden and al Qaeda demonstrated how it is possible to use terrorism as a “global instrument” to “compete with and challenge” traditionally organized state power and mobilize new global conflicts.2 The threat of terrorism today lies not only in the weapons that terrorists can yield, but also in their ability to procure and use those weapons through innovative, discreet, and complex fund-raising and fund-transfer techniques. This has changed the entire complexion of conflict in the twenty-first century. In the new paradigm, the state is but “one of several protagonists in the conflict, confronted by one or more armed movements . . . each challenger for state power . . . surrounded by criminal networks . . . and (the struggle) . . . financed by means of criminal activities (drugs, arms, forced labor).”3 As Martin van Creveld predicted, “future wars will not be fought by armies, but by groups whom we today call terrorists, guerrillas, bandits, and robbers.”4 This has led to the possibility that the distinction between terrorism, organized crime, and warfare would disappear, especially in the context of asymmetric conflicts.

These developments reflect the changes in trends and patterns of terrorism in recent years. The international strategic environment of the post–Cold War era has transformed the nature, quality, and support structure of terrorist groups. With the gradual demise of state sponsorship, transnational terrorist groups have learned to take advantage of prevailing political and economic conditions, especially opportunities provided by the ease in transborder mobility, advances in communications technologies, and a global financial system networked through electronic information systems, to raise and move funds for their activities around the globe.5 This, criminality, and the exploitation of the resources of both domestic and international
charitable organizations and legitimate business enterprises, have helped sustain global terrorism even in the absence of state sponsorship.

The evolving combination of terrorism and transnational crime is fast becoming one of the most defining and threatening aspect of modern-day conflicts. Some analysts argue that the emerging nexus (or alliance) between the two now follows a logical progression culminating in “hybrid organizations” or even in what have come to be termed as “black-hole syndromes.” In both dynamics, analysts maintain, the objectives, methodology, and organizational structure of terrorist and criminal entities would become increasingly undistinguishable. This paper examines the context of the terrorist and criminal nexus from a utilitarian perspective. It argues that even as terrorists and criminals leverage each other’s respective capabilities, these interactions are only for mutual convenience and are temporary, usually devoid of any long-range strategic importance. Hence, conflating the crime-terror nexus to a point where it loses any clear meaning can be problematic, both conceptually and from more pragmatic counterterrorism perspectives. An understanding of how terrorists are taking to crime, however, would help counterterrorism agencies respond to the evolving terrorist threats.

THE CONTEXT

“Money in the hands of the terrorists is money that kills.” Like in a commercial enterprise, access to finance and means of transfer is crucial for sustaining terrorist organizations and vital in formulating and implementing their activities. As former U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft put it, “Terrorists cannot terrorize without money, without resources. Training costs money, planning costs money, and explosives cost money, plane tickets cost money.” Back in the 1960s, James Adam noted how “in the progression from fringe radicals to recognized terrorists, all groups” must first acquire the “income...armaments and recognition that will help sustain them and their operations.” Further, in order to survive, terrorist groups need to bridge the economic divide that separates those living hand to mouth from those with enough capital to plan ahead, pay for arms, recruitment, training, and travel, to build a propaganda base among the people the organization claims to represent. They have also to pay for safe haven. According to one estimate, Osama bin Laden paid over U.S. $100 million to the Taliban during the five years he was in Afghanistan. The same was the case when he was in Sudan, where his organization provided important financial support to its host state, instead of the other way around. A successful terrorist group therefore, must necessarily be able to build and maintain an effective financial infrastructure for generating funding, the means to launder those funds, and ways to make the funds available for committing terrorist operations.

Different terrorist networks operate with very different structures and sources of financial support. Some are state-sponsored and financed, some operate as quasi-states (with regional or territorial control and financed by their participation
in the drugs trade or by other linkages to global crime), while still others are decentralized, widely dispersed and partially state-funded. Such groups raise money from their domestic supporters, as well as from diasporas spread across the globe.

The end of the Cold War saw a marked decline in the state funding of terrorism worldwide. Terrorist groups then began to rely on a variety of sources for funding and logistical support, exploiting front organizations, legitimate business, and nongovernmental organizations, as well as turning to self-financing criminal activities such as kidnapping, narcotics, and even petty crime. Like criminal entrepreneurs, many terrorist groups now break into high-risk, high-profit criminal ventures such as narco-trafficking and human smuggling, even going as far as extortion, protection, racketeering, and credit card fraud, as well as the illicit sale of gold, diamonds, and other precious gems.

Transnational terrorist groups have also mastered transborder movement of funds, using a variety of means. These include use of credit or debit cards, wire transfers, and cash smuggling (by courier or bulk cash shipments). Some groups are also known to make extensive use of underground banking networks (particularly the *hawala* system) and unregulated offshore jurisdictions—locations with limited bank supervision, no anti-money laundering legislation, ineffective law enforcement regimes, and a culture of no-questions-asked banking secrecy. This cross-border movement of capital has been especially facilitated by the process of globalization. With information-age technology, it has become rather easy for the money manipulators to “find and penetrate states whose laws (or lack thereof) make them susceptible to criminal financial transactions.”

It is in the realm of financial logistics that terrorism and organized crime converge. As Rupert H. Kupperman has noted, “the growing interconnectivity of organized crime, with its vast resources and its ability to move money, share information, exploit and manipulate modern technology... has forever changed the way terrorists do business. Terrorists have always sought leverage to penetrate international power and influence. A major change today is that otherwise small and insignificant terrorist groups can join with organized crime to exercise disproportionate leverage.”

THE NEW DYNAMIC

In its resolution No. 1373 (2001) adopted on September 28, 2001, the United Nations Security Council noted with concern “the close connection between international terrorism and transnational organized crime, illicit drugs, money laundering, illegal arms-trafficking, and illegal movement of nuclear, chemical, biological, and other potentially deadly materials.” Prior to September 11 however, organized crime and terrorism were often considered in isolation. Consequently, very little has been written on the subject. The criminality and terrorism nexus, however, is not new. One of the oldest manifestations of terrorism was in the nature of crimes...
committed by armed brigands known as the Thugees who were active in western India for about four centuries, until they were ruthlessly eliminated by the British. The most obvious manifestation of the symbiosis between terrorism and organized crime has been the drug trade, which is also one of the oldest criminal enterprises. What have changed are the increasing entanglement and expanding scale and scope of the relationship, enabling both transnational criminals and terrorists to threaten vital national and international interests.

Despite important differences, both terrorists and organized crime syndicates supplement each other to bridge the gaps in their respective capabilities. The relationship, in other words, is mutually beneficial. Terrorists gain resources, as well as expertise in money laundering and money transfer techniques. Terrorist groups also use drug cartel assets or personnel to enhance, support, conceal, or conduct terrorist activities. The groups that have used narcotics trade to further their political objectives include the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and 19th of April Movement (M-19) in Columbia, Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) in Peru, Contras in Nicaragua, Omega 7 in Cuba, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and its factions, Palestinian Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah in the Middle East, the Red Brigades in Italy, the Basque ETA in Spain, Kurdish and Armenian rebels and the right wing Gray Wolves of Turkey, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, the United WA State Army, the Burmese Communist Party in Myanmar, and al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Similarly, criminal entrepreneurs benefit from terrorists’ military skills and networking. For example, well-known drug trafficker Joseph Murray used his extensive criminal contacts to obtain munitions (estimated at US$1.7 million in 1984) including rockets, rifles, and hand grenades for the Provincial Irish Republican Army (PIRA). PIRA and Murray did not share a similar ideology; rather this was based on expectations of mutual gain. Murray obtained weapons for PIRA to make a profit and PIRA used Murray to obtain weapons.22 Similarly, Omega 7, the Cuban terrorist group, collected money from drug cartels in exchange of information, including surveillance notes and photographs about individuals identified by the traffickers. In addition to exchange of information, The FARC in Columbia provided traffickers information and the use of hidden airfields in exchange for protection payments. A combination of mutual expertise also lets both have greater access to fraudulent documents, such as passports and customs papers, as well as access to illegal weapons.23

**FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO THE CRIME-TERROR NEXUS**

Crime syndicates and terrorists tend to thrive in areas of lawlessness with ineffective governance, which are further destabilized by war and internal conflict.24 In recent years however, a number of new factors have contributed to the growing synergy between terrorism and crime.
With changes in global economy and its technology infrastructure, globalization has altered the dynamics of both legitimate and illegitimate business. As conflicts translate into armed confrontations, demand–supply asymmetries involving weapons, information, skills, and controlled goods have spurred the trading of these goods in the gray market. These changes have enormously impacted on terrorist group objectives, organizational structures, tactics, and weaponry for terrorist groups. It has become possible for individual terrorists, terrorist organizations, and their support networks to operate in a relatively unregulated environment. This facilitation is most manifest in the realms of terrorist financing, in which it is now possible for small groups and even private individuals to fund terrorism at a level previously maintained by their state sponsors. Similarly, by exploiting advances in technology, finance, communications, and transportation in pursuit of their illegal endeavors, crime syndicates have now become highly diversified entrepreneurs. Their organizational structures now resemble those of transnational corporations. “Think global act local” has become as much a part of transnational crime as it is of transnational business. Thus both criminals and terrorists have been remarkably successful in exploiting to their advantage enormous regulatory discrepancies in the globalized world. The globalization of financial, commercial, transportation and communications networks has enabled buyers and sellers to locate each other, identify points of common interest, and establish terms of cooperation.

The globalization-induced dilution of national boundaries has also facilitated cross-border population transfers. This has led to significant migrant populations in most developed countries. Migrant communities often function as support bases for both organized crime and terrorist groups. In many instances, migrant settlements are the ultimate destination for illicit commodities or laundered profits generated by criminal networks. For terrorist groups such as LTTE, the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI), and PIRA, these are primary generators of revenue, collected either voluntarily, or through coercion. Similarly, financial market liberalization, techno-banking, diffusion of industries across borders, the international spread of consumer goods (trade flows), and the revolution in communications and data transfer technology have also facilitated networking among terrorists and criminals. Demand for and cross-boundary movement of “labeled” consumer goods in computer software, compact discs, videos, clothes, and various pharmaceuticals products, for example, has increased the propensity for counterfeiting and piracy. The criminal enterprise has been able to embed illicit products in vast amounts of imports and exports that now characterize international trade. According to a report by the Alliance against Counterfeiting and Piracy, an industry organization working in the field of Intellectual Property Rights, the piracy and counterfeiting of consumer goods and electronics results in average losses of over £5 million per year in the United Kingdom alone. Criminals have also latched onto the Internet to extend the reach of their enterprises. Credit card fraud using information obtained through the Internet is one example. Another is the innovative (and now infamous) financial fraud scams such as those conducted by Nigerian criminal groups.
The modern technology and information revolution, moreover, has helped metamorphose hierarchical entities—both criminal and terrorist—into cellular structures. In a recent statement, Chilean Ambassador Heraldo Munoz, the head of Security Council committee monitoring United Nations sanctions on al Qaeda, remarked how the terrorist group “had been going through a major change since 2001, shifting from a centralized network with a strong hierarchy to a decentralized movement.”34 What we see now more and more is the emergence of a professional subculture of terrorists—“free floating surrogate warriors.” Within groups terrorist cells have grown smaller, more amorphous, and autonomous. Increasingly, funding is being generated locally through a combination of legitimate and criminal activities. As Brachman and Forest illustrate in their chapter on virtual camps, al Qaeda continues to spread its message of hatred against the West among supporters and sympathizers. It continues to recruit new members for global jihad, through decentralized cells spread across the globe, and a robust and techno-savvy propaganda and communication network.35 At the same time crime syndicates have become “Global Mafiosi” comprising major criminal conglomerates, increasingly negotiating strategic alliances with one another.36 They have become more decentralized and fluid through a process of innovation that involves rationalization, brutalization, militarization and internationalization.37 This has made their leadership easily replaceable and hence dispensable, thus ensuring continued and uninterrupted operations.

NEXUS/CONVERGENCE MODELS

With an “overall decrease of state financial support” for terrorism in the last two decades, combined with interdiction of terrorist finances, regulation and control of charitable and other nongovernmental front organizations, terrorist groups are increasingly taking to crime to generate funds to sustain their activities. But terrorist groups using the crime route to raise money are not an entirely new development. In the past, many terrorist organizations have engaged in low-level local crime to finance their activities. Groups such as the Irish Republican Army and German’s Red Army Faction raised money “the old fashioned way,” such as robbing banks, while groups like PKK used extortion.38 FARC in Columbia collected taxes from people who cultivate or process illicit drugs on lands, which were under its control. Lebanese Hezbollah and the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) trafficked in drugs themselves, while others in many parts of the world such as the Abu Sayaff Group, use ransom money raised through hostage-taking operations.39

What some analysts have found is an emerging convergence between terrorist groups and organized criminal networks to the extent that a single entity simultaneously exhibits criminal and terrorist characteristics.40 For example, Chechen terrorists may primarily be interested in creating an independent state, but their interests are also served by maintaining a degree of instability so that they can
continue engaging in extremely lucrative criminal activities. Some Irish factions may be less interested in having a peace settlement, as it may deprive them of the profits being obtained from criminal activities. Similarly, most members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) appear to be primarily interested in profiting from the regional drugs trade, though at the same time they remain devoted to promoting a militant and extremist view of Islam. This trend, analysts argue, is symptomatic of a growing overlap of objectives among terrorists and the criminals. While criminal enterprises are interested in influencing the politics of target states, terrorist groups look for creating an environment conducive to the exploitation of opportunities provided by criminal activities.

The nexus or convergence between terrorist organizations and transnational crime is based on the symbiotic relationship between the two, a dynamic that allows both entities to profit financially. This nexus, which includes one-off, short-term and long-term agreements, exists along a continuum and is usually meant for exchange of expertise (money laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making), or for operational support (access to smuggling routes). A study of criminal and terrorist organizations undertaken by the Library of Congress found the nexus between the two entities in three broad patterns. As the study concluded, the first form of contact between the two types of groups is “alliances for mutual benefit.” In this the terrorists enter agreements with transnational criminals solely to gain funding without engaging directly in commercial activities or compromising their ideology. “The second pattern is direct involvement of terror groups in organized crime, removing the ‘middleman,’ but maintaining the ideological premise of their strategy. The third pattern is the replacement of ideology by profit as the main motive for operations.” Though the study found the second pattern to be the most prevalent, it nevertheless suggested a natural progression that “seems to occur from the first category toward the third.”

The most obvious convergence has been in the field of transnational smuggling operations involving, especially, drugs, illegal weapons, and people. This synergistic merger of the international networks of drug traffickers and terrorist organizations depicts a well-organized web of drug cartels and terrorist groups, such as narcotics in Columbia, weapons in Cuba and Mexico, and money laundering in Panama. The interaction within the web of associations is often based on expectations of mutual benefit, as with organizations that launder money for drug traffickers, who also launder money for arms traffickers and terrorists. Even without the expectation of mutual benefit, the interaction takes place for profit. As transnational criminal organizations have proven the value of flexibility, mobility, and pragmatism, terrorists with strong ideologies are also tempted to “diversify.” Whether the motivation is profit or ideology, or some combination of both, the end product is disruption and destabilization through violence.

Interactions between terrorism and the drug trade, have also gone by the subscript narco-terrorism. This type of activity is one in which groups or associated individuals participate, not only in aiding or abetting drug trafficking endeavors by providing security, but also become involved themselves in the cultivation
manufacture, transportation, or distribution of narcotic substances, in order to finance their terrorist activities. The term is understood to mean the attempts of narcotics traffickers to influence the policies of government by the systematic threat or use of violence. There are instances where criminal organizations run the drug trafficking operation, while the terrorist organizations control the territory where the drugs are cultivated, processed, and transported. This has been the way that terrorist groups such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), Lebanese Hezbollah, and al Qaeda used money from drug trade to further their political agendas. The erstwhile Taliban regime directly taxed and derived financial gain from Afghanistan’s rampant opium trade. According to the 2000 report of the Observatoire Géopolitique des Drogues, about 80 percent of the Taliban’s financial resources, estimated at $75 million, was derived from their tariffs on opium and heroin. Even though the Taliban’s spiritual leader Mullah Mohammed Omar prohibited poppy cultivation in July 2000, the regime managed to profit from opium’s subsequent scarcity, which lead to a sharp increase in prices in 2001. The Taliban’s current insurgency is being supported through exhortation from the opium trade. The drug trade also funds a significant part of the economies of Syria and Lebanon. It is no secret that while Damascus has funded terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, Beirut continues to host numerous terrorist groups including Hezbollah and Hamas. The strategic alliance between IMU, and Afghan drug mafia and Central Asian criminal groups was to ensure that drug shipments transit safely between Afghanistan, the Russian Federation, and the Caucasus.

The terrorist groups may be involved in all aspects of the drug trade, from cultivation, production, transportation, and wholesale distribution to laundering the proceeds from the trade. The money derived from the narcotics trade provides them with a degree of autonomy, flexibility, and relative freedom from scrutiny. According to Frank Cilluffo, Director of the Counterterrorism Task Force, Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Whether the terrorists actively cultivated and trafficked the drugs or ‘taxed’ those who did, the financial windfall that the narcotics industry guarantees has filled the void left by state sponsors.” Conversely, terrorists also see narcotics as a weapon system aimed at weakening their enemy. Not only does it pay for itself, the huge profit in hard currency gets into the banking system and the main economic arteries of the target societies through money laundering. As Rachel Ehrenfeld notes, “the directions of the flow are ideologically attractive.” Drugs go to the target countries, where they corrupt and kill. In testimony before the U.S. Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on Judiciary, Alvaro Jose Baldizon Aviles noted how the “drug traffic destroys and corrupts American youths so as to weaken and harm future generations, provides a mechanism whereby American youths finance liberation movements,” and how the “network used for cocaine distribution is used for traffic of weapons bought on the black market.” This is probably the argument that Osama bin Laden used when he advocated using narcotics
trafficking to weaken Western societies by supplying them with addictive drugs. In the ultimate analysis, drugs and terrorism frequently share common elements of geography, money, and violence.

In addition to the narcotics trade, terrorist groups have also engaged in other crimes, such as fraud and human trafficking. LTTE amassed huge payoffs from human smuggling mostly to the European states. In October 2001, the Egyptian Rizik Amid Farid, a suspected mujahideen, was discovered by the Italian Police in the southern Italian port of Gioia Tauro on a container ship at Genoa, hiding in a steel container bound for Toronto. The container was furnished as a makeshift home with a bed, water, supplies for a long journey, and a bucket for a toilet. Farid was born in Egypt but carried a Canadian passport. Unlike most stowaways, he was smartly dressed, clean-shaven, and appeared well rested as he emerged. He was found to be carrying two mobile phones, a satellite phone, a laptop computer, several cameras, batteries, airport security passes, and an airline mechanic’s certificate valid for four major American airports. In another incident in May 2003, Hezbollah operatives were caught while attempting to smuggle Hamad Masalem Mussa Abu Amra, an explosives expert into Gaza strip in a vessel disguised as a fishing trawler. Thai criminal networks helped facilitate smuggling of small arms into Sri Lanka and the Indonesian conflict zones of Aceh, Sulawesi, and Maluku to arm terrorist groups. In Albania, which is considered a terrorist transit point, organized crime rings help smuggle terrorists from the Black Sea to Western Europe. This is also the case with Bosnia, Russia, Albania, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia, Austria, Germany, and Italy, where criminal elements help the transit of terrorist elements. These links help criminal groups who gain access to state-controlled arms stockpiles through corruption, coercion, and theft, to supply arms and weaponry to terrorists and insurgents. Victor Bout, an ex-KGB officer turned criminal, supplied arms to the Taliban and in the process, established connections with al Qaeda. Under the cover of a legal business organization called Transavia Export Cargo set up in 1993 in Belgium, Victor Bout could traffic in light weaponry, antiaircraft equipment, munitions, tanks, and even helicopter parts in Afghanistan, Angola, Uganda, UAE, South Africa, and many other countries. Bout is reported to have supported the operations of terrorist organizations such as the Taliban, Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), and the Lord’s Resistance Army and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) of Sierra Leone substantively.

**POINTS OF CONVERGENCE**

**Organizational/Operational/Tactical**

Terrorists and persons engaged in organized crime are rational actors, operating clandestinely against the state (except where the state is complicit or actively engaged in the process). Both use violence or threats of violence as a means to achieve their objectives. Some of the tactics used by both are the same: bombings,
kidnappings, assassination, attempts at intimidation and coercion, and extortion (either in the form of protection money or “revolutionary” taxes). While criminal activities provide funds to terrorist organizations, organized crime syndicates use terrorist tactics such as bombings, and kidnappings to add “credibility” to their extortionist demands. For example, in a series of attacks, the Colombian drug cartels assassinated Lara Bonilla (April 30, 2004), bombed the U.S. embassy in Bogotá (November 1984), and threatened to kill U.S. citizens in retaliation for seizure of drugs by Columbia’s Special Anti-Narcotics unit. Subsequently in association with the terrorist group M-19, the drug syndicates raided Colombia’s Palace of Justice, assassinated eleven judges, and destroyed large number of documents pertaining to Colombian nationals awaiting extradition to United States. Similarly, in the 1990s, the Italian mafia, in response to government’s anti-mafia drive, responded with terror attacks against the Uffizi Gallery in Florence and St. John Lateran Church in Rome.

In many cases, criminal and terrorist groups have also developed the capacity to simultaneously engage in criminal and terrorist activities on their own. Here the point of convergence is operational tactics, which the two entities learn from each other and adopt for their own purposes. This is manifested in criminal groups using terror tactics to influence the political process and terrorists engaged in organized crime to replace or recoup financial support from state sponsors.

Both in terms of organizational structure and recruitment process, organized crime syndicates and terrorist groups now demonstrate strategic and tactical convergence. Both have assumed networked structures resembling modern business enterprises, organized into small cells without a central command. This has enabled them to become more amorphous and discreet. Both now exploit advances in computing, telecommunications, and data transfer capabilities, to plan and coordinate their activities around the world. Both often use similar methods—underground financial networks, human couriers—to make, move, and launder money. Their support and recruitment bases now overlap. For example, elements within the Chechen Diaspora in Russia, which had been the backbone of the Chechen criminal network, turned to terrorism by providing support for attacks in Moscow and Volgondonsk. Ethnic Albanians in Europe running prostitution and drug rings had links with the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). Similarly there has been a significant increase in the recruitment of imprisoned criminals into terrorist organizations. Many members of the Palestinian terrorist groups have been recruited from internment camps in Jordan. Caucasian prison converts are considered assets for non-Western terrorist groups because of their ability to blend easily into their societies and avoid undue law enforcement scrutiny. In a study J. Michael Waller, of the Washington, DC based Institute of World Politics detailed out how Islamist terrorists “view conversions of non-Muslims to Islamism as vital to their effort.” According to Waller, the strategic goal for terrorist groups here is twofold: “to dominate the voice of Islam around the world; and to exert control over civil and political institutions around the world through a combination of infiltration, aggressive political warfare, and violence.” Richard Reid,
the infamous “Shoe Bomber” was a criminal who converted in a British prison. Jose Padilla, the so-called “Dirty Bomber” was exposed to Islam in a U.S. prison. Christian Ganczarski, a German convert who coordinated logistics for the Djerba bombing in April 2002, and Pierre Richard Robert, implicated in terrorist attacks in Morocco, were recruits with criminal backgrounds. Common experience in prison generates a level of trust that can easily translate into common ventures. 

“It is in the prisons where political operatives recruit specialists whom they need to run their networks,” notes Alain Grignard, a Belgian law enforcement official. “The prisons of today are producing the terrorists of tomorrow.”

Often, crimes committed by both types of organization differ in motive but not in substance. Points of convergence in such cases are where terrorist resources, or the profits of transnational criminals, are mixed. As James Adams noted, in the 1990s, terrorism became big business, with an annual turnover of US$2 billion, mostly financed through criminal activities—such as Columbia’s FARC and ELN, financed substantially from drugs money in connivance with the Columbian drug mafia. The Chechens were financed by petrodollars as well as proceeds from organized crime activity such as protection racketeering and drug trafficking. Both terrorist organizations and crime syndicates delve into check, credit and debit card fraud, fraud in commercial loan transactions, counterfeiting, computer intrusion and wire transfers, smuggling such as transactions in conflict diamonds (guns-for-diamond trade), CD and video piracy, etc., to make and move money. In the Bank of New York case, for example, huge amounts that originated with criminal activity were laundered through legitimate accounts of corresponding banks in Russia. This not only masks criminality in fund transactions, but also makes the money easily accessible to terrorist groups through legal channels. A major source of terrorist funding in recent years has been the abuse of charitable organizations, shell companies, and offshore trusts. In many offshore centers such as Antigua, the Bahamas, Cayman Islands, Labuan (Malaysia), Malta, Mauritius, and Vanuatu there are minimal regulations on international business companies and trust arrangements. This helps the promoters mask their true identities and the value, nature, and location of their assets, creating opportunities for criminal money laundering and financing of terrorist activities (reverse money laundering). Both organized criminals and terrorist groups are adept at avoiding behaviors that trigger reporting requirements on suspicious transactions that could lead to law enforcement investigation. This was demonstrated from the fact that 9/11 plotters took care to move money through regular banking channels in small amounts to avoid detection.

**Motivational/Ideological**

In certain cases crime groups have displayed distinct political motivations, which often go beyond obstructing anticrime legal and judicial processes. Instead, organized crime syndicates seek direct involvement in the political processes and institutions of a state, especially in the economic sector. “Political criminal” groups
in Russia and Albania, for example, seek to control the weak political structures of their respective areas. Similarly, “criminal terrorists” use political grievances to justify what would normally be regarded as purely criminal acts. Here the point of convergence is an interchangeable membership and recruitment base. In a sense these entities are terrorists during the day and criminals at night.69

Geographical

Bases of operations for both types of organization also converge in areas with little governmental control, weak law enforcement, and open borders. One such area is in the Russian Far East, where relative lack of central control from Moscow has enabled transnational criminals and terrorist groups to heavily infiltrate governmental and law enforcement structures.70 Similarly, terrorist groups in Myanmar sustain themselves through a thriving drug trade along the Golden Triangle, comprising vastly unpoliced areas in southern China, Laos, and to a lesser extent northern Thailand.71 Another significant manifestation of this is the emergence of geographic pockets in which specialized criminal activities are conducted, supporting the spread both of crime and terrorism. Specific areas in Russia and in the Balkans, for example are considered to be reliable sources of small arms, while Algerian-based criminal groups are known specialists in producing counterfeit documentation.72

THE “BLACK HOLE SYNDROME”

Some analysts have stretched the nexus or convergence between criminals and terrorists to demonstrate what is termed “black-hole syndrome.” For example, Tamara Makarenko argues that the “convergence between criminal and political motivations within a single group allows it to subsequently gain economic and political control over a state.” This syndrome is manifested in fractured or contested states, or states which lack centralized control over their respective territories, such as Afghanistan, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Liberia, North Korea, and Myanmar. In some cases authorities in these states use terror tactics to retain power and use their official position to engage in lucrative illicit activities for financial gain. The territories under their control become transit points and safe havens for criminal or terrorist organizations.73

POINTS OF DIVERGENCE

The crime and terrorism nexus however, need not be conflated unduly. For one thing, terrorist groups are not entirely dependent on criminal activities, rather they have “diversified portfolios” for fund-raising.74 Even though there is some
common ground between organized crime and terrorism and overlap of modus operandi, there are several important differences. Terrorism is usually a mixture of politics, ideology, propaganda, and warfare, and terrorists often see themselves as political actors. Political ideology, radical religious viewpoints, social and economic alienation, or revenge usually drive the terrorists, not necessarily a desire for financial gain.75 Organized crime, on the other hand, shies away from publicity, does not usually confront the state, and while trying to infiltrate the political establishment for logistical reasons, generally has no political ambitions. Organized crime groups are essentially entrepreneurs, pragmatic rather than ideological, and their political activities are almost invariably intended to protect their illegal activities. Furthermore, many criminal acts are demand-and-supply driven, such as the drugs trade, which has a strong demand component, while there is arguably no international demand for terrorism. For the terrorists, money is a means to an end, not an end in itself. Terrorists’ targeting can be quite precise. But the nature of its intended victims, not to mention the destructive consequences of asymmetric violence, is less discriminate than those hurt by organized criminal activity.

Often, the association of terrorist groups with criminal organizations may erode their political support base. This has been more pronounced in cases of group involvement in the drug trade. For example, the diaspora support for Omega 7 in Cuba declined, once the group’s involvement with narco-trafficking was known, even to the extent that former supporters began to cooperate with law enforcement authorities.76 Indulgence in some form of crime such as drug trade may also be a transgression of a terrorist group’s religious or political philosophies. But some groups have managed to get around the problem by developing their own interpretation of religious texts, as with Sunni Taliban and the Shiite Hezbollah extremists. For them, even though Islam forbids consuming drugs such as opium, it nevertheless permits producing and selling them. As discussed earlier, the Taliban’s decree against poppy cultivation was a tactical move to garner more revenue as prices increased.

Similarly, the notion of the black-hole syndrome is problematic. As Phil Williams noted, “both terrorist and criminal organizations flourish in lawless areas where the state is weak, but there is a huge gap between this and obtaining joint control over the state.”77 However there can be a dual dynamic in some hybrid organizations. These combine a political agenda and quest for power, with a desire to profit from illegal activities and a willingness to use violent methods. Cooperation takes place between criminal enterprises and terrorist organizations, as in the case of the Madrid train bombings, in which the attacks were carried out by a strange mix of “long time extremists and radicalized gangsters.”78 The danger lies in the fact that for most of the terrorist groups who now need independent sources of funding and remain “self-financing”, crime is often the path of least resistance. Crime is self-starting and requires no particular training or expertise—as for example Al Tawhid, the network of the late Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, which got its “start trafficking in forged documents and immigrant smuggling between the Middle East and Europe.”79
CONCLUSION

During the Cold War era, competing states provided support and sanctuary to various terrorist groups to advance their respective political and foreign policy objectives. As state sponsorship declined, terrorist groups began to self-finance their activities by exploiting loopholes in the international financial system as well as by increasingly imbedding in crime. Moreover, post-September 11 public delegitimation of terrorism\(^8\) has pushed terrorist groups to the subterranean world where support and sanctuary could easily be arranged by manipulating or adopting the tactics and the structures of criminal organizations. This has led to a new concern among analysts, some of whom point to a scenario in which a combination of criminality and terrorism could give the terrorist groups a disproportionate advantage in terms of skills and capabilities vis-à-vis the states they fight against. As Robert Kupperman notes, the benefits accruing from the global interconnectivity of organized crime could enable even smaller terrorist groups to engage in disproportionate acts of violence.\(^81\) Others like Tamara Makarenko project that the increasing nexus between criminals and terrorists might lead weak and fragmented states to become “black-holes” where the pursuit of political objectives with criminality would become the order of the day.\(^82\)

In this paper we have argued that the nexus between crime and terrorism is based on expediency and mutual convenience. However, even as terrorists and criminals leverage each other’s capabilities, these interactions are temporary and usually devoid of any long-range strategic importance. The possibility of this convergence of interest and tactics leading to a stage where elements of criminality and terrorism become indistinguishable is remote. Hence, conflating the crime-terror nexus to a point where it loses any clear meaning can be problematic, both conceptually and from counterterrorism perspectives. Besides, as terrorists increasingly embed themselves in crime, they run the risk of exposures to law enforcement action.

A range of factors determine the effectiveness of a terrorist organization. These include leadership, command, control and communication structures, military capability, finances, and its support base. However, as groups like al Qaeda demonstrated, physical basing of the groups with a hierarchical structure is no more as salient as the potency of the ideology which propels these groups into violence. Even though the top leadership of al Qaeda is in disarray its message of hatred and call for revenge against the West resonates well with disparate groups and individuals across the world. After September 11, these groups and their associates and affiliates have lost their ability to generate resources in a structured manner. However, they are still capable of carrying out their activities by exploiting the dynamics of the alternative sanctuary of the world of crime. This criminal sanctuary supports “new terrorism” in various ways—to generate funds and procure other logistics necessary for operations, to facilitate movement of personnel and money across national borders, and most importantly to ensure anonymity against law enforcement scrutiny. This does not necessarily suggest
that criminality has substituted state sponsorship for terrorist groups. From both motivational and organizational perspective, the criminals and terrorists retain distinctive characteristics.

As global counterterrorism efforts gained rapidly in scope and intensity, terrorist groups have developed new strategies not only to avoid attrition and interdiction, but also to supplement and complement their respective capabilities. In this terrorist groups have significantly leveraged their links with crime. This fatal combination of political and economic motivation, with terrorist and criminal strategies and tactics, now pose an unprecedented and complex threat to international security. Terrorist use of organized crime has significant potential to jeopardize terrorist finance interdiction strategies. Alternatively, however, criminal enterprises provide opportunities for law enforcement infiltration. The conventional law enforcement response to crime has been within the limited context of domestic jurisdictions. But as terrorist support bases become increasingly embedded in criminal structures, and terrorism begins to masquerade as organized crime, it is necessary that the knowledge of criminal operations be leveraged to understand evolving terrorist tactics. In the final analysis, successful antiterrorist and anticrime strategies depend on how the security and policing agencies understand the new paradigm and calibrate their responses appropriately.
Legal Sanctuaries and Predator Strikes
in the War on Terror

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On the first night of the campaign against al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan in October 2001, the United States nearly had a major success. Officials believed that they had pinpointed the location of the supreme leader of the Taliban, Mullah Muhammad Omar. While patrolling the roads near Kabul, an unmanned but armed CIA drone trained its crosshairs on Omar in a convoy of cars fleeing the capitol. Under the terms of an agreement, the CIA controllers did not have the authority to order a strike on the target. Likewise, the local Fifth Fleet commander in Bahrain lacked the requisite authority. Instead, following the agreement they sought approval from United States Central Command (CENTCOM) in Tampa to launch the Hellfire missile from the Predator drone positioned above Omar.

The Predator followed the convoy to a building where Omar and about 100 guards sought cover. Some delay ensued in securing General Tommy R. Franks’ approval. One report indicated that a full-scale fighter-bomber assault was requested, and that General Franks declined to approve the request on the basis of legal advice he received on the spot. Another report suggested that the magnitude of the target prompted General Franks to run the targeting by the White House. Media reports indicated that President Bush personally approved the strike, although the delay permitted time for Mullah Omar to change his location and thus disrupt the attack. F-18s later targeted and destroyed the building, but Omar escaped. Some speculated that the attack was aborted because of the possibility that others in a crowded house might be killed.

The decision to target specific individuals with lethal force after September 11 was neither unprecedented nor surprising. In appropriate circumstances the United States has engaged in targeted killing for a long time, at least since a border war with Mexican bandits in 1916. In a time of war, subjecting individual combatants to
lethal force has been a permitted and lawful instrument of waging war successfully. But new elements of the targeted killing policy emerged in recent years, in response to terrorism and its threats against the United States at home and abroad.

The components of the targeted killing policy quickly took on a sharper focus soon after September 11. For the first time, pilotless drone aircraft were equipped both with sophisticated surveillance and targeting technology and with powerful Hellfire missiles capable of inflicting lethal force effectively from a safe distance. The drones are CIA aircraft, part of the Special Activities division. Thus, the drones were controlled by civilian leaders outside the chain-of-command. The civilian officials cooperate and share information and decision making with military commanders in a shared campaign against terrorism.

The use of the Predator promised gains in the war against terrorism. If targets as significant as Mullah Omar or even Osama bin Laden could be dispatched with such effectiveness and with little or no risk to U.S. personnel, the objectives of the War on Terrorism could be advanced dramatically. At the same time, some questioned the use of the new weapon and its CIA links, as well as several more general short and longer-term consequences of an invigorated policy of targeted killing.

This chapter is presented in a case study format and is designed to raise and explore a few themes that are central to the present and likely future direction of counter-terrorism strategies and tactics throughout the world. The issues assessed concern the overall theme of terrorist sanctuaries, and they range from host government cooperation, legal authorities, collateral damage, and the locus of decision authority, to tactical questions about the appropriate uses of technology and weaponry. The next section provides a concise narrative backdrop on the conflict triggered by the September 11 attacks. Then the chapter reviews the emerging policies and procedures that permit targeting terrorists with lethal force, followed by a short section that explores the evolving DOD/CIA relationship in this area. The next two sections assess the legal authorities for and potential limits on targeted killing/assassination and the utility of targeted killing in the War on Terrorism. A final part considers the complex and controversial growing role for drone-fired missiles in the global War on Terror in the years since the Yemen strike.

THE “WAR ON TERRORISM”

The worst terrorist attack ever occurred in the United States on September 11, 2001, when nineteen al Qaeda-linked operatives used knives and box cutters to kill or wound passengers and pilots and then commandeered four separate but coordinated aircraft in pursuit of preselected targets. Two of the planes struck in New York City at the World Trade Center, causing both towers to collapse, killing approximately 3000 persons, including hundreds of firefighters and rescue personnel who were helping to evacuate the towers. A third plane was flown directly into the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia, where 189 persons died, including all who were on board the plane. The fourth plane crashed in Stony Creek Township,
Pennsylvania, apparently after passengers overpowered the terrorists, preventing the aircraft from being used as a missile toward its unknown target. All forty-five persons aboard were killed in the crash.

Within hours the hijackers had been linked to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. President Bush visited the World Trade Center site the next day and said, “Freedom and democracy are under attack.” On September 17, the President remarked that bin Laden “is wanted dead or alive.” In a September 20 address to a joint session of Congress the President also stated, “Our war on terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.” The President emphasized that “we will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”

The War on Terrorism began dramatically and won significant early gains. But as the targeted killing policy evolved from the early days of the war in Afghanistan, not all the signs were positive. After the near miss on Mullah Omar, no verified intelligence reported seeing, much less targeting, either Omar or Osama bin Laden during the Afghanistan campaign. Senior leaders of al Qaeda remained at large, and they were likely relocating early and often to elude detection, capture, or death. However, on November 3, 2001, a missile-carrying Predator drone killed Mohammed Atef, al Qaeda’s chief of military operations, in a raid near Kabul. Then, in early May 2002 the CIA tried but failed to kill an Afghan factional leader, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, an Islamic fundamentalist who had vowed to topple the government of Hamid Karzai and to attack U.S. forces.

The calculus for targeted killing changed dramatically on November 3, 2002, when a CIA drone fired a Hellfire missile and killed a senior al Qaeda leader and five low-level operatives traveling by car in a remote part of the Yemeni desert. In the first use of an armed Predator outside Afghanistan or, indeed, the first military action in the war against terrorism outside Afghanistan, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi was killed. Al Harethi was described as the senior al Qaeda official in Yemen, one of the top ten to twelve al Qaeda operatives in the world, and a suspect in the October 2000 suicide bombing of the U.S. destroyer Cole, where 17 American Navy personnel were killed. U.S. intelligence and law enforcement officials had been tracking his movements for months before the attack. Along with al Harethi, killed in the Predator strike were five other al Qaeda operatives, including an American citizen of Yemeni descent, Kamal Derwish, who grew up in the Buffalo suburb of Tonawanda and who, according to FBI intelligence, recruited American Muslims to attend al Qaeda training camps.

DECIDING TO TAKE ACTION

The Predator is an ungainly, $40 million, propeller-driven aircraft, 27 feet long with a 49-foot wingspan that flies as slowly as 80 miles per hour and is guided by an operator at a television monitor who may be hundreds of miles away. The drone
can hover continuously for 24 hours or more at 15,000 feet above any battlefield, and it can send live video to AC-130 gunships or command posts around the world without putting any pilots in harms way. The drone’s radar, infrared sensors and color video camera can track vehicles at night and through clouds, producing sharp enough pictures to make out people on the ground from more than three miles away. The Predator cannot fly in stormy weather, and they have been prone to icing. The drone is also vulnerable to enemy antiaircraft fire. The Predator has been flown by the U.S. military for a number of years. The combat debut of the Predator came in 1995 in the skies over Bosnia, where it provided sharp “real time” images of the battlefield. One year before the September 11 attacks, an unarmed CIA drone captured a video in Afghanistan of a man who intelligence officials believe was Osama bin Laden.18

The decision to develop the Predator as a combat device was made specifically to attack bin Laden, according to administration officials.19 The Hellfire missiles are air-to-ground, laser-guided weapons that were used effectively by Apache helicopter gunships against Iraqi tanks in the 1991 Gulf War.20

The idea of using the armed Predator drone in counterterrorism combat has been circulating for years. However, lingering disagreements over who should have the ultimate authority for firing the Hellfire missiles—the military or the CIA—slowed the development of the new counter-terrorism weapon. It was the possibility that a Predator missed a chance to strike a convoy that apparently included Mullah Omar on the first night of the Afghan war that finally settled the targeting authority dispute, at least for the time being. The missed opportunity, caused by traditional military chain-of-command reviews up to and apparently including the Commander in Chief, gave the CIA its first ever authority to strike beyond a narrow range of preselected counter-terrorism targets.

It has often been said that the September 11 terrorist attacks changed everything. However broad and deep the changes wrought by the cataclysmic attacks, the United States clearly reacted by changing long-standing tenets of its counterterrorism strategy. Where law enforcement and intelligence gathering were the primary instruments of U.S. policy against terrorism outside any designated battlefield, after September 11 the concept of theater of war itself was shelved in the War on Terrorism. Terrorist sanctuaries also became targets, although it was not clear just where such attacks might be carried out.

In the weeks after September 11, President Bush signed an intelligence finding giving the CIA broad authority to pursue terrorism around the world.21 A finding contains the factual and policy predicates for the intelligence activities authorized in any significant operation, and the document must be personally approved by the President. By statute, a finding must accompany any covert operation approved by the President, including those that permit targeted killing. However, a finding governs the use of appropriated funds for covert operations by intelligence agencies. (The military use operations orders, and are thus neither given authority nor restricted by the findings.) In the classified finding, the President delegated targeting and operational authority to senior civilian and military officials. Precise
approval mechanisms remain classified. The authority given in the presidential finding is surely the most sweeping and most lethal since the founding of the CIA. In part, the finding contemplates a high and unprecedented degree of cooperation between the CIA and Special Forces, as well as other military units. Reacting to the finding, one official implicitly warned the terrorists: “The gloves are off.”

Terrorists were first singled out by name in a 1995 Executive Order by President Clinton that introduced a category of “specially designated terrorists” on a list maintained by the Secretary of State and the Treasury Office of Foreign Assets Control. In fact, the CIA has been authorized since 1998 to use covert means to disrupt and preempt terrorist operations planned by Osama bin Laden. The Clinton administration directive was affirmed by President Bush before September 11 and was based on evidence linking al Qaeda to the August 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Africa. The directive stopped short of authorizing targeted killing, but did authorize lethal force for self-defense.

Neither the 1998 directive nor the one issued by President Bush after September 11 exempted the agencies from the 1981 Executive Order provision banning political assassination (discussed later in this chapter). The 2001 finding broadens the class of potential targets beyond UBL and his close circle, and also extends the boundaries beyond Afghanistan. In permitting explicitly the targeting of an individual with lethal force, the finding also more narrowly focuses the potential to inflict violence.

John C. Gannon, retired deputy director of central intelligence, reacted favorably to the new finding: “The important thing is that the accountability chain is clear. I would want the president’s guidance to be as clear as it could be, including the names of individuals. You’ve got to have the political levels behind you so the intelligence officers are not left hanging.”

But was the use of the Predator in Yemen the only way to achieve the Administration’s objectives? One alternative to the Predator was a “snatch and kill” operation conducted by a squad of commandos, deployed by helicopters from ships in the Red Sea. In discussions with Yemeni officials, it was feared that a ground operation could ignite a guerrilla war. U.S. officials commented that armed Predators had been flying over Yemen for some time, awaiting targets of opportunity. Yemeni government officials were aware of the surveillance and of its potential application against al Qaeda, U.S. officials said.

The Yemeni government increased its cooperation with the U.S. effort in the months before the November 2002 strike, after U.S. officials complained of a lack of cooperation in investigating the Cole bombing and other terrorist attacks where suspects hiding in Yemen were potentially involved. Although Yemen sought to conduct its own counter-terrorism operations near its remote and largely lawless border with Saudi Arabia, a principal sanctuary for al Qaeda operatives, a December 2001 operation led to heavy Yemeni casualties.

One key figure in the Yemen Predator strike was outside the traditional circle of those normally involved in planning military operations. U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Edmund Hull, a seasoned counterterrorism expert, personally traveled to
remote Yemeni desert territory to seek intelligence on al Harethi. The Arabic-speaking Hull met with local tribesman and reportedly paid for information on al Harethi’s whereabouts. Hull angered local Yemeni officials with his freelancing, and by facilitating a Predator strike that threatened peace in Yemen. But the Yemenis had failed to nab al Harethi in the December 2001 raid, and it appeared that Yemen would not strike again on its own. Aside from insufficient training in counterterror operations, Yemen may have been reluctant to act on its own because of a perceived debt that President Ali Saleh owes to Osama bin Laden’s forces, which assisted in putting down a separatist movement in 1994.

Grumbling aside, the Yemen strike was conducted after considerable cooperation between United States and Yemeni officials, including the mounting of a joint U.S./Yemen intelligence team. In addition to the intelligence gathered by Hull, the Yemen Predator operation may also have been aided by global positioning coordinates given by one of the several phones held by al Harethi. Once those coordinates were received, targeting officials knew that the Predator had to act quickly, as soon as al Harethi was traveling in a car, away from civilian areas. Apparently, Al Harethi had evaded earlier capture attempts and, on that November day, it was suspected that the passengers were going to a target. Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz called the strike “a very successful tactical operation.” The wreckage of the car revealed traces of explosives and remnants of communications equipment.

THE DOD/CIA RELATIONSHIP

Part of the buildup toward use of the Predator for the targeted killing operation involved new and still-evolving relations between civilian and military leaders in DOD and the CIA. Beginning with the seizure of American hostages in Iran in 1979 and continuing through the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s, military planners recognized that the CIA had little human intelligence that could have assisted the military and provided better advice concerning U.S. policies. The Pentagon responded by creating an Intelligence Support Activity (ISA) to collect intelligence and conduct covert military operations, with Special Forces personnel and intelligence officers.

After September 11, the ISA, code-named Gray Fox, was invigorated to participate in the global War on Terrorism. Operating independently of the intelligence community agencies, Gray Fox provides a military force that can conduct covert operations or collect intelligence in support of military operations. In July 2002 Secretary Rumsfeld ordered Special Forces commander and Air Force General Charles Holland to develop a plan to capture or kill members of terrorist organizations, on a global scale. When questioned in December about the Predator strike in Yemen and Pentagon policy regarding assassination or killing of al Qaeda operatives, Secretary Rumsfeld denied that the Special Forces personnel were trained
to assassinate: “That is not what they are trained to do. They are trained to serve their country and to contribute to peace and stability in the world.”

The evolving Special Forces roles and missions could conceivably find the military carrying out covert operations much the way that CIA has done so traditionally. Some questioned whether such an overlap or redundancy in operation roles and capabilities is desirable, or, if desirable, whether it is workable in practice. According to Defense Science Board Chairman William Schneider, Jr., the CIA would execute the operations, using DOD assets. Schneider said that the DSB did not recommend changes in the ban on assassinations, or reductions in congressional oversight. Some members of Congress expressed concern on hearing the Defense Science Board report, however, because DOD is not subject to the covert operations reporting requirements. In light of the shared DOD/CIA responsibilities in the targeted killing program, it is unclear whether Special Forces personnel who participate in a CIA operation are bound by military regulations. Nor is it clear whether an operation that is planned by CIA but carried out by Special Forces is a covert operation and thus regulated by the intelligence laws.

LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THE OPERATION; TARGETED KILLING VS. ASSASSINATION

Because the Yemen strike was authorized by the President in an intelligence finding, at first blush, the relevant law is the law of intelligence. Since the Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974, Congress has authorized CIA covert operations if findings are prepared and delivered to select members of Congress before the operation described, or in a “timely fashion” thereafter. So long as the intelligence committees are kept “fully and currently informed,” the intelligence laws permit the President broad discretion to utilize the nation’s intelligence agencies to carry out national security operations, perhaps including targeted killing. Such an operation would follow Hughes-Ryan as an “operation in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,” and thus presumably would be conducted pursuant to statutory authority.

To some it seemed that the President’s “wanted dead or alive” remark about bin Laden ran counter to the long-standing ban on political assassination. Enshrined in an executive order first by President Gerald Ford and unchanged since President Reagan’s iteration in 1981, the directive forbids political assassination but does not define the term. Just what does distinguish lawful targeted killing from unlawful political assassination? The answer turns upon which legal framework applies. During war, the law of armed conflict applies, and targeted killing of individuals is lawful, although killing by treacherous means—through the use of deceit or trickery—is not. In peacetime, any extra-judicial killing by a government agent is lawful only if taken in self-defense or in defense of others. But what rules apply when the United States is engaged in a nontraditional War on Terrorism?
Although President Reagan’s Executive Order 12,333 forbids political assassination, the order does not restrict the lawful use of force against legitimate enemy targets. Without this legal justification, assassination is simply murder and violates domestic and international law. Executive Order 12,333 simply reflects existing law and makes that policy a prominent and explicit part of U.S. law. The defensive use of force—targeted at a known al Qaeda leader, for example—has firm legal roots in U.S. law, the U.N. Charter, and customary international law. In making operational decisions like the one made to strike with the Predator in Yemen, the law of armed conflict permits targeting al Qaeda combatants, although carrying out the strike in a terrorist sanctuary rather than on a traditional battlefield complicates the legal issues.

On the one hand, President Bush asserted forcefully that the September 11 attacks were acts of war directed at the United States, giving it the legal right to repel the horrific attacks. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld opined, “it is certainly within the president’s power to direct that, in our self-defense, we take this battle to the terrorists and that means to the leadership and command and control capabilities of terrorist networks.”39 Whether waged against us by a state or a nonstate terrorist organization, war is defined by what it does, not by the identity of the perpetrator. Still, the law of armed conflict has not yet evolved to account adequately for the twilight zone between conventional war and conventional peace, when nations are subject to the continuing threat of terrorist attack.

On the other hand, within this twilight zone of threat from terrorist attacks it is not clear exactly what distinguishes a combatant and, thus, a proper target, from a civilian who may not be targeted. Nor is it known what evidence will suffice that someone who does not wear a uniform and who does not fight for a sovereign state is sufficiently implicated in terrorist activities so as to warrant targeting with lethal force. Clearly someone who is positively identified as an al Qaeda operative is an enemy combatant, one who may be targeted with lethal force. But, as Yale law professor Harold Hongju Koh asks, “what factual showing will demonstrate that [the target] had warlike intentions against us and who sees that evidence before any action is taken?”40

Under the law of war, the selection of individuals for targeted lethal force would not be unlawful if the targets are combatant forces of another nation, a guerilla force, or a terrorist or other organization whose actions pose a threat to the security of the United States. Other international law strictures also come into play, including the United Nations Charter. Article 2 proscribes the violation by one nation of the territorial integrity of another nation, although Article 51 permits measures for “collective self-defense.”

In addition to the President’s constitutional authorities as commander in chief and his authorities over intelligence activities authorized by statute, the President’s finding may also be supported by Congress’s September 14, 2001 Joint Resolution giving the President the authority to use “all necessary and appropriate force” against “persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” of September 11. The sweeping authority granted in the resolution
is not time-limited; nor does it have a geographic constraint. Nor is his discretion on choice of target narrowed in any way, so long as the target is connected to September 11.\textsuperscript{41}

Under what conditions could a U.S. citizen be subject to a Predator attack, ordered by the CIA or the military? Before September 11, the government’s authority to kill a citizen outside the judicial process was generally restricted to situations where the American is threatening directly the lives of other Americans or their allies.\textsuperscript{42} Still, the President’s intelligence finding does not make any exception for Americans. The authority to target U.S. citizens is thus implicit, not explicit.

Al Qaeda members do not wear uniforms or serve in a nation’s army, or fight on a conventional battlefield. But the battlefield against al Qaeda was declared to be the entire world after September 11. American citizen Kamal Derwish was in the car with Harethi. Although Derwish was not targeted, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice responded to a question about the killing of an American by stating that “no constitutional questions are raised . . . [the President] is well within the balance of accepted practice and the letter of his constitutional authority.”\textsuperscript{43}

The strike could thus be seen as an air strike in a combat zone, or it could be characterized as an assassination of a civilian who was innocent until proven guilty. Officials also alleged that Derwish was the leader of an al Qaeda cell in Western New York. Although several Yemeni-American members of the alleged cell were arrested and criminally charged with providing support to terrorist activities, Derwish was not accused of any crime.

Senator Richard Shelby supported the Administration’s view that Derwish was an enemy combatant whose constitutional rights as an American were nullified by his actions: “A U.S. citizen terrorist will kill you just like somebody from another country.”\textsuperscript{44} But Mohammed Albanna, vice president of the American Muslim Council Buffalo chapter, disagreed: Derwish “has not been tried and has not been found guilty . . . he’s still an innocent American who was killed.”\textsuperscript{45} Former Air Force JAG officer and director of the Duke University Center on Law, Ethics and National Security Scott Silliman expressed concern about the implications of the Administration’s legal and operations theories: “Could you put a Hellfire missile into a car in Washington, D.C., under the same theory? The answer is yes, you could.”\textsuperscript{46}

WEIGHING THE UTILITY AND IMPLICATIONS OF TARGETED KILLING

There was little doubt among U.S. officials that the Predator strike had material benefits. An important al Qaeda leader was eliminated, and a strong signal was sent that there is no sanctuary for terrorists. Still, tactically the strike against al Harethi represented an escalation of the War on Terrorism.

The Predator depends on reliable intelligence; mistakes happen. In February 2002, a Predator patrolling thousands of feet above Afghanistan fed images to CIA and military officers of a very tall man among a small group. After officials on the
ground determined that the man could be Osama bin Laden, a request to launch a Hellfire was made through the chain of command. The request was granted a few minutes later, but by then the group had disbanded. When the man and two others were spotted emerging from a wooded area shortly thereafter, the Hellfire was launched and the three men were killed. Media reports indicated that the three were local men who were scavenging for scrap metal.47

Could the Yemen strike be interpreted by other nations and even nonstate groups as a justification of their own preemptive attacks on perceived adversaries? Silliman thinks so: “We are basically opening up and crafting a new tool and tactic which is not [only] for the United States to use. . . . We may be putting our leadership at risk.” Assassination of a U.S. Secretary of State or another cabinet official cannot be ruled out. Swedish Foreign Minister Anna Lindh expressed similar concerns: “Even terrorists must be treated according to international law. Otherwise, a nation can start executing those whom they consider terrorists.”48 Silliman mused, “if we does this outside the traditional combat area in Afghanistan . . . could we not do it in Germany, Ottawa, or even Cincinnati?”49

Should the United States acknowledge that it has conducted an operation like the one in Yemen? Some Yemeni officials reacted angrily to the U.S. strike. General Yahya al Mutawakel, deputy general of the People’s Congress party, maintained that the public acknowledgment of the Yemen strike by the United States violated a secrecy agreement between the two nations.50 Al Mutawakel argued that the United States did not consider adequately the internal circumstances in Yemen in deciding to go public: “In security matters, you don’t want to alert the enemy.”51 He feared domestic unrest in Yemen, and reprisals by al Qaeda sympathizers still active in Yemen.

How broadly should the targeted killing net be cast? As Vice President Dick Cheney commented, “There’s no piece of real estate. It’s not like a state or a country. The notion of deterrence doesn’t really apply here. There’s no treaty to be negotiated, there’s no arms control agreement that’s going to guarantee our safety and security. The only way you can deal with them is to destroy them. The reach of our efforts must be as broad and deep as the tentacles of the terrorist networks.”52

As President Bush noted, “We will make no distinction between the terrorists who committed these acts and those who harbor them.”53 Another intelligence official commented, “You have to go after the Gucci guys, the guys who write the checks.”54 Killing them would be especially dramatic, he said, because they do not commonly die for a cause.55 Although he is opposed generally to targeted killing, retired CIA inspector general Hitz agreed that going after the funding people “would have a tremendously chilling effect” on al Qaeda.56

EXPANDING THE USE OF THE PREDATOR AND TARGETED KILLING

Five years after the September 11 attacks, little is known about the scope and limits of the Bush Administration’s targeted killing program—how many missiles
have been fired from Predators, for example, how targeting is done, or the extent of casualties. By early 2006 several U.S. officials confirmed that at least nineteen successful strikes with Hellfire missiles have occurred against terrorist targets abroad since September 11, including 10 in Iraq during one month in 2005. At least four senior al Qaeda leaders have been killed, along with many civilians, and the number of times the missiles missed their target is unknown.57

As al Qaeda has become more diffuse, and the Predator has had some successes, the operational difficulties and legal complexities embedded in use of the Predator have increased. Geographic expansion is one important consideration. Will the targeted killing program expand to Somalia, or to Indonesia, or to other new frontiers in the War on Terrorism? Will the targeting reach beyond the leadership of al Qaeda and its affiliates to the rank-and-file? To what extent will the expanded program depend upon host government cooperation—will the United States carry out operations without host government permission, or even its knowledge?

In 2004 and 2005, Predator missiles struck at least three times in Pakistan and killed former Taliban commander Nek Mohammed and al Qaeda leaders Haitham Yemeni and Abu Hamza Rabia. Although the missile attacks were precise, five others were killed with Mohammed and the strike against Rabia killed his bodyguards, as well as young relatives of the owner of the house that was struck.

In the ongoing conflict inside Afghanistan, Pakistan has become a critical sanctuary for terrorists. In January 2006, Hellfire missiles struck three houses in the sparsely populated village of Damadola Burkanday in the North West Frontier Province of Pakistan. Their target was Ayman al-Zawahiri, the second-in-command of al Qaeda and supposed chief strategist for Osama bin Laden. Four children were among eighteen villagers who died in the attack, but Zawahiri was not among them. The Predator performed exactly as it was supposed to, but the intelligence that picked the targets and the timing of the strike was faulty.58

The fact that the target in Pakistan this time was someone of the value of Zawahiri made the decision to strike relatively easy, although protests were mounted in Pakistan and elsewhere against the United States and against the government of Pakistan President, General Pervez Musharraf. In any case, the expansion of the Predator into Pakistan again raised the legal issues, as well as the utility of the targeted killing policy. In this area of operation, like so many others since September 11, President Bush has made policy on his own, largely unfettered by Congress, the courts, or by international bodies and laws.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has used the 2002 Predator strike in the War on Terror to raise and then assess a few important themes that are central to the terrorist sanctuaries problem. One overarching issue—host state cooperation and the culpability of those who harbor terrorists—is shown here as legally murky, politically tricky,
and largely dependent on case-specific personalities and circumstances. If the war against terrorists continues to expand, in part through these precise targeted killing technologies, what are its limits? Next, the decision process and civil/military cooperation aspects of the program are relatively untested and evolving. Will the program become more or less one for the CIA, and, if it becomes predominantly one for CIA, what legal vetting and limits will it face?

One potentially positive outcome of the expanded program is the chance that the Predator will deter governments and other groups that might provide sanctuary to terrorists. Yet the program could also foment anti-American sentiments and destabilize sensitive regimes. As former CIA counsel Lee Strickland speculated, “You give shelter to al Qaeda figures, you may well get your village blown up. Conversely, you have to note that this can also create local animosity and instability.”

In addition, the program may open the field to foreign governments to conduct similar activities or be more overt about their intentions to do so. The United States may now have (re)joined a select club of state actors, by virtue of a policy that is setting a precedent for what might be considered permissible in foreign affairs and international security.

Although the legal and targeting review and vetting process inside CIA and DOD is thought to be multilayered and rigorous, no one outside a small group knows just how decisions are made, or the extent to which CIA might launch missiles on its own. Even as President Bush expressed misgivings in 2005 for his September 2001 vow to get Osama bin Laden “dead or alive,” there is little doubt that a Predator could strike at bin Laden without hesitation if he is clearly identified and in a place where he can be isolated from bystanders.

There also remains the possibility that an expanded targeted killing program could reach those who are not clearly lawful targets. As the United States Supreme Court stated unequivocally in its Hamdan decision in June 2006, the executive does not possess unreviewable legal authority to make the rules in fighting terrorism. While the Court curtailed the President’s authority to try alien detainees by military commission and did not comment directly on other aspects of the post-September 11 regime for combating terrorism, the Hamdan decision serves as a reminder that a background set of human rights may well establish legal parameters for targeted killing operations, whether run by the CIA or the military.
On August 8, 2005, a video entitled “Cubs of the Land of the Two Sanctuaries” was posted on the militant radical Islamic Web forum Tajdid.org.uk.1 In the title of the video, the use of the word “cubs” suggests lion cubs, as militant radical Muslims commonly refer to themselves as lions, while the “Land of the Two Sanctuaries” is an Islamic term for Saudi Arabia, the two sanctuaries being Mecca and Medina.

The video introduces a young girl, perhaps ten years old, with an AK-47 at her side. She is joined by a young boy, and together they begin speaking and gesturing in unison, waving pistols in the air as they recite the following speech: “We are terrorists, and terror is our way. Let the oppressors . . . and their masters know that we are terrorists and that we frighten. Prepare what force and equipment you can to terrorize the enemy of God. For terror is an obligation of the religion.” While reciting lines such as, “We are terrorists, and terror is our way,” the children place the pistols in front of their own chests. At other times they point the pistols up in the air, or toward the camera.2

Jihadi propagandists have been posting radical videos like this with increasingly regularity since the late 1990s. Some of these Web sites host photos and videos of jihadi summer camps for kids, displaying images of young Arab children dressed as suicide bombers and videos of children conducting mock beheadings. One recently hosted an animated cartoon featuring Iraqi mujahidin dragging American forces from their Humvee and executing them. The purpose of such Web propaganda is obvious: appeal to a younger generation of future militants, while demonstrating to the enemies of Islam the threat posed by this generation. The existence of thousands of jihadi-styled Web sites also demonstrates one of the most important facets of the global security environment—information technology is playing an increasingly central role in the evolution of modern terrorist networks.
Over the past decade, groups and movements of all persuasions have leveraged new information and communication technologies, the Internet and cellular phones in particular, in order to further their agendas. These technologies have facilitated

- the coordination of activities, events, and collective action;
- the discussion of topics of interest and news with movement participants;
- the dissemination of propaganda, educational, and training materials;
- the ability to identify, recruit, and socialize new membership; and
- opportunities to find and exploit information about their opposition.

The very nature of the Internet—including easy access for virtually anyone to publish and retrieve information, the ability to maintain anonymity, a rich multimedia environment, and the ability to encrypt data transmissions—makes it an ideal arena for individuals and organizations of all ideological persuasions to mobilize resources, recruits, and recognition of their political agendas. Radical jihadi propagandists have been particularly effective in harnessing the virtual world as a sanctuary for sharing their ideas, strategy, tactics, plans, and funds. By circumventing television, radio, and newspapers, the Internet creates not just the tools, but an entirely new forum for fostering global awareness of issues unconstrained by government censorship or traditional cultural norms.

Despite the fact that jihadi Web sites have only recently received widespread public attention, pro-jihad Web masters have been hosting Web sites since before the attacks of September 11, 2001. The famed “al-Neda.com” run by Saudi al Qaeda propagandist, Yusuf al-Ayiri, served as al Qaeda’s first official Web site. Throughout the late 1990s, new sites emerged (like “Azzam.com”) which provided important jihadi articles, communiqués, photos, testimonials, and biographies of martyred jihadi fighters to its readers. As Internet penetration broadened and deepened around the world, jihadi use of the Internet has grown exponentially. It was not until the United States and its allies unseated the Taliban in Afghanistan, however, that senior al Qaeda leaders found themselves in a post-9/11 scramble to keep their movement motivated and coherent. As such, the Internet became not only a useful way to replace their dismantled training camps and reconnect their weakened organizational leadership, but one of the only ways to sustain the global jihadi movement.

Michael Innes observes in his introductory chapter to this volume that the virtual realm “is a key element of contemporary terrorist threats, facilitating both domestic and transnational terrorism through access to digital and Internet-based channels for command, control, communications, and intelligence.” Similarly, a recent report by the RAND Corporation suggests that terrorists “will move from hierarchical toward information-age network designs. More effort will go into building arrays of transnational internettred groups than into building stand alone groups.” During a recent visit to Europe, Ambassador Henry Crumpton, U.S. Coordinator for Counterterrorism, noted his current concern over “cyber-safe
Academics and analysts have begun exploring the ways in which jihadists look to the Internet for training. As Gabriel Weimann observed, “The Internet has become a valuable tool for the terrorist organization, not just to coordinate operations and launch attacks, but also as virtual training camps and a tool for indoctrination and recruitment. In reality, the Internet became for al Qaeda what experts call an ‘online terrorism university.’” Terrorism analyst Reuven Paz notes that the jihadists refer to the Internet as an “open university of jihad.”

As reflected in this chapter, our own analysis indicates that while the Internet is playing an increasingly prominent role in the global spread of knowledge and know-how among its readers, it plays a more important role: it has become a virtual sanctuary within which jihadists can mobilize, educate, and establish their version of Islamic governance. This chapter will examine the nature of these virtual terror training camps, as well as other ways in which terror organizations use the Internet, and then highlight the technical, legal, and policy challenges that this phenomenon poses for the counterterrorism community.
exploring the role of virtual camps to resist this advance of Western culture into the Islamic world. And still others focus on the jihadi end-state: the establishment of the global Islamic caliphate.

Lots of thousands of pro-terrorist Web sites exist throughout the world, hosted in multiple languages, and all of which seek to establish a rationale for their use of violence in pursuit of particular goals and objectives. In addition to written appeals for action, images, music, speeches, and videos are also used to persuade—or at least connect with—by a Web site visitor on an emotional and intellectual level. Estimates suggest that in 2006, over a billion humans have at least some access to the Internet (an actual figure is impossible to determine), offering an enormous opportunity for terror groups to reach new audiences. According to RAND researchers Michelle Zanini and Sean Edwards:

Using some of the same marketing techniques employed by commercial enterprises, terrorist servers could capture information about the users who browse their websites, and then later contact those who seem most interested. Recruiters may also use more interactive Internet technology to roam online chat rooms and cyber cafes, looking for receptive members of the public—particularly young people. Electronic bulletin boards and Usenet discussion forums can also serve as vehicles for reaching out to potential recruits. Interested computer users around the world can be engaged in long-term “cyber relationships” that could lead to friendship and eventual membership.7

However, as Weimann notes, “modern terrorists do not recruit directly online; they use the Net only to identify, profile and select potential candidates for recruitment. Afraid of having their groups infiltrated by security agencies and counterterrorism forces, they will use the Internet only for the early stages of the recruitment process.”8 Once radicalized, individuals seeking to do more than read or discuss the problem will seek out like-minded individuals in the physical world, often at mosques, school, work, or other local environments.

Examples of the Internet’s use for recruitment and mobilization range from right-wing extremists in the United States to Islamic militants in Saudi Arabia, Chechnya, and Indonesia. However, while most terrorist groups are local in scope and objectives, many terrorism researchers have described a globalized jihadist terror movement as the most important security threat of the current decade. The Web’s growing centrality in al Qaeda-related radicalization and mobilization has led analysts, such as former CIA deputy director John E. McLaughlin, to describe the movement as primarily driven today by “ideology and the Internet.”9 Terrorism researchers Scott Atran and Jessica Stern note that the Internet provides a way to connect with individuals and provide them direction as they surf jihadi Web sites.10 In fact, no matter at what level one is willing to serve and participate in jihad, training and educational materials exist to help move an interested browser down a specific trajectory.

Some jihadi Web sites have offered detailed instructional documents and videos that explain how to use specific software packages or access certain types of files online. These tutorials are accompanied with a “jihadi-approved” version
of the software to download, which often includes computer programs for video editing or Web page design. To this end, *jihadi* computer programmers have actually launched new stand-alone Web browsing software, similar to Internet Explorer, which searches only particular sites. By structurally constraining Web traffic, the software seems to be discouraging the freedom to navigate to other online destinations, thus facilitating the intellectual separation of *jihadi* visitors from the chaos of cyberspace. These efforts to define and bound *jihadi* ideological space, critical for *jihadi* success in light of the multiplicity of alternative viewpoints that can be accessed online, should be expected to accelerate as ideologues seek dominance over this technology.

More thoughtful *jihadi* candidates can read about *jihadi* ideology and strategy from the al Qaeda library site (http://tawhed.ws), which hosts over 3,000 books and monographs from respected *jihadi* thinkers. One recent posting in a radical Islamic discussion forum, Tajdid al-Islami, demonstrated for participants how *jihadi*-themed books can even be downloaded on to cell phones. In addition to books, anyone can download propaganda and recruitment videos directly onto their mobile devices. Anyone anywhere can access a wealth of material at any intellectual level related to waging violent jihad. In short, the Internet provides individuals with the resources and social networks they need to move from being angry to being able to act on that anger.

Norwegian terrorism researcher Thomas Hegghammer has identified three basic categories of Web sites within the jihadi Internet community. First, there are the message boards where one finds the political and religious discussions among the sympathizers and potential recruits. These provide links to the second type, the “information hubs,” where new radical-Islamist texts, declarations, and recordings are posted. These are often found among popular online “communities” hosted by Yahoo!, Geocities, and others, where members can discuss a certain topic, post relevant articles and multimedia files, and share a meeting place for those with similar interests. Creating your own Web site within these forums is free, quick, and extremely easy. Finally, there are the third type of sites, the “mother sites,” which are run by people who get their material directly from the ideologues or operatives.

In March 2005, a statement on the jihadi forum Minbar Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a noted that an Information Jihad Brigade had been formed, with the stated objective of launching a full-scale propaganda war to “influence the morale of our enemies.” This is now one of several jihadi media brigades that have emerged in recent years, their primary goal being to conduct psychological operations to convince Western forces, their families, their governments, and Western publics that they are losing the Global War on Terror, while simultaneously proving to their own constituencies that the jihadis are winning the global war on Jews, Crusaders, and apostates.

Focused on turning their enemy’s strengths against them, *jihadis* actively use the latest Western software—including Windows Movie Maker, Adobe Acrobat, and others—to create anti-Western products intended to inspire their followers...
and humiliate their enemies. These al Qaeda affiliated or inspired media outlets have found a wealth of imagery from Western media sources, which they manipulate to craft their own propaganda products. Over the past year, this imagery has increasingly focused on profiling wounded and dead American soldiers in disturbingly graphic ways. Perhaps even more shocking to Western audiences is the black humor that often accompanies this imagery.16

These types of propaganda products are typically burned to CD-ROM and distributed by hand not only to jihadi activists but also to anyone who may be curious about the movement. Available in markets and under the counters of some shops, these videos can be purchased throughout the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The sniper has become a folk hero for some Iraqis, who may not necessarily subscribe to the jihadi ideology, but do feel a connection with the active resistance waged by the sniper against what they perceive to be imperialistic U.S. forces.

In addition to using technology for education and indoctrination purposes, jihadi groups have also exploited these technologies to revolutionize the way in which their supporters participate in the struggle. For example, in November 2005, the information bureau of “The Army of the Victorious Group,” a Sunni insurgent group operating in Iraq, used several radical Islamic Web sites to announce a contest for designing the organization’s Web site. The winner would not only have his design implemented, but he would receive a prize in the form of the opportunity to fire missiles via computer at a U.S. army base in Iraq. 17 The announcement emphasized that:

The winner will fire three long-range missiles from any location in the world at an American army base in Iraq, by pressing a button [on his computer] with his own blessed hand, using technology developed by the jihad fighters, Allah willing. 18

By stressing the “opportunity for our brothers outside Iraq to join their brothers on the front line[s] in Iraq, the land of the frontier and of jihad, and to [participate in] destroying the strongholds of polytheism and heresy,” the contest sponsors demonstrate their view that the very use of technology is an integral part of the education and indoctrination process. Such novel applications of technology allow those interested in supporting fighting in Iraq to do so from the comfort of their homes.

In sum, it is widely recognized today that Web sites, chat forums, and other forms of online communications play an important role in the terrorist world, particularly in terms of spreading ideology and mobilizing support for a particular cause. Indeed, security agencies of many countries are seeking ways to address this issue—but perhaps there is not much that can be done. In fact, Jihadi Web users have become increasingly aware of attempts by governments to monitor their online behavior. In order to enhance operational security in the use of technology, jihadis have recently posted protocol about safe ways to use technology. For example, a guide for using the Internet safely and anonymously recently emerged on a jihadi forum site. 19 The guide explains how governments identify users,
penetrate their usage of software chat programs including Microsoft Messenger and PalTalk, as well as advising readers to not use Saudi Arabian based email addresses (those that end with a ".sa" extension) because they are not secure. Rather, the author of this guide suggests, jihadis should register for anonymous accounts from commercial providers, like Hotmail and Yahoo. This is but one small example of a more worrisome aspect of the Internet’s role in worldwide terrorism: providing strategic and tactical guidance for groups and individuals.

TRAINING AND ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

The Internet has become the new Afghanistan for terrorist training, recruitment, and fundraising . . . Terrorist groups are exploiting the accessibility, vast audience, and anonymity of the Internet to raise money and recruit new members.20

—PC World, July 7, 2004

In April 1999, while visiting an Internet cafe in the Victoria district of London, a young man downloaded two books—The Terrorists’ Handbook and How to Make Bombs, Book Two—from a seemingly ordinary Web site.21 Following the instructions provided in these texts, he packed a plastic pipe with flash powder he had removed from various fireworks, and sealed the pipe with glue. This was put into a box surrounded by around 1,500 nails of differing sizes, which would act as shrapnel when the pipe was detonated. He added a modified timer and two battery-powered electrical igniters (which would serve as detonators), placed the device inside a sports bag, took a taxi to Brixton, South London, and left the bag on the corner of busy Electric Avenue. The explosion occurred at 5:25 PM, injuring fifty people. The following Saturday, a second explosion took place, this time in Brick Lane, an East London neighborhood. The same type of device was used, this time injuring thirteen. Less than a week later, an explosion ripped apart the Admiral Duncan pub in Soho, London at approximately 6:10 PM. The pub had been full of Friday evening patrons: three were killed, four needed amputations, twenty-six suffered serious burns, and another fifty-three were injured in other ways.22

Thanks to a series of tips to Scotland Yard, David Copeland’s terrifying nail bombing campaign ended while the dead and maimed were still being counted from the wreckage of the Admiral Duncan pub. At his trial, Copeland told police that he was a Nazi, and that he hoped the explosions would “set fire to the country and stir up a racial war.” The media focus on the trial of this young engineer from Farnborough, Hampshire, brought considerable public attention to the widespread availability of online resources like The Terrorists’ Handbook and How to Make Bombs, Book Two. Both titles are still easily accessible; a search for the keyword phrase “terrorist handbook” on the popular Google search engine found over 423,000 matches. One site gives instructions on how to acquire ammonium nitrate, Copeland’s “first choice” of explosive material.
The globalization of access to the Internet has had a dramatic impact on the dissemination of this type of knowledge. As Bruce Hoffman aptly observed, “using commercially published or otherwise readily accessible bomb-making manuals and operational guides to poisons, assassinations and chemical and biological weapons fabrication . . . the ‘amateur’ terrorist can be just as deadly and destructive as his more ‘professional’ counterpart.”

Throughout the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe, cells affiliated with al Qaeda that have recently carried out or seriously planned bombings have relied heavily on the Internet.

Although these virtual combat classrooms do not render physical training camps obsolete, information technologies do change the nature of education, indoctrination, and participation. Terrorist training manuals available online provide guidance for a broad range of activities, from acquiring explosives and rocket propelled grenade launchers to falsifying documents and target vulnerability assessment. Over the past several years, al Qaeda and its affiliates have been building a massive and dynamic online library of training materials—some supported by experts who answer questions on message boards or in chat rooms—covering such varied subjects as how to mix ricin poison, how to make a bomb from commercial chemicals, how to pose as a fisherman and sneak through Syria into Iraq, how to shoot at a U.S. soldier, and how to navigate by the stars while running through a night-shrouded desert.

According to Weimann, “More than 300 new pages of al Qa’ida-related manuals, instructions and rhetoric are published on the Internet every month.”

For example, an individual known as “al-Mohager al-Islami” (“The Islamic Immigrant”) recently published online a nearly forty-page pamphlet on “The Art of Kidnapping—The Best and Quickest Way of Kidnapping Americans.” The manual includes information for planning raids, the composition of support crews, general rules for these crews to follow, observation points, kidnapping suggestions, and methods of capturing Americans. He has also posted messages to dozens of jihadist e-group forums, both public and password-protected, about the locations and equipment of U.S. and British sites in Kuwait, Qatar, and other areas, including photos of embassies and living areas, and has provided logistic information about several bases in Iraq, calling upon the mujahideen to target these sites.

As Iraqi insurgents perfect their combat techniques, they communicate them to a larger audience through a variety of channels, including the Internet. Increasingly, military commanders have reported a growing trend of Iraqi insurgent tactics being replicated in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s use of remote triggered improvised explosive devices (IEDs), for example, demonstrates a notable evolution from the hard-wired detonators they had previously used. In recent months, government officials in Thailand have reported a similar upsurge in the technical sophistication of tactics used by their own radical Islamic insurgents in the south of the country.

Thai security forces attribute these seemingly overnight advancements, particularly in terms of how guerrillas are wiring and deploying improvised explosive devices, to a combination of the availability of jihad training manuals, which they
have found in safe houses in CD-ROM and hardcopy form, and direct instruction from Thai jihadis with al Qaeda training camp experience.

In another example, the online training magazine Muaskar al-Battar, or Camp of the Sword, has become required reading in the jihadis’ online terrorist training curriculum. Even military Web sites in Europe and North America—many of which offer publicly available field manuals on everything from conducting psychological operations to sniper training and how to install Claymore antipersonnel mines—have become resources for developing particular kinds of knowledge useful for terrorists and insurgents in other parts of the world. Other prominent sources of operational knowledge include The Anarchist Cookbook and The Mujahideen Poisons Handbook. The latter was written by Abdel Aziz in 1996 and “published” on the official Hamas Web site, detailing in twenty-three pages how to prepare various homemade poisons, poisonous gases, and other deadly materials for use in terrorist attacks. The Terrorist’s Handbook, published by Chaos Industries and Gunzenbombz Pyro Technologies, offers 98 pages of step-by-step operational knowledge. But the multivolume Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, written in Arabic and distributed on paper and on CD-ROM, is perhaps one of the most oft-cited terrorist training manuals in existence today. It contains a wealth of operational knowledge for new terrorists, covering topics such as recruitment of new members, discharging weapons, constructing bombs and conducting attacks. Specific examples are included, such as how to put small explosive charges in a cigarette, a pipe, or lighter in order to maim a person; drawings of simple land mines that could be used to blow up a car (not unlike the improvised explosive devices seen most recently in Iraq); and radio-controlled devices that could be used to set off a whole truckload of explosives, like those used to destroy the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998.

Elaborate video games are also available on the Internet to help training new would-be terrorists. The first computer game developed by a political Islamist group is called Special Force, and was launched in February 2003 by the Lebanese terrorist group Hezbollah. A “first-person shooter” game, Special Force gives players a simulated experience of conducting Hezbollah operations against Israeli soldiers in battles re-created from actual encounters in the south of Lebanon, and features a training mode where players can practice their shooting skills on targets such as Israeli Prime Minister Sharon and other Israeli political and military figures. According to terrorism analyst Madeleine Grunen, Hezbollah’s Central Internet Bureau developed the game in order to train children physically and mentally for military confrontation with their Israeli enemies. The game can be played in Arabic, English, French, and Farsi, and is available on one of the Hezbollah Web sites. Mahmoud Rayya, a member of Hezbollah, noted in an interview for the Daily Star that the decision to produce the game was made by leaders of Hezbollah, and that “in a way, Special Force offers a mental and personal training for those who play it, allowing them to feel that they are in the shoes of the resistance fighters.” In essence, through simulating acts of violence,
these games develop the player’s skill to kill other human beings without having to leave the comfort of their own home.

Overall, the Internet provides an increasingly useful mechanism for terrorists to engage in distance learning activities. The invention and increasing availability of online language translation tools offers a particularly unique and important dimension to the transfer of knowledge in the terrorism world. With these tools, Web sites in English can be translated online and used to educate non-English speaking terrorist-minded individuals. Meanwhile, the ability to rapidly transfer new information in electronic form to a global audience, simultaneously and in multiple languages, presents additional challenges to those seeking to curb the ability of terrorist organizations to train new members. Further, individual “seekers of jihad” throughout the world now have access to information that can develop their knowledge and abilities in the deadly terrorist tradecraft.

It is thus most important to recognize that a large proportion of the terrorist-related material available on the Internet is meant to produce individual action. Among many religious extremists, action in service to one’s god (even murder) is itself the end state. Thus, the primary goal of the videos and manuals described in this chapter are intended to provide a global audience with the knowledge of how and why to conduct a terrorist attack. Without action, it can be argued, the terrorist group or movement risks stagnation and atrophy. As Bruce Hoffman observed, terrorists are like sharks—they must continue moving and attacking in order to ensure their survival. Thus, terrorist groups rely on the Internet for mobilization (developing an individual’s will to kill) and training (developing their skill to kill). Combined, these aspects of online terrorism resources generate considerable alarm among most government security agencies. However, there are other important uses of the Internet worth consideration as well, such as soliciting and managing a group’s financial support and logistics.

**FINANCIAL AND OPERATIONAL SUPPORT**

In addition to mobilization and training, terrorist groups are increasingly turning to the Internet to support their operational needs, particularly in the areas of financial transactions, attack planning, target surveillance, and exploring the potential for computer-based attacks (referred to by some observers as “cyberterrorism”). While the most valuable terrorist-oriented uses of the Internet involve the exchange of information, the growing dominance of online commerce has not gone unnoticed. Several terrorist group Web sites now solicit donations or try to raise funds through the sale of videos, audios, or other items—in some cases, even accepting credit cards or other forms of electronic payment. The Internet also provides an easy mechanism to move organizational funds from one part of the world to another, and often in a manner that is difficult (if not impossible) for government authorities to trace. The existence of Internet-accessible unregulated “offshore” financial institutions (e.g., the Cayman Islands) offers
a particularly attractive haven for terrorist finances. The global spread of online commercial transactions has also enabled new forms of criminal activity, such as fraud and identity theft, which can generate funds to support terrorist organizations.

In addition to raising funds and transferring money, the Internet allows members of terror cells to coordinate their planning for a terrorist attack, as well as gather intelligence on the target of their attack. Through the use of free, disposable e-mail accounts (Hotmail, Yahoo!, etc.), individual members can communicate “below the radar screen,” creating significant difficulties for counterterrorism agencies. Meanwhile, there are many types of information available freely to terrorists for attack planning. Satellite imagery, street maps, photos of buildings and the surrounding area, news reports and other forms of information can be found online using any number of Web site search engines. In many cases, a potential target may have unknowingly posted information online that would be useful to terrorists. The public Web sites of many government organizations and private businesses provide driving directions, hours of operation, key personnel,. typical periods of peak activity, and so forth. However, an amateur computer hacker who gains access to their internal network would no doubt find a variety of operational manuals, guidelines, security procedures, official memorandum, personnel information, and perhaps even building schematics. While the protection of these and other kinds of information is a primary concern of information technology professionals, there is growing concern that the tools and techniques developed by mainstream computer hackers (most often, used for monetary gain or curiosity than anything else) are being studied and adapted for more nefarious means by terrorist organizations.

These online tools also offer terrorists the capability to conduct new kinds of attacks—the so-called cyberterror threat. The Internet offers a rich source of information for self-styled hackers or crackers to learn how to conduct a wide variety of cyber-attacks against any private or public entity with an online presence. These resources are becoming increasingly sophisticated, and can enable a would-be terrorist to potentially bring down a power grid or an airport control tower, among other types of targets. A host of Web sites provide detailed step-by-step instructions for conducting denial of service attacks, packet sniffing, password cracking, buffer overflow attacks, network vulnerability testing, and so forth. Web surfers can download free software (like the SuperScan vulnerability scanning tool or the Ethereal packet sniffing program) for use in exploiting virtually any type of computer or network system. An entire world of hacker communities is supported online through chat rooms and other communication forums, where members share ideas and experiences, sometimes even boasting of their exploits in a perverse form of one-upmanship. Criminal hackers (an increasing concern of the FBI, Interpol, and many other agencies) most often use their technical knowledge in an effort to gain financial rewards. Terrorists may use the same knowledge and tools to gain financial rewards, but may also seek to cause real harm to economies, infrastructure, and people.39
Some observers have proposed scenarios in which terrorists attack dams, chemical plants, water systems, and other sensitive systems, causing massive damage and casualties. While such scenarios typically involve some form of physical attack, usually with conventional explosives, security professionals also acknowledge an increasing threat from cyber-savvy terrorists. Over 85 percent of the critical infrastructure in the United States is owned and operated by the private sector, and its management functions are handled by various industrial control systems including Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems which are frequently connected directly or indirectly to the Internet in order to allow remote monitoring of their functions (and thus reduce the company’s labor costs).40 While numerous cases have been reported in recent years of computer hacker attacks against prominent government agencies and businesses, technology experts agree that many such attacks go unreported. In the case of the private sector, companies have historically proved reluctant to acknowledge such intrusions for fear that doing so would alarm shareholders and other stakeholders, and possibly affect revenues.

Overall, the Internet offers an array of mobilization, training, and operational support capabilities to terrorist groups—capabilities which were not available to groups and movements before the modern information age. As such, it has been argued that the global security environment of the twenty-first century is facing a “new terrorism”—a globally networked, highly sophisticated, and adaptable adversary, which will be much more difficult to defeat than any previous types of violent nonstate actors.

CHALLENGES FOR COUNTERING TERRORIST USE OF VIRTUAL SANCTUARIES

Among the many challenges faced by security organizations in the information age, three areas of concern seem most salient for addressing the role of virtual training camps in the terrorist world. First, the technical challenges of mapping and disrupting globally decentralized networks are perhaps the daunting. Second, there are a host of legal challenges to consider, particularly when it comes to the role of the Internet in a liberal democracy. Third, the policy decisions over what can or should be done are naturally driven by a variety of political necessities, social norms, and procedural constraints. Further, while each of these categories present many specific challenges, the globalized nature of the Internet demands a response that is internationally coordinated. The current lack of global cooperation in addressing virtual training camps is one of the most pressing vulnerabilities that contemporary terrorist groups are able to exploit in the global security environment.

**Technical Challenges**

The most obvious hurdle to combating jihadi use of the Internet is its open access design. Anyone, anywhere can access the Internet. Technologies discussed
above, including IP proxy software, allow for people to access the Internet anonymously, making law enforcement’s job all the more complicated. Making matters more difficult, the number of jihadis using the Internet and the number of jihadi Web sites are both increasing on a daily basis.

Jihadi Web propagandists have developed new protocols for posting Internet videos. They post upward of 20 copies of a video in high resolution, 20 copies in medium resolution, 20 copies in low resolution and 20 copies in cell phone format to a variety of free file hosting services. In fact, some Web sites have long lists of the various services that detail the length of time that files can be hosted for free and the megabyte limitations on those files. Pulling down all of these redundant copies of one video would be an incredibly time-consuming task, particularly given that there are thousands of these types of videos that have been released to date in such a manner. Further, removing videos from a Web site—or taking an entire Web site offline—most often has only a temporary impact, as the same materials tend to appear on some other Web server shortly thereafter. Because electronic forms of information can be duplicated and distributed without limits, the technical challenges posed by virtual sanctuaries are particularly daunting.

Legal Challenges

The primary transit hub of Internet financial and information transactions—the United States—has only recently indicated a serious commitment to tackling the challenges discussed in this chapter, as reflected in its first national strategy for securing cyberspace. To its credit, this document highlights the importance of multinational cooperation, particularly since many of the most active Web sites are hosted in countries beyond those that are committed to the global War on Terrorism. By allowing terrorist training Web sites to exist on Internet servers within their jurisdiction, these countries are in essence playing host to online centers of knowledge transfer in the terrorist world. As a result, governments are facilitating a vast “ungoverned space” which terrorist organizations are able and willing to take advantage of. Yet, despite a critical need for international cooperation, there are no global or even regional legal standards for addressing online activity by violent nonstate actors. Some countries (like Brazil) have no laws against computer crime, while others, which do have some form of legal framework for dealing with virtual sanctuaries, encounter significant difficulties when confronted with the need to protect civil liberties of free speech.

Jihadis themselves have grown increasingly familiar with cyber monitoring laws and widely discuss changes to those laws in their own Internet forums. These posts are usually accompanied by updates to their own standard operating procedure manuals for online activity, which often includes details about using Web-proxy software, IP masking software, and illegal copies of other computer software. Thus, while countries grapple with increasingly complex legal
challenges, terrorists are finding new ways to exploit critical vulnerabilities that allow them to sustain and expand their virtual sanctuaries.

**Procedural and Policy Challenges**

To date, there is no widespread consensus on a national strategy for dealing with these jihadi Web sites. Some have suggested launching an aggressive campaign to remove them from existence. However, because of free speech protections in this country, much of what is posted in the jihadi Internet world cannot be used as justification for removal. Some private citizens have engaged in their own attempts to bring the sites down, either by hacking them, or by identifying the Internet Service Provider that hosts the site, contacting them with detailed information about the type of Web site they are hosting on their server, and requesting that they be removed.

Other analysts contend that removing such sites is actually detrimental to longer-term efforts to monitor and track the jihadi movement. Because the Internet is the only way that the jihadis have to mobilize, recruit, and communicate on a global basis, and given the limitless ability to change Internet addresses and find new servers very rapidly, this side argues that terrorists will find a way to adapt to any government effort to remove their Web presence. Additionally, rapid changes in Web addresses make it more difficult, they argue, for analysts to effectively monitor the conversation and files being transferred—a key window into the jihadi mindset.

**CONCLUSION**

This chapter has identified a variety of difficult challenges for counterterrorism, challenges which demand a globally coordinated response. The Internet provides one of the most popular “ungoverned spaces” for terrorists to exploit for a variety of purposes. These purposes include more well-known uses, including fundraising; communicating their strategic vision for the future of the jihadi movement; and providing detailed instructions about tactics including bomb construction, assassination techniques, covert cell communication, and hacking. Jihadis also use the Internet for less tangible activities, including the establishment of a flourishing radical Islamic thought community online, what can be called “Internet as emirate.” This pervasive and ever-expanding jihadi Web activity facilitates knowledge of, and a culture grounded in, the salafi jihadi ideology. Whether a jihadi candidate wants to learn more about tactics, strategy, ideology, or simply be entertained, they can thanks to the help of the Internet.

There is a growing consensus across the U.S. government that information must be countered with information, not simply bullets and bombs. As Nye observes, “repeated polls show that Osama bin Laden in his cave has communicated
more effectively than America or Britain have despite their massive budgets for public diplomacy. Jordan and Pakistan are front line states in George W. Bush’s War on Terror, but polls show far more people saying they trust bin Laden than the U.S. president.43 One question that policymakers and Internet analysts are now beginning to ask is whether they can take advantage of the Internet in the same ways that the jihadis do? Are there vulnerabilities of virtual sanctuaries (beyond so-called honey-pots) that we can exploit? If so, how?

The generation of policymakers not raised with the Internet or cell phones need to become more aware of the changing nature of the threat and increase investment in monitoring and surveillance. One nation acting alone will not be enough. Democratic leaders must use soft or attractive power to disseminate a positive narrative about globalization and the prospects for a better future that attracts moderates and counters the poisonous jihadist narratives on the Web. Fortunately, we have a credible story to tell.44
A jihadist movement needs an arena that would act like an incubator where its seeds would grow and where it can acquire practical experience in combat, politics, and organizational matters.

—Ayman al-Zawahiri

The French would periodically bombard us with warnings and get very worked up and we decided they were over-exaggerating on Islamic extremists colonising London. Fact is, they were right, we were wrong, and we have not stopped apologising since.

—British security official

One day the black flag of Islam will be flying over [Number 10] Downing Street.

—Anjem Choudary

My officers and the police are working to contend with some 200 groupings or networks [in the UK], totaling over 1600 identified individuals (and there will be many we don’t know) who are actively engaged in plotting, or facilitating, terrorist acts here and overseas…[Their] view is shared, in some degree, by a far wider constituency [within Britain].

—Eliza Manningham-Buller

The bulk of this volume is devoted to discussing and analyzing the precise significance of concepts such as terrorist “sanctuaries” and “safe havens.” More specifically, it is concerned with the question of whether jihadist terrorist groups aim to or actually need to acquire a “solid base” (al-qa’ida al-sulba) in particular parts of the Muslim world, a question that suggests that it is only in the Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam) itself or in other, more or less remote parts of the
developing world that they might pursue such an objective. Although it is clear that transnational Sunni terrorist organizations do in fact seek to establish a “true” Islamic state somewhere in the Muslim world that can serve as a secure base from which further efforts can be made to restore the unity of the umma (community of Muslim believers) and reestablish the khilafa (Caliphate) or some other type of pan-Islamic regime, this does not mean that it is only within the Muslim world that such groups are interested in establishing bases and safe havens. Indeed, as this chapter will illustrate by examining “Londonistan” as a case study, a wide variety of Islamist networks—whether set up by violent jihadist groups, equally uncompromising anti-Western groups that profess to be nonviolent, or a plethora of organizations whose strategy is to gradually infiltrate and Islamize the dar al-harb (Abode of War), that is, the non-Muslim world—have long operated in western Europe, Canada, and the United States. Unfortunately, by taking advantage of the open, pluralistic, and indeed humanitarian policies adopted by most Western host governments, these networks have been able to “hide in plain sight” right under the noses of the security forces and the public in virtually every liberal democracy.

Note, however, that when considering Islamist “safe havens” in the West, it would be a serious mistake to focus exclusively on terrorist networks in the narrowest sense of the term, that is, on actual operational cells and their covert logistical support networks. This is because, besides terrorist cells proper, numerous other Islamist organizations have created an extensive array of institutions, including social service agencies for Muslim immigrants, ostensibly humanitarian and charitable front organizations, research centers, political parties, advocacy groups, religious schools, mosques, publishing houses, Web sites, businesses, and even banks. In addition to founding their own satellite organizations and front groups, Islamists have also been making a concerted effort to penetrate mainstream Muslim social, cultural, and religious institutions in various Western host countries, often by covertly infiltrating and gradually assuming control over more respectable and moderate Muslim organizations. This largely unrecognized process is even more prevalent in Europe and Canada than it is in the United States.

At first glance these activities may suggest that the Islamists, like innumerable other special interest and lobbying groups in Western democracies, have now become active participants in the pluralist system, which could even be interpreted as a hopeful sign that they are increasingly becoming an integral part of modern democratic societies. However, as several observers have argued, the Islamists’ underlying agendas are essentially totalitarian, not democratic, and from that standpoint their organizations seem to be more akin to the front groups set up by interwar fascist and communist parties than to garden variety interest groups in pluralist democracies. Meanwhile, the growing Muslim populations in various European nations effectively serve to provide the “cover,” wittingly or inadvertently, under which these Islamist activists and entities are often able to operate more or less undisturbed, if not altogether unobserved.
“LONDONISTAN”: AN ISLAMIST SAFE HAVEN IN THE MIDST OF “INFIDEL” BRITAIN

With this background, the diverse Islamist networks that have been established in Britain, and which have come to be identified with “Londonistan,” can now be delineated. For analytical purposes, it is perhaps best to divide these networks into three distinct categories. The first consists of what Anthony McRoy has called “participationist” groups, that is, those that engage in normal democratic political activities, such as lobbying, organizing protests, and participating in electoral politics, in order to further their largely undemocratic political agendas. The second are “rejectionist” groups that eschew participation in the democratic processes they abhor—though they have no qualms about exploiting the democratic freedoms that Western societies offer them—but do not openly promote the immediate launching of jihad or presently carry out acts of violence against the West. The third are violent “rejectionist” groups that are secretly engaged in facilitating or carrying out subversive and terrorist activities, either in their countries of origin or directly against the West.13 The extent to which Islamist organizations from these rival “participationist” and “rejectionist” camps differ from and indeed struggle with each other can be clearly observed in their bitter public polemics.14 Due to space limitations, the focus herein will be exclusively on the violent “rejectionist” groups.15

Unfortunately, most of the major Arab jihadist organizations, or factions thereof, managed to ensconce themselves in London and form active external branches during the late 1980s and 1990s. Among these were both jihadist groups with a local or national focus, which concentrated primarily on expelling “infidel” occupiers from their own regions or on overthrowing “impious” regimes in their own countries, and transnational jihadist networks, which planned and plotted to target Western “Crusaders” in their own countries. During that period, the British government was accused by several other European secret services of tacitly entering into an informal “Covenant of Security” with such extremists, a Faustian bargain whereby the latter would be allowed to operate more or less freely within the country so long as they did not plan, organize, or carry out any attacks on British soil.16

From Tunisia, for example, in addition to “gradualist” Islamist leaders such as Rashid al-Ghanushi, who had previously been affiliated with the Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami/Mouvement de la Tendance Islamique (MTI: Islamic Tendency Movement) and its successor, the Harakat al-Nahda (Movement for Rebirth), there were representatives in London associated with far more radical groupings.17 One of these was the Jabha al-Islamiyya al-Tunisiyya/Front Islamique Tunisien (FIT: Tunisian Islamic Front), a terrorist organization headquartered overseas in Italy that had been founded in 1992 by “Afghan-Tunisian” mujahidin. Another was the circle around the London-based Tunisian jihadist magazine al-Minhaj (The Method), which had been established by Afghan veteran ’Abdallah Sufyan al-Tunisi, a member of the Tunisian Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a committee. This
The group subsequently developed close relations with ‘Umar b. Mahmud ‘Uthman ‘Umar (Abu Qatada al-Filastini) and other key al Qaeda figures. Another exiled London denizen, in this case from Morocco, was Muhammad al-Gharbuzi, the alleged founder of the Jama’at al-Islamiyya al-Muqatila al-Maghribiyya/Groupe Islamique Combattant Marocain (GICM: Moroccan Islamic Combat Group) and an apparent architect of the May 2003 Casablanca suicide bombings.

As for Saudi Arabia, London soon became a haven for Islamist opposition movements that viewed the Saudi royal family as corrupt apostates and tools of the “Great Satan.” Several of these so-called “Islamic awakening” (al-sahwa al-islamiyya) movements initially avoided advocating the outright overthrow of the Saudi regime, including Muhammad al-Mas’ari’s Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDLR), a group whose Saudi branch was sponsored by two radical clerics that were openly critical of the House of Sa’ud, Salman al-‘Awda and Safar al-Hawali, to the extent that they were either arrested or placed under house arrest. However, in 1996 al-Mas’ari initiated a rapprochement between the CDLR and much more radical Saudi groups, initially by expressing support for the Islamist Khubar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia and thereafter by increasingly adopting a global jihadist agenda, a change of course that caused his CDLR partner Sa’d al-Faqih to break away and establish a new organization that remained focused exclusively on reform in the Arabian peninsula, the Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA). Ultimately, al-Mas’ari’s growing radicalization led him to advocate the assassination of Prime Minister Tony Blair and admit that the CDLR served as the “ideological voice” of al Qaeda. Nor were the CDLR’s activities restricted solely to radical exhortations, since a Saudi student at the University of Missouri, Ziyad Khalil, purchased a satellite phone, allegedly with a credit card provided by the CDLR, which was later used by al Qaeda to issue instructions in connection with the 1998 U.S. embassy bombings in Africa. In May 2004 Mustafa’Abd al-Ansari, a member of the CDLR, was one among the small group of jihadist family members who carried out a bloody attack on a Saudi oil refinery.

Yet al-Mas’ari himself has never been charged with or arrested for supporting or sponsoring terrorism. Recently, through the Web site al-Tajdid (Renewal), he has been engaging in bitter polemics with ostensibly pro-jihadist Web sites such as al-Hisba (Bringing to Account) and al-Buraq, which he accuses of working for Arab and Western intelligence services in connection with their efforts to expose and arrest contributors to jihadist Web forums.

Among the openly jihadist opposition groups with which al-Mas’ari developed closer relations was the Advice and Reformation Committee (ARC), a press and propaganda agency established by Osama bin Laden in July 1994, which was run out of London for five years by his lieutenant Khalid al-Fawwaz. The ARC office was located on Beethoven Street and equipped with state-of-the-art communications equipment, which it used to maintain contact with the shaykh in the Sudan and later Afghanistan. However, according to the American indictment against Osama bin Laden, the ARC was also used to “provide a cover for activity in support of al-Qaeda’s ‘military’ activities, including the recruitment
of military trainees, the disbursement of funds and the procurement of necessary equipment... and... services. In September 1998 al-Fawwaz was arrested by British authorities and, despite claiming to have had a falling out with al Qaeda’s leader, is now fighting extradition to the United States for his alleged involvement in the 1998 African embassy bombings.

Apart from setting up the ARC, ostensibly as a Saudi opposition organization, al Qaeda has also been linked to several high profile cases of terrorism implicating either its agents in Britain or numerous British Muslims that it inspired and recruited, such as failed “shoe bomber” Richard Reid. Among those agents were Abu Duha (alias “Dr. Haydar”), an Algerian affiliated with the terrorist Jama at al-Salafiyya li-al-Da’wa wa al-Qital/Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC: Salafist Group for Preaching and Fighting), who also served as the principal Europe-based recruiter of prospective jihadists for training in al Qaeda’s Afghan camps and was reportedly a facilitator of both the 2000 “millennium plot” involving Ahmad Rassam and the alleged 2003 London “poison plot” involving Kamal Bourgass, and Mustafa Sitmaryam Nasir (Abu Mus’ab al-Suri), a red-haired Syrian Jami’ayyat al-Ikhwan al-Muslimin (Society of the Muslim Brothers, or Muslim Brotherhood) activist who became a member of al Qaeda’s Majlis al-Shura (Consultative Council) and was subsequently implicated in the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings. Indeed, there seem to have been al Qaeda connections, however indirect, to virtually all of the major terrorist bombings and plots in the United Kingdom, including the July 7, 2005 bombings, the botched July 21, 2005 bombings, and the apparent scheme, fortunately interdicted in August 2006, to hijack multiple commercial airliners and destroy them, perhaps by flying them, à la 9/11, into major buildings, landmarks, or facilities. Although all of these plots were either carried out or slated to be carried out mainly by native-born British Muslims, they were in large part inspired and seem to have been logistically supported by Pakistani or European jihadist networks linked to al Qaeda. This is a pattern that is also observable in connection with the March 11, 2004 Madrid train bombings and various other serious terrorist plots hatched in European countries.

Moving on, perhaps the most interesting developments of all involved the London-based branches of various factions of the armed Algerian resistance movement. The event that precipitated years of brutal terrorist and counterterrorist campaigns in Algeria, which have reportedly led to the deaths of over 150,000 Algerians, was the government’s January 1992 decision to crack down on the Islamist umbrella party, the Jabha al-Islamiyya li-al-Inqadh/Front Islamique du Salut (FIS: Islamic Salvation Front). The FIS had already made a strong showing in the December 1991 legislative elections, and was expected to win an upcoming second round of elections, but the regime was determined to prevent it from coming to power through electoral or any other means. Now subjected to brutal repression and therefore unable to engage in overt political activities of any sort, both “religious nationalists” (who were known as “Algerianists” [jaza ‘ira]) and jihadist Salafis with a transnational agenda built up their preestablished clandestine
armed groups to fight against the regime. The most radical of these violent Algerian Salafist organizations later ended up sponsoring terrorist attacks outside of Algeria, above all in Europe.

Initially, FIS-linked elements from both currents joined the Harakat al-Islamiyya al-Muslaha/Mouvement Islamique Armé (MIA: Armed Islamic Movement), which had been established in 1991 by “Algerianists.” However, in late 1991 or early 1992 a much more radical armed underground network known as the Jama’at al-Islamiyya al-Muslaha/Groupe Islamique Armé (GIA) was formed by hardline Salafists, including influential “Afghan Algerians,” that is, Algerian veterans of the Afghan jihad against the Soviets. Although intensive efforts were made in 1994 by the new GIA ’amir Sharif al-Ghusmi to combine armed Islamist resistance forces and bring Algerianists into the GIA, efforts that were partially successful, this project was opposed by factions within the Algerianist milieu, who then broke off contact with the GIA and founded the Jaysh al-Islami li-al-Inqadh/Armée Islamique du Salut (AIS: National Salvation Army), essentially a renamed MIA. The GIA was made up of three distinct factions for a time, but after the FIS signed an agreement with the Algerian government in January 1995, new GIA ’amir Jamal Zituni, a Salafist, began carrying out ruthless internal purges and spectacular terrorist massacres. Several Algerianists were declared to be traitors and executed on videotape, and Zituni and his successor Antar al-Zu’abri thereafter rapidly moved the GIA in a takfiri direction, which provided the GIA with an ostensibly religious justification for brutally and indiscriminately slaughtering civilian “unbelievers.” This process culminated in 1997, when al-Zu’abri declared Algerian society in its entirety to be “infidel.” As the carnage increased, thereby alienating more and more Muslims from the Islamist cause, GIA and AIS cells increasingly attacked each other, the GIA was rent by internal schisms, and a dissident faction headed by Hasan al-Khattab broke away in August 1998 and formed a new group, the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC), which vehemently criticized the excesses of the GIA and eventually siphoned off most of its supporters.

These factional disputes between armed jihadist groups inside Algeria itself were soon mirrored in conflicts between their respective external support networks, including those headquartered in London. These conflicts in turn caused other Islamists based in the British capital to lend their support to one or another of the Algerian factions. In 1993, the FIS was the first to establish an external network, the Comité Exécutif du FIS à l’Étranger (CEFE: FIS Executive Committee Abroad), which was headquartered in Tirana, Albania, but had an important branch in London. Then, at the behest of GIA leader ’Abd al-Haqq Layada, Rashid Ramda established an external GIA headquarters in London, from where he helped organize and finance a Europe-wide GIA support network. For a time these two networks coexisted and even collaborated in certain ways, but once their parent organizations had a definitive and violent falling out back home, they began competing with each other to obtain support from both their Algerian and non-Algerian “brothers.” In the meantime, the AIS had established its own support organization
in London known as the Algerian Community of Great Britain (ACGB), whose headquarter was installed at the Parsons Green mosque, and it too battled with the GIA for influence. Given the latter organization’s intransigence, London-based radicals such as Mustafa Kamal Mustafa (Abu Hamza al-Masri), Abu Qatada, representatives of Ayman al-Zawahiri’s faction of the Egyptian Tanzim al-Jihad al-Islami (Islamic Jihad Organization), and Abu Mus’ab al-Suri initially lent their support to the GIA, so much so that they wrote for its various publications, especially *al-Ansar (The Supporters)*. The GIA’s headquarters had by then been transferred to the Finsbury Park mosque, where Abu Hamza had managed to get himself appointed as prayer leader. As GIA atrocities mounted and became harder to justify, however, there were increasing schisms among its supporters in countries throughout Europe, including Britain, where Abu Mus’ab al-Suri was the first influential leader to break with the GIA, followed by al-Zawahiri and Abu Qatada, who was then forced out of the Finsbury Park mosque and begin preaching at the Four Feathers youth club. Indeed, Abu Hamza stubbornly continued to back the GIA until late 1997, when it became clear that most of the group’s supporters were abandoning it, at which point he produced a treatise entitled *Khawarij wa jihad (Kharijites and Jihad)*, wherein he accused the GIA of deviating from the path of Allah. Eventually, most of these radicals transferred their support to the GSPC, which was also allegedly backed by Usama b. Ladin.

Last but not the least, there were the Egyptians. In the early 1990s, many “Afghan Egyptians” returned home ready to continue their *jihad*. Since Muslim Brotherhood “gradualists” had long been collaborating with the regime, these veterans of the Afghan war joined the ranks of armed underground organizations set up by Egyptian radicals, such as the Tanzim al-Jihad (whose members had assassinated Anwar al-Sadat in October 1981) and the more decentralized Jama’a al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group) network. However, the terrorist strategies pursued by both groups failed to weaken the Mubarak regime and instead precipitated brutal waves of repression that ended up decimating their ranks and forcing many of their leaders to flee abroad to escape imprisonment or execution. As elsewhere, many made their way to Britain and other European countries. Within Egypt itself, meanwhile, bitter conflicts soon developed within and between jihadist factions over whether or not to abandon armed struggle. Finally, in the wake of the bloody November 17, 1997 attack on foreign tourists by Jama’a al-Islamiyya terrorists in Luxor, which outraged the Egyptian public and unleashed a new round of repression, imprisoned leaders of the group seriously began to consider brokering a truce with the regime. Despite impassioned resistance from hardliners within the organization, such as military head Rifa’i Ahmad Taha, as well as from the rival Tanzim al-Jihad, especially al-Zawahiri, in 1999 leading Jama’a al-Islamiyya figures agreed to renounce armed struggle and signed a truce with the government. By that time, the main bone of contention between the intransigents had to do with whether Egyptian jihadists should now concentrate on attacking the “near enemy” or the “far enemy.” These disputes inevitably ended up roiling émigré jihadist circles in London as well.
Among the Egyptians who made their way to London were Hani al-Siba'i, a lawyer associated with the Jama'a al-Islamiyya; 'Adl 'Abd al-Majid (Abu al-Hasan); Yasir Tawfiq 'Ali al-Siri (Abu 'Amr), an Egyptian terrorist leader affiliated with the Tala'i al-Fatah al-Islami (Vanguard of the Islamic Conquest) organization; and four leaders of the Tanzim al-Jihad—-Ibrahim Husayn al-'Aydrus, Sayyid Aghami Mu'awwad, Ahmad Hasan Rabi', and 'Abd al-Maqsud al-Sayyid. These and other Egyptian fugitives established several organizations in the British capital. One of these was 'Abd al-Majid's International Office for the Defense of Egyptian Rights, which published al-Dalil (The Evidence), a journal that provided information about Islamists arrested by the Mubarak government (which soon responded by alleging that the Office had links to the perpetrators of both the November 1995 bombing of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad and the 1997 massacre of tourists in Luxor). Another such organization was the al-Maqrizi Centre for Historical Studies, which was set up in Hammersmith by al-Siba'i and also had its own Web site. Still another pro-jihadist entity established in London was the Islamic Observation Centre (IOC), a Web site and publishing house run out of an Edgware Road bookstore founded in 1996 by Abu Yasir al-Siri. The emphasis of the IOC was ostensibly on developing a specifically Muslim concept of human rights (huquq al-insan al-muslim), but in practice that meant supporting “persecuted” Islamists, on behalf of whom al-Siri provided a forum to challenge the “false” information disseminated by “illegitimate” Muslim regimes and issued a series of Amnesty International-type reports describing Egypt’s human rights abuses, all of which he claimed violated the shari'a. As with the Algerian exiles, these émigré Egyptians soon became embroiled in, and thus reflected, the doctrinal and operational disputes between the various Egyptian jihadist groups. For example, al-Siba'i supported the faction within the Jama'a al-Islamiyya—which was also backed, among others, by the Islamist lawyer Muntasir al-Zayyat and the group’s ex-military head Taha, who had by then changed his position—that advocated brokering a truce with the government, and also initially opposed the carrying out of any actions against the “far enemy,” both of which necessarily brought him into conflict with hardliners like al-Zawahiri. After 9/11, however, al-Siba'i increasingly promoted a global jihadist agenda, and in 2005 he even proclaimed that the 7/7 bombings were justified. Al-Siri may have gone still further, since he was temporarily arrested by the British authorities in October, 2001, for having facilitated the assassination of Northern Alliance leader Mas'ud, an operation sponsored by al Qaeda. Finally, there is the case of Abu Hamza al-Masri, another Egyptian who resided in London. However, he is important not so much because of his links to terrorist groups in his birthplace, but rather because of his associations with influential transnational jihadists in other countries, for whom he subsequently became a recruiter and facilitator. Like other “born-again” jihadists, he was not a devoutly religious man when he first arrived in Britain in July 1979, and indeed initially spent much of his time there womanizing and working as a nightclub bouncer. After a short-lived marriage to a British girl, he was allowed to extend...
hiding in plain sight in londonistan
his stay in the United Kingdom until he eventually managed to obtain British
citizenship in 1986. It was only after he encountered 'Abdallah 'Azzam during
a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1987 that he fervently embraced Islamism, and once
back in London he strengthened his convictions by attending several lectures by
Egyptian jihadist “spiritual advisor” 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Rahman. In late 1993, after
spending two years living in Afghanistan, where he lost both of his hands and an
eye while mixing nitroglycerine at al Qaeda’s specialized Darunta training camp,
he returned to London, where his natural charisma, uncompromising radicalism,
prestigious foreign contacts, and presumed exploits overseas gave him a certain
cachet among both émigré jihadists and alienated young British Muslims. He then
temporarily became a protégé of Abu Qatada, and in 1994 established his own
radical Ansar al-Shari’a (SOS: Supporters of the Shari’a) organization, whose
members were required to swear an oath of allegiance (bay’at) to Osama bin
Laden. After carrying out supposed “relief work” in Bosnia in 1995, Abu Hamza
was invited to preach at a mosque in Luton, where he soon attracted a large
following. In 1997 he persuaded the trustees of the Finsbury Park mosque, the
second most important mosque in the British capital, to appoint him as Friday
prayer leader, but with the help of an intimidating personal security force and a
growing base of radical supporters he quickly ousted the old guard and turned it
into a center of jihadist agitation and, worse still, a recruiting center for foreign
terrorist organizations.43

The evidence gathered in a variety of countries, and later presented in part at
his 2006 trial, demonstrates conclusively that Abu Hamza systematically preached
hatred against non-Muslims, urged his parishioners and followers to become “mar-
tyrs” and wage jihad against “infidels,” stockpiled weapons at the mosque, iden-
tified and vetted prospective recruits for jihadist networks (including al Qaeda,
the GIA, Kashmiri terrorist groups, and the Jaysh Adan-Abyan al-Islami [Islamic
Army of Aden]), established training camps in the British Isles to help indoc-
trinate and physically prepare prospective native-born mujahidin, provided false
documents and valuable contact information for those jihadist recruits, helped
fund al Qaeda’s Afghan training camps, and sponsored specific terrorist actions
in Yemen and perhaps elsewhere. Indeed, many now notorious jihadist terrorists
and would-be terrorists—such as “second wave” al Qaeda operative Zakariyya
Musawi, Richard Reid, GIA-linked terrorist Jamal Baghal, ex-soccer star Nizar
Trabalsi (who had plotted to attack a NATO base in Belgium), the two Britons
who carried out a suicide attack at “Mike’s Bar” in Israel, and three of the 7/7
bombers, among many others—had previously made their way to the Finsbury
Park mosque before embarking upon their respective violent escapades. Finally,
on January 20, 2003, the British police descended on the dilapidated mosque com-
plex and conducted a thorough search of the premises, in the process uncovering
plenty of evidence of apparent criminal and terrorist logistical activities. Now
expelled from his base of operations, Abu Hamza portrayed himself as a victim
of religious persecution and began ostentatiously preaching every Friday outside
of the Finsbury Park mosque, where for over a year he attracted increasingly
large crowds of sympathizers and curiosity seekers. However, on May 27, 2004, he was arrested at his home at the behest of the American government, which characterized him in an indictment as a “terrorist facilitator with a global reach,” and was thence transferred to the high security Belmarsh prison while he awaited trial. After interminable legal delays, he was tried in January and February 2006, convicted of eleven out of fifteen charges, and given a concurrent sentence of seven years, which he is currently appealing. So it was that the British state very reluctantly and belatedly took action against one of the most high-profile jihadist propagandists and activists in London.

In sum, during the 1990s London became yet another locale, albeit an important one given the large concentration of foreign extremists who flocked to and managed to find a refuge there, in which conflicts within the broader Islamist movement played themselves out. These conflicts occurred first and foremost between the “gradualists” and jihadists, and then, within the latter camp, between those engaged in fighting the “near enemy” and those waging a global struggle, who sought to transform every local armed conflict involving Muslims into yet another front in the worldwide jihad. As is typical of extremist milieus, there were also personality conflicts between rival Islamist leaders, disputes within and between factions, and arguments over sometimes hairsplitting doctrinal and operational matters. These internecine struggles between foreign radicals, which were reflected in both the Islamic and Islamist media, also ended up affecting the attitudes of British Muslims, especially second-generation citizens who, feeling themselves unable to fit into either their parents’ traditional culture or mainstream British society, had already been radicalized in the wake of the Rushdie affair or periodic international crises affecting the umma.

**CONCLUSION**

On the basis of the evidence provided above, there can be no doubt that during the late 1980s and 1990s London became a de facto “safe haven” or “base of operations”—however one chooses to define those terms—for Islamist radicals from all over the world, including many terrorists who were wanted by the authorities in their own countries but were inexplicably allowed to set up external support apparatuses on British soil. Far from being an alarmist claim, this is an empirically verifiable reality that has been openly acknowledged by the radicals themselves. As Syrian exile 'Umar Bakri Muhammad put it, “I believe Britain is harboring most of the Islamic opposition leaders of the Muslim world.” Although the radicalization of indigenous British Muslims was in part arguably the culmination of decades of government-sponsored communal representation policies, which acted to insulate or isolate Muslim immigrants and their native-born offspring from the wider society, the appearance of so many émigré anti-Western extremists in London in the last decade of the twentieth century was due above all to the baleful influence of another long-standing British policy—the almost automatic
granting of “asylum” status to self-proclaimed “political refugees” and “victims of persecution” from other countries, irrespective of whether the individuals in question were in fact guilty of having committed serious violent crimes elsewhere. This is a fine old British tradition, inspired by both the noblest of humanitarian and the most cynical of pragmatic motives, which dates back several centuries, one that formerly enabled a host of continental radicals (including such luminaries as Karl Marx) to settle in London, but it is a tradition that arguably needs to be reconsidered given the documented role that foreign jihadist refugees have recently played in fueling the radicalization of disaffected British Muslims and justifying their commission of acts of terrorism against “unbelievers.” Finally, and perhaps worst of all, it seems certain that some sort of informal “Covenant of Security” had been tacitly agreed upon, whereby the British secret services allowed these fugitive extremists and their local supporters to operate relatively undisturbed as long as they did not organize or carry out acts of terrorism within Britain itself or against British troops stationed overseas.

More generally, the case of Britain reveals that it is not only jihadist “bases” in the narrowest sense of that term that are likely to be problematic and potentially dangerous, but rather Islamist milieus in general. In the West it is not simply terrorist operational cells, logistical networks, or training facilities that one needs to be concerned about, but also the presence of large, poorly assimilated native-born Muslim populations, diasporic communities with generally adversarial attitudes toward their host societies, and “participationist” Islamist organizations that are shrewdly exploiting kafir democratic freedoms whilst actively pursuing what appear to be intrinsically antidemocratic agendas. The record shows that within all of these milieus, transnational jihadists can readily find “cover” and recruit new members.

This may seem to be a rather conventional interpretation given the often interesting arguments that other contributors to this volume have made, especially regarding the implicit shortcomings of consensus thinking about terrorist sanctuaries and safe havens. For example, Michael Innes and Alice Hills are absolutely correct to highlight the “multidimensionality” of, respectively, sanctuary and “terrorist spaces,” in contrast to the often simplistic and misleading state-centric and exclusively territorial notions that are normally proffered by government and academic analysts. Innes is also quite justified in suggesting that the adoption of strictly military approaches and the obsession with denying terrorists sanctuary “at source”—usually in relatively remote regions of the globe—are likely both to fail in the long term and result in a costly and never-ending projection and application of American military power overseas.

However that may be, the position of the foreign radicals in “Londonistan” became increasingly precarious, especially after 2000. Even beforehand, during the late 1990s, several extremists had been arrested and some had been deported to their countries of origin, but the status quo ante really began to change with the passage of the Terrorism Act 2000, which made it illegal to support any terrorist actions, including those conducted outside of the United Kingdom. Then, in March
2001 the British government prepared a list of twenty-one terrorist organizations, including many of those discussed above, with which persons residing in the United Kingdom were expressly forbidden to be associated. In December of that year, in the wake of 9/11, a new Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 was passed that gave the authorities an even freer hand in cracking down on violence-prone extremists. However, the introduction of these new measures may have only worsened the situation. On the one hand, they arguably did not give the security services and the courts a free enough hand, but on the other they appeared sufficiently threatening to prompt the proponents of jihad to conclude that the preexisting “Covenant of Security” had been broken by the host society, which therefore offered them a rationale for instigating, sponsoring, and organizing terrorist attacks within the United Kingdom itself. This was surely one major reason, in addition to the anger generated by the Coalition invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, for the increasing number of Islamist terrorist plots targeting Britain between 2002 and the present day.

Another disconcerting aspect of the situation is that the media’s focus on foreign jihadist émigrés in “Londonistan” inadvertently had the effect of diverting the attention of both the security services and the public from an even greater potential long-term danger—the increasing disaffection and radicalization of native-born British Muslims. Recent reports concerning the latter’s alienation from mainstream society, hostility toward their own government, and support for jihad against “unbelievers,” should serve as a wake-up call for everyone concerned about terrorist sanctuaries that may exist or develop within the very bosom of Western democratic states. According to a YouGov survey commissioned by The Daily Telegraph and conducted shortly after the July 7, 2005, bombings, for example, 6 percent of British Muslims—which, if the survey was representative, would reflect the views of around 100,000 persons—thought the 7/7 bombings were “fully justified,” whereas as many as 24 percent sympathized “a lot” or “a little” with the bombers’ motives, 56 percent “understood” why the bombers might want to behave that way (whether or not they sympathized with them), 18 percent professed to have little or no loyalty toward Britain, 43 percent believed that “Western society is decadent and immoral and that Muslims should seek to bring it to an end,” 1 percent—equivalent to 16,000 persons—expressed a willingness to pursue that objective by engaging in violence, and around 50 percent did not believe that Muslims were treated equally or that British party leaders respected Islam. Subsequent surveys have yielded similar results: in an ICM survey conducted in February 2006, also for The Daily Telegraph, 40 percent of British Muslims said they wanted to introduce shari’a law into the “predominantly Muslim areas” of Britain and 20 percent said they had sympathy with the “feelings and motives” of the 7/7 bombers, which prompted Labor MP Sadiq Khan to opine that “[v]ast numbers of Muslims feel disengaged and alienated from mainstream British society.” Perhaps even more alarmingly, in a November 10, 2006 university speech Dame Eliza Manningham-Buller, head of the domestic intelligence service MI5, claimed that her agency had already identified thirty major terrorist plots and that it was currently targeting
some 200 British-based terrorist “groupings or networks” and 1,600 individuals, most of whom were British-born but connected to al Qaeda elements in Pakistan, which were actively engaged in promoting attacks at home and abroad.⁵⁰

Even if some of these figures turn out to be exaggerated, they nonetheless seem to reveal the existence of potentially serious short-term and long-term sociopolitical problems and security threats that must be addressed, however belatedly, by the British authorities. They also serve to illustrate Innes’ insightful points regarding the multidimensionality of terrorist havens, since it seems as if violence-prone extremists are capable of finding physical and/or psychological sanctuary in a wide variety of sometimes unexpected places, including within existing communities of their co-nationals or co-religionists, within subsets of those communities, within insular sectarian groups, within clandestine terrorist networks, within assorted criminal milieus, within “virtual” online communities, or even within the solipsistic confines of their own personal mental universes. Coping effectively with this much wider array of potential “sanctuaries” or “havens” will require fresh approaches that transcend the narrowly militarized responses that have so far been characteristic of the Bush Administration’s “Global War on Terrorism,” which in many respects has only made the situation worse. This is not to say that military responses are not at times required, only that such bellicose actions need to be conjoined with a broad range of other, subtler measures, if Western democracies hope to be able to restrict the ability of terrorists to find sanctuary.
Across the globe, belligerent groups have increasingly embraced a variety of illicit economies. Be they terrorists, insurgents, or warlords—belligerents have become involved in the drug trade, illicit smuggling with precious gems, illicit smuggling with licit goods, illicit logging, smuggling with wildlife, and even maritime and insurance fraud schemes, to name just a few illicit economies. Much of academic and think tank literature on the topic has focused on the financial profits that belligerents derive from such illicit economies. But successful exploitation of illicit economies by belligerents brings them many multifaceted benefits and increases their power in many more ways than frequently assumed.

Illicit economies provide belligerent groups with several layers of sanctuary: geographic, economic, political, and institutional. Their illicitness prevents the state from officially providing the same regulation services to the economies that it does in the case of legal economies. Consequently, the illicit economies provide a unique space where belligerents do not face competition from the state in satisfying the needs of the population participating in the illicit economy. In fact, frequently the state’s response to such illicit economies is an effort to suppress them—a policy that further enhances the value of belligerent services to the illicit economy.

This chapter explores how belligerents’ participation in illicit economies provides them with these multiple levels of sanctuary. It shows how belligerents obtain not only large financial resources from such illicit economies, but, crucially, also political capital, and how they mobilize these benefits to transform sanctuaries into protostates. It also outlines the factors that influence the size and scope of benefits that belligerents obtain from their sponsorship of and participation in illicit economies. The chapter then turns to the specific case of Afghanistan and
shows how the Taliban during the 1990s mobilized two illicit economies—illicit smuggling with licit goods and the drug trade—to increase its physical resources and political capital. Finally, the chapter analyzes current counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and shows how these efforts paradoxically have resulted in the reintegration of the Taliban into the Afghan drug trade and how they undermine counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. The chapter uses a variety of sources, including academic treatments of illicit economies and their relationship to conflict as well as the author’s interviews with government officials in several countries struggling with the nexus of illicit economies and conflict.

THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Illicit economies provide belligerents with several layers of sanctuary: geographic, economic, political, and institutional. I define sanctuary as a space, both physical and cognitive, where belligerents face a degree of protection and less intense competition from their enemies, such as the state, than elsewhere and where threats to belligerents are relatively weak. The state and other enemies do not have to be altogether absent from such a sanctuary, but they have to be either weak or uninterested in posing a significant challenge to the belligerents. For the rest of the chapter I will focus on state-to-hostile-belligerents interactions.

Successful belligerent exploitation of illicit economies provides them with multiple layers of sanctuary. First of all, belligerents’ participation in such illicit economies frequently takes place in context of a physical sanctuary. Many illicit economies, especially the production of illegal commodities, exist in periphery regions where state presence is weak or nonexistent. Prime examples of such remote territories without state presence are the cultivation of coca in jungle regions of Peru and Colombia and of opium poppy in the remote areas of the Golden Triangle, today mainly Burma. Although illicit economies are also abundant in areas with relatively thick law enforcement, such as methamphetamine production in the United States, for many belligerent groups, the penetration of an illicit economy coincides with establishing a presence in a territorial periphery, often with rugged and impassable terrain. State absence and weakness in such remote regions have both direct and indirect effects in enabling the spread of an illicit economy. The direct effect is that they limit the effectiveness of law enforcement of prohibitions and regulations. An indirect, but in some ways a more fundamental effect of state absence, is the perpetuation of poverty and social and economic underdevelopment in such regions. Without easily available alternative means of subsistence and basic social services, the population in such regions becomes both motivated to participate in and dependent on illicit economic activities for basic subsistence. In undermining law enforcement overall, state weakness also undermines detection and suppression of belligerent groups. Illicit economies thus frequently thrive and belligerents penetrate them in areas of geographic sanctuaries. Whether belligerents emerged in such regions of state absence to
begin with or they were pushed there by the state since the state did not consider such regions as important, such physical territories of lawlessness and illegality provide a physical respite for the belligerents from the military might of the state.

Second, illicit economies provide belligerents with an economic sanctuary. In a large part due to their illicitness, such economies tend to be highly lucrative. Given a stable or increasing demand for a commodity or service, the illegality of its provision imposes a so-called “crime tax”—namely, it substantially increases the transaction costs for the producers and traffickers. The traffickers are easily able to pass the increased transaction costs onto eager customers, thus making large profits.\(^2\) If the service or commodity were legal, their profitability in most cases would be substantially decreased. Participation in illicit economies thus provides belligerents with access to highly profitable economic transactions.

Facing no competition from legitimate, uncorrupted businesses, belligerents can acquire a large market share of the illicit economy, reaping substantial financial benefits. They do not need to compete with legitimate businesses in providing the most efficient and cheapest supply of the good or service. The illicitness of the economy erects large barriers to entry for other participants, giving the belligerents an economic sanctuary from competition. Although belligerent groups can and do compete in the legal economy—viz al Qaeda’s large financial profits from bin Laden’s construction company—the illicitness of the economy makes belligerent participation much easier. In the case of international illicit economies, such as the drug trade, the barriers to belligerents’ participation in consumer-country distribution of the illegal commodity are very high, unless the belligerents militarily operate in the consumer country to start with. The loyalist paramilitary groups, Ulster Defense Association (UDA) and Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), provide examples of groups that during the 1990s penetrated drug distribution networks in Northern Ireland, for a while, pushing out regular distributors.\(^3\) But despite some allegations of possible efforts by the Colombian leftist guerrillas (the FARC) and the rightist paramilitaries (the AUC) to establish their own distribution networks independent of criminal organizations in the early 2000s,\(^4\) there has yet to be a belligerent group that manages to operate on a large-scale in both the producing and the consuming country. Most frequently, belligerent groups tax an aspect of the illicit economy in the country where they operate, such as production and traffic within the country.

The fact that the illicitness of the economy greatly limits competition from legitimate businesses does not mean that belligerents participating in an illicit economy face no competition at all. They still have to contend with frequently violent and vicious competition from criminal organizations on whose turf they trespass and whom they may seek to eliminate to increase their own profits and control as well as from other belligerent groups that may try to cut in on the illicit economy. Moreover, legitimate businesses may also become corrupted, participating both in the legal and illicit economy, thus increasing competition for the belligerents.
Still, even only moderately competent belligerent groups will be able to obtain very large financial profits from the illicit economy. Such profits, easily in tens of millions of dollars a year, are converted into beefed up and simplified acquisition of weapons and supplies for a large number of combatants, and thus into a substantial increase in the group’s physical resources.

Third and crucially, illicit economies also provide belligerents with political and institutional sanctuaries. Whether in remote jungle regions or right outside the police station in the capital’s center, official state intervention in illicit economies is by the fact of their illegality limited to suppression. The state cannot provide the normal regulatory functions that it provides to licit economies and their participants, including channeling competition, assuring predictability and property rights, and providing at least a modicum of protection for the producers. In fact, to the extent that the state is officially involved at all in the illicit economy (barring for a moment widespread state corruption at various levels in countries with extensive illicit economies), it actively tries to hamper the business by increasing instability and uncertainty to both producers and traffickers, including by the threat of jail and death. Such state involvement thus provides the belligerents with an ideal institutional and political sanctuary where the belligerents can offer their protection and regulation services to the traffickers and producers without having to face any competition from the state. In fact, state suppression efforts toward the illicit economy directly create the demand for belligerent regulatory and protection services and greatly increase the belligerents’ value to the producers and traffickers.

Belligerents protect the traffickers and the producers from state efforts to destroy the illicit economy, thus protecting the local population’s livelihood. State suppression efforts against the illicit economy include suppressing production, disrupting smuggling networks, and imprisoning or eliminating the producers and traffickers. Belligerents can provide protection services against all three of these. But the belligerents also provide protection to the producers—in the case of illicit crops, the peasants—from the traffickers themselves. Unreliable, unrestrained, and frequently brutal, the traffickers pay very small wages to the producers and subject them to high levels of violence. Belligerents can step into this lacuna of regulation and bargain on behalf of the peasants for better prices and limit the level of abuse imposed by the traffickers on the peasants. Finally, to the extent that there is a foreign power or an international organization that actively participates in the destruction of the illicit economy in the source country, belligerents also protect the producers and the traffickers from the suppression efforts of such a foreign actor, thus wrapping themselves in the mantle of nationalist legitimacy. And with the very large financial profits from illicit economies, belligerents also provide otherwise-absent social services, such as hospitals, roads, and schools. Successful participation in illicit economies thus allows belligerents to act as protostates.

But even if the state (or its representatives) is corrupt and actively participates in the illicit economy without trying to suppress it, the belligerents can
still provide a variety of regulatory and protection services to the producers. Corrupt government officials frequently behave no differently than the traffickers themselves—extorting and abusing the producers and the local population in a predatory capricious manner. Once again, such behavior provides an opportunity for belligerents to step in, moderate the abuse against the local population, and function as price and protection agents of the producers and the population.

In addition to obtaining large physical resources, belligerents participating in illicit economies hence also obtain political capital—namely approval of and support from the local population whose illicit livelihood they protect. Territory-based belligerent groups depend on a basic acceptance of their presence by the population for their survival. Even if they do not need to acquire food, shelter, and supplies from the local population—having solved such logistics and procurement problems by their participation in illicit economies—they still need to rely on the willingness of the population to deny intelligence on them to the state in order to elude state campaigns against them and to survive.

Belligerents try to obtain such a basic acceptance both by violence—intimidating the local population and killing off informers—and by satisfying the material and other social needs of the population. Belligerent violence against the population frequently backfires, alienating the population from the belligerents. Moreover, the state can engage either in a competition in intimidation, also brutalizing the population, or in extending protection to the population against intimidation by belligerents, thus neutralizing the effect of belligerent actions. Similarly, in the context of legal economies, belligerents have to compete with the state in providing for the population’s needs. In such a competition, they have smaller resources at their disposal than the state does and are frequently equally incompetent in boosting a local legal economy, and hence in improving the lives of the population. But illicit economies provide a unique sanctuary for the belligerents since they provide an institutional space where the belligerents do not face competition from the state in their provision of regulatory, protection, and other institutional services to the population. The first and frequently only manifestation of state in that case is the destruction of the population’s illicit livelihood by the state. Moreover, belligerents’ embrace of illicit economies enables them to distribute material benefits from the illicit economy to the population in real time and improve the lives of the population immediately, not simply to promise improvements in the future once they have defeated the state. In short, successful participation by belligerents in illicit economies allows them to mobilize and transform sanctuaries from mere physical hideouts to protostates with physical, economic, political, and institutional dimensions.

Four conditions critically influence the extent to which belligerents obtain political capital from their participation in illicit economies and hence the extent of their ability to transform sanctuaries into protostates. These factors are: (a) the state of the overall economy in the region/country; (b) character of the illicit economy; (c) the presence of traffickers; and (d) government response to the illicit economy.
The state of the overall economy in the region captures the level of poverty in the region, the availability of alternative means of subsistence for the population outside the illicit economy, and the extent to which the local population is dependent on the illicit economy for basic survival. If the economy is poor, a large segment of the population is vitally dependent on the illicit economy, and hence the belligerents derive large political capital from their sponsorship of the illicit economy.

The second factor, the character of the illicit economy, indicates the extent to which the illicit economy is or is not labor-intensive. This factor thus captures the extent to which the illicit economy generates reliable livelihood for the local population. If the illicit economy is labor-intensive, such as the cultivation of illicit crops, it satisfies the livelihood needs of a large segment of the population, and hence generates large political capital for the belligerents.

The third factor, the presence of traffickers, influences the extent to which the local population needs the protection of the belligerents against the traffickers. If thuggish traffickers are present, in the form of corrupt abusive government officials, belligerents can protect the population against the abusive traffickers and thus increase their political capital.

The fourth factor, government response to the illicit economy, represents a strategic choice for the government. If the government engages in suppression policies that threaten the illicit economy (such as eradication), both the population and the traffickers become more dependent on the belligerents for the preservation and protection of the illicit economy, and thus the belligerents’ political capital increases. One of the critical consequences of the increase in belligerents’ political capital is the unwillingness of the population to provide intelligence on the belligerents to the government. The acquisition of good and timely tacit human intelligence on belligerents is a critical element for success of state efforts against belligerents.

Meanwhile, although predicated on the desire to bankrupt the belligerents by eliminating their source of financial income, suppression policies have only limited effects on the physical resources of the belligerents. In the absence of reduction in demand for the illicit commodity, the belligerents (and the traffickers and the producers) can adapt in a variety of ways to counteract the impact of the suppression policies, such as replanting after eradication, moving production to areas that are not being eradicated, altering production methods, changing smuggling ways, and switching to another illicit economy. In fact, there has not been one case yet, when eradication bankrupted the belligerents.

If the government response to the illicit economy is one of tacit acquiescence (laissez-faire) or legalization, the traffickers’ and population’s need for the services of the belligerents decreases, and hence the political capital of the belligerents is reduced. Tacit acquiescence can be either blanket, where the government is taking no action against the illicit economy at all, or directed, where the government refrains from attacking a certain aspect of the illicit economy. Specifically, the government can refrain from destroying production (i.e., from undertaking
eradication) while at the same time undertaking interdiction (i.e., interrupting smuggling and punishing traffickers). The government hence avoids alienating the producers and the broader local population, but targets the smugglers. Legalization can take the forms of (a) licensing, that is, legalizing the commodity for licit purposes, such as in the case of drugs for medical opiates, or legalizing the means of production, that is, the Kimberley certification process for conflict diamonds; or (b) full legalization, that is, legalizing the previously illicit commodity or service. Licensing and legalization schemes may frequently be politically infeasible and socially undesirable.6

When the government refrains from suppression policies that destroy the local population’s livelihood, the population is considerably more willing to provide intelligence on the belligerents to the government. The downside of this approach, however, is that the belligerents’ physical resources will be unaffected and potentially even increased, if production increases as a result of an unsatiated demand. The government thus faces a basic trade-off in its desire to substantially reduce the belligerents’ physical resources (extraordinarily hard to achieve) and to win the hearts and minds of the population. While very small in the case of rich countries with labor-nonintensive illicit economies, this trade-off is large and acute in the case of poor countries with labor-intensive illicit economies, such as drug cultivation. It is here where misguided government efforts to suppress the illicit economy, such as eradication of illicit crops, paradoxically only enhance the belligerents’ ability to transform sanctuaries into protostates. By thrusting the population into the hands of the belligerents and limiting information provision to the government, they critically limit the government’s ability to defeat the belligerents.

AFGHANISTAN: THE TALIBAN AND ILLICIT ECONOMIES

The following section shows how during the 1990s the Taliban exploited two illicit economies—illicit smuggling with licit goods and the drug trade—to increase not only its physical resources, but crucially its political capital. The differences in labor-intensiveness of the two illicit economies had crucial implications for the level of political capital the Taliban could obtain from them. The section also reveals how after the fall of the Taliban in 2002 and consequently its removal from the narcotics economy, ill-designed suppression measures toward the drug economy undertaken by the international community once again allowed the Taliban to reintegrate itself into the drug economy and hence to again mobilize the illicit economy to increase its physical resources and its political capital.

When the Taliban emerged in Afghanistan in fall of 1994, it encountered two illicit economies—illicit smuggling with licit goods and illicit cultivation of opium poppy. As the Soviet occupation and civil war largely destroyed legitimate production, these two illicit economies were persuasive. Due to the destruction of infrastructure, irrigation, and basic agricultural extension services, legal economic
activity had come close to a halt. The country was desperately poor, and the various warring warlords participated in these two illicit economies.

The Taliban immediately embraced the illicit traffic with licit goods, a labor-nonintensive illicit economy. Under the Afghan Transit Trade Agreement, negotiated in the 1950s, landlocked Afghanistan secured a deal from Islamabad that allowed goods to pass from the port of Karachi through Pakistan and over the border to Afghanistan duty-free. Subsequently, the goods were smuggled back to Pakistan where they were sold with high profits for the smugglers. Naturally, however, warlords stepped into this lacuna of state regulation, and exploited the economic sanctuary it afforded to acquire large financial profits. The warlords charged fees for the use of roads and passes under their control, and sometimes even stole the goods. Over time, the fees became exorbitant and unpredictable, critically limiting the ability of the trafficking criminal networks to operate the businesses. When the Taliban emerged on the scene, it prevented the warlords in the territory it controlled from interfering with the traffic. It reduced fees and imposed a uniform tax code on traffic throughout the regions it controlled. It also catered to the interests of the traffickers in decreeing that only Afghan drivers and traffickers, not Pakistanis, could conduct the traffic within Afghanistan. The trafficking mafia loved the Taliban—it provided it with intelligence and assets against various warlords, such as in the Kandahar area. And the Taliban obtained very large financial profits from this economy—between $50 and $70 million a year. Along with military aid from Pakistan, it successfully mobilized these assets to expand throughout the territory. Although the Taliban had no state-making or economic management experience and, in fact, later proved completely uninterested in performing any state or administrative functions with respect to the licit economy, the illicit economy provided it with a sanctuary where even its minimal management skills allowed it to reap large profits from the illicit economy.

As the Taliban rapidly took control over the Helmand province, it also encountered the illicit cultivation of opium poppy. 3,400 metric tons of opium was produced in Afghanistan in 1994, with the majority of cultivation concentrated in Helmand province. Instead of embracing this illicit economy like it did in the case of illicit smuggling with licit goods, the Taliban prohibited the opium economy, considering it anti-Islamic, and undertook eradication. Immediately, its political capital was undermined.

Although it was operating in the Pashtun south, it faced protests and uprising. The local population was desperately dependent on the illicit economy for basic survival. Not only was the economy fairly lucrative, more importantly, it was subject to smaller long-term price fluctuations than licit crops, it did involve large transaction costs as licit agricultural products did, and access to land and microcredit had also become tied to opium production. Without access to such microcredit, the population was not able to obtain essentials such as foods, clothes, and seed. The Taliban prohibition and eradication policies thus threatened the very economic survival of the population, and the population mobilized behind the Helmand warlords, the Akhundazas. The Taliban lost control of the Helmand and
was mired in bitter fighting over the region. Its embrace of illicit smuggling with licit goods did not provide it with sufficient compensatory political capital since this labor nonintensive illicit economy could not employ many people and hence compensate the population for the loss of livelihood resulting from the suppression of the opium economy. Moreover, the aforementioned structural drivers, such as access to microcredit, were also linked to the opium economy.

But the Taliban’s prohibition policy toward narcotics did not last. The need to secure the Helmand Valley, the Taliban’s vital base, resulted in a switch in the Taliban’s policy and a rapid embrace of the illicit narcotics economy. By 1996, the Taliban ended eradication and lifted the ban on cultivation. At first it adopted a laissez-faire approach to drug cultivation, but progressively it became directly involved in various aspects of the opium economy, taxing the farmers and teaching them how to achieve higher opium yields as well as providing security for and taxing the traffickers.

Once the Taliban ended eradication, it was able to consolidate control over the region. In fact, Helmand became its key stronghold. Its political capital greatly increased, and throughout the country the population widely praised the Taliban for its protection and management of the opium economy. As the 1990s progressed, the Taliban drug taxes brought in between $45 million and $200 million a year. The sponsorship of the opium economy thus not only generated large financial profits for the Taliban, it became a crucial, and sometimes, sole source of political capital necessary for the movement to sustain itself in power. The management of the opium economy thus provided the Taliban—a movement that otherwise abdicated all state-making responsibility other than the imposition of a harsh religious code—with a unique institutional and political space from which to obtain political capital. Management of the opium economy was in fact the critical element that allowed the Taliban to function as a protostate.

In 2000, hoping to obtain international recognition, boost falling opium prices, and consolidate control over the narcotics economy, the Taliban again prohibited opium poppy cultivation and undertook large-scale eradication. The policy resulted in the largest reduction of opium poppy cultivation in a country in any single year. Cultivation fell from an estimated 82,172 hectares in 2000 to less than 8,000 in 2001. Globally, this reduction contributed to a 75 percent fall in the global supply of heroin for that year. The economic consequences for the population were devastating. The majority of the rural population was driven heavily into debt, and despite severe punishments, the prohibition started breaking down in 2001, with the population returning to cultivation. On the eve of the U.S. invasion in September 2001, the Taliban revoked the ban in a desperate attempt to recapture popular support during the coming war with the United States.

The population, however, did not mobilize behind the Taliban, and United States and coalition forces swiftly deposed the movement. Moreover, not only did it lose control of the country, with those who were not killed fleeing to their physical sanctuary in the border regions with Pakistan, it also lost control and access to the opium economy.
The opium economy rebounded to pre-2000 levels of opium production at 3,400 metric tons in 2002, reaching a staggering 6,100 in 2006. A large rebound was inevitable since neither the Taliban nor the international community and the Karzai government addressed the structural drivers underlying opium poppy cultivation: No substantial economic development took place in the south and other opium growing regions (progressively the entire country), and the south was also left without sufficient forces to ensure basic security to the population and to remove warlords from power. On the run, the Taliban could no longer provide any regulation and protection services to the illicit economy. Moreover, many warlords and traffickers, now free from the Taliban’s control, were able to expand their operations in the illicit economy. The economy was decentralized, and neither the population nor the traffickers depended on protection of an armed group for the preservation of the illicit economy. The warlords’ protection was sufficient.

Enhanced interdiction and eradication measures undertaken by the international community and the Karzai government since 2004, however, generated a new demand for the protection services of the Taliban insurgency. Paradoxically, these measures, adopted without first addressing the structural drivers of opium poppy cultivation and hence without the reduction of the population’s dependence on the illicit economy, allowed the Taliban to re-integrate itself into the illicit economy and transformed the opium economy once again into a multi-layered sanctuary for the Taliban. Although ill-designed to substantially reduce opium poppy cultivation, these measures nonetheless presented a significant threat to individual traffickers who were now in need of protection. The disarmament of many warlords and their co-option into the Karzai government removed them as physical protectors of the illicit economy at the local level, even though many of them remained in position to influence the targets of drug interdiction and eradication to their advantage. The Taliban, having regrouped in the south and in its physical sanctuary in Pakistan, was now in a unique position to offer its protection services to the traffickers and the population dependent on the illicit economy.

Between 2004 and 2006, forced eradication was undertaken by regional governors and officials and also by the Afghan police and the Central Poppy Eradication Force. In 2004–2005, the Central Poppy Eradication Force, trained by U.S. defense contractor Dyncorp and preferred by the United States as the main eradication instrument, eradicated 217 hectares out of the estimated 131,000 hectares, retreating from Kandahar province after it faced angry armed peasants. In the Maiwand and Panjwayi districts, protesters blocked roads and opened fire on the eradication teams. In fact, eradication generated a near provincial revolt, and the eradication teams did not dare return. Not coincidentally, Panjwayi has been one of the most volatile regions where the Taliban has been strong.

Deployed in safer areas, the Afghan National Police eradicated 888 hectares in 2004–2005, while the provincial governments’ efforts, especially in Nangarhar, eradicated 4,007 hectares. In 2004–2005, eradication in the Helmand suppressed cultivation by 30–40 percent, generating demand for the Taliban’s protection
services to the illicit economy during the 2005–2006 season and creating major
inroads for the Taliban insurgency to reintegrate itself into the social, political,
and economic life of the Pashtun belt.

Local officials in Helmand and elsewhere used eradication to eliminate com-
petition while boosting their own opium profits. Provincial government authorities
frequently impose a “double” tax on cultivation: a first tax not to eradicate early in
the season and a second tax at the time of crop harvest. The selective enforcement
of eradication has resulted in a significant vertical integration of opium production
in the hands of a few large traders with good connections to (if not outright po-
sitions in) provincial governments. The ability to selectively impose eradication
increases not only the financial profits of the local authorities, but also their polit-
ical capital. Local authorities obtain political capital by choosing not to eradicate
the poppy fields of their fellow tribesmen, thus reinforcing their legitimacy based
on tribal affinity while undermining other tribal drug competition.

Carried out by local authorities also, the intensified interdiction is similarly
manipulated to acquire control over the opium economy, displace intermediaries,
and buy specific political allegiance. Local authorities tax both bazaars and traffic.
One protection fee is paid to government authorities to avoid seizures by govern-
ment authorities, and another protection fee is paid to government authorities to
secure their protection from drug trafficking rivals who try to rob the drug cargo.
The targeting of smaller traders and collection of protection fees and political
IOUs from bigger traffickers who frequently come from politically influential and
economically powerful elites with tribal followings once again leads to the vertical
integration of the opium economy and the concentration of power in the hands
of provincial elites. Like eradication, interdiction carried out by such provincial
elites thus allows them to acquire not only increased profits, but also increased
political capital.

Although interdiction conducted by national government forces—whether
Task Force 333 or Afghan Narcotics Police—also takes place, it suffers from a
similar selectivity problem. Rather than targeting a specific ethnic group or specific
political opponents or economic rivals, it frequently targets smaller traffickers and
local bazaars, while ignoring powerful ex-warlords cum statesmen. The latter are
still too powerful militarily and politically—not coincidentally as a result of their
deep and frequently long connection to the drug trade—to be frontally confronted
and arrested. Furthermore, involvement with the narcotics trade is deeply pervasive
at all levels of the state—village, provincial, and national. Consequently, national
interdiction efforts target mainly lower level traffickers and small local bazaars.
The effect of national interdiction operations is thus once again the displacement
of small level-local traffickers and the concentration of control over the trade in
the hands of powerful political elites.

The attacks on the drug business competition through the subversion of eradica-
tion and interdiction have resulted in a new alliance between the attacked opium
traders and the Taliban. This alliance is especially prominent in Helmand, but
is increasingly emerging in the greater Pashtun belt. The Taliban has built new
inroads to local elites affected by eradication and interdiction. These local elites are frequently important regional power brokers with substantial clout among the local population whom they can encourage to help the Taliban insurgency. At least some elders in the area have openly declared themselves sympathetic to the Taliban, accusing the provincial government of being corrupt, exploitative, and robbing them of their livelihood. Elders in the Sangin region, a prominent drug-traffic hub, even admitted to joining the Taliban, angry at the local government for preying on them and robbing them. The Taliban has also been hired by the drug traffickers to provide protection for drug convoys and poppy fields. Thus, the first mechanism by which the Taliban has been able to exploit eradication to obtain political capital and use the drug economy as a political sanctuary, is to obtain political support from local elites—traditional, elected, or criminal. Needless to say, the Taliban is once again reaping large financial revenues from the drug trade.

The Taliban has capitalized on widespread resentment toward eradication and offered itself as a protector not simply to the opium traders, but also to poor opium farmers. The group has sought to capture and transform the large uncoordinated and spontaneous protests against eradication into organized activity under its leadership. In southern Afghanistan, the Taliban has hammered posters on walls offering to protect the poppy fields, warning eradication forces against destroying the crops, and killing members of the eradication teams. The insurgency has been most active in major poppy-growing regions, such as Helmand, and in major trading areas subject to interdiction, such as Sangin. Partially as a result of the Taliban’s increased military activity, opium poppy cultivation in the Helmand increased by 162 percent between 2005 and 2006, despite the fact that eradication efforts in the province also increased (from 1046 had eradicated in 2005 to 4973 eradicated in 2006). The Taliban’s protection for the traders and farmers and the overall increase in its military activity have significantly hampered eradication in Helmand. The Taliban has thus been able to demonstrate not only its desire to protect the population against the state, but also its potency in doing so. Paradoxically, the more vigorously the state attempts to suppress the illicit economy, the more it makes a sanctuary for the Taliban from which it can derive economic and political capital.

The large-scale eradication campaign in Nangarhar during 2004–2005, which has been hailed as a major counternarcotics success, provides a dramatic illustration of the alienation of the population from the Kabul government. Under the supervision of Governor Mohammad Din and Police Chief Hazrat Ali, poppy cultivation fell by 95 percent during 2004–2005. With the promises of international aid, the threat of poppy field destruction, and imprisonment of violators, the local authorities managed to persuade many farmers not to cultivate opium poppy and destroyed the fields of those that did not comply. Yet the economic consequences for the population in Nangarhar were devastating. A Cash-for-Work program designed to meet some of the economic consequences failed to reach the poorest and most vulnerable farmers. The loss of on-farm and off-farm income resulted in
household income losses of as much as $3,400, equivalent of 90 percent of total
cash income.24

Overall, alternative livelihoods programs have been slow to reach the popu-
lation, especially the ones most dependent on the opium poppy economy.25 Only
small progress has been achieved on providing alternative microcredit system to
the population and on rebuilding infrastructure and irrigation. Work of alterna-
tive development agencies, such as USAID and Chemonics, have been compli-
cated by Taliban attacks. In regions with the Taliban’s intense military activity,
much of the Pashtun south, alternative livelihoods programs have been altogether
halted because of threats to Westerners and Afghan employees of international
organizations.26

The suppression of the opium base of the overall economy in Nangarhar also
resulted in downturns in trade in other sectors, including transport, construction,
and retail.27 The pauperization of the rural population alienated it from the local
authorities and the Kabul government. Shah Mahmoud, an influential tribal leader
in Nangarhar, explained: “I made the decision this season that it would be forbidden
to plant poppy. So none of us did. Now I’m not so happy about that. [Disappointed
with lack of government aid], farmers will grab my collar and say, You said that we
could get aid for not growing poppy and we got nothing!”28 In 2006, cultivation
in Nangarhar increased by 346 percent, the largest increase in any province in the
country. The undermining of the pro-Kabul provincial leaders and the widespread
resentment directly play into the hands of the Taliban.

Despite intensified counterinsurgency efforts, including foot patrols in lo-
cal villages, the local population has not provided intelligence on the Taliban
insurgents. In the majority of cases, U.S. and NATO forces have returned from
local information-gathering missions only with vague promises of cooperation
and staunch denials of having any information on the Taliban. In fact, the U.S.
military has even resorted to threatening to cut off aid to local areas if information
was not provided.29

On the other hand, the Taliban has been successfully using its opposition to
counternarcotics operations to build up a local information network and boost
its legitimacy. In a village near Kandahar,30 the Taliban handed out its phone
number to local people to contact them if they faced problems with U.S. soldiers
or the Afghan government. About a week later, the villagers caught on to a
counternarcotics sting operation, in which a prospective opium trader made several
visits to the village to buy opium only to be followed with a raid on the villagers’
opium crops, and contacted the Taliban. The Taliban instructed them to invite the
suspected informant back, captured him, and forced him to call in police. Upon
their arrival, the Taliban ambushed them, killing several of them. The fourth way
the Taliban is thus capitalizing on its opposition to eradication is by obtaining
intelligence from the local population. At the same time, intelligence gathering of
the counterinsurgency forces is severely hampered by eradication.

The final way in which the Taliban derives political capital and paradoxically
also physical resources as a result of eradication is from migration to Pakistan
caused by eradication. Nangarhar in 2005 once again provides an illustration. The widespread impoverishment of the rural population as a result of the eradication in the province during that period led to a large-scale migration into Pakistan. As the peasants were unable to repay their debts because of the suppression efforts, they faced three possibilities: death at the hands of the local trader; liquidation of their productive assets and sales of livestock and daughters (as young as three) to generate income to cover the debt; or absconding into Pakistan. Having to give daughters away of course generates further resentment against the government.31 Even more significant for the Taliban insurgency is the migration to Pakistan. The shelters most easily available to the new economic refugees are the Deobandi madrasas that swelled the ranks of the Taliban in the early 1990s. The Taliban is easily capable of agitating against the Kabul government and its foreign sponsors among the already-alienated people. Once again, these networks in Pakistan are replenishing the Taliban ranks today.

Overall, exploitation of the illicit narcotics economy since the Taliban’s fall has generated not only large physical resources for the Taliban insurgency, but crucially, a new political capital that greatly enhances the staying power of the insurgency. This political capital is strengthened by counternarcotics eradication and interdiction policies that motivate the population not to provide intelligence on the belligerents to the counterinsurgency forces. The illicit drug economy once again provides the Taliban with a geographic, economic, political, and institutional sanctuary where it not only avoids having to compete with the state, but where state suppression efforts directly generate the demand for the Taliban services to the illicit economy and the population dependent on it.

CONCLUSIONS

Illicit economies provide belligerents with several layers of sanctuary: geographic, economic, political, and institutional. With respect to the geographic dimension of sanctuary, belligerents frequently penetrate illicit economies in remote, isolated, and neglected areas where the state is weak. Although illicit economies also exist in areas with strong state presence, state weakness is periphery regions provides belligerents with specially enhanced opportunities to penetrate illicit economies, and the population in these regions is often critically dependent on the illicit economy for basic livelihood. The second layer of sanctuary that belligerents obtain from illicit economies is economic: by participating in an illicit economy belligerents face weaker competition than in the case of licit economies and their provision of violence and provision of protection from violence give them a large comparative advantage over other actors. Third, and most importantly, illicit economies provide belligerents with political and economic sanctuaries where they do not face a competition from the state in providing political public goods, such as protecting the illicit livelihood of the population and regulating the illicit
economy. Frequently, the first and only manifestation of the state is destructive—namely its efforts to suppress the illicit economy. But such state suppression efforts only generate the demand for belligerent services for the illicit economy, allowing belligerents to reap not only significant material physical resources, but also critical political capital from its participation in the illicit economy.

After emerging in Afghanistan in 1994, the Taliban ultimately exploited two illicit economies—the labor-nonintensive traffic with licit goods and the labor-intensive opium cultivation that provided livelihood for vast segments of the rural population. The Taliban obtained both large physical resources and political capital from managing these two economies, which allowed it to transform the sanctuary into a protostate. After its fall in 2002, the illicit opium economy and the measures taken to suppress the illicit economy once again presented the Taliban with a unique political sanctuary where it could offer protection and regulation services almost without competition. Although many warlords manipulated interdiction and eradication to collect taxes, as long as they wanted to maintain a modicum of legality with the international community operating in Afghanistan, they could not openly provide the same level of physical protection the Taliban could. Paradoxically, the more vigorously the Karzai government and the international community have attempted to eradicate the illicit opium economy, the greater inroads they have created for the Taliban to reintegrate itself into the political, economic, and social life of the Pashtun belt by providing a variety of protection services to the illicit economy.
Notes

Chapter 1

2. Ibid., 29–30.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid., 200.
8. Sir Adam Roberts, “The ‘War on Terror’ in Historical Perspective.” Written Evidence Submitted by Professor Sir Adam Roberts to the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs, December 6, 2004.
10. Roberts, “The ‘War on Terror’ in Historical Perspective.”
11. “President Urges Readiness and Patience: Remarks by the President, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Attorney General John Ashcroft, Camp David, Maryland,” Office of the Press Secretary (September 15, 2001).
13. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid., 13.
24. Ibid., 4.
25. Ibid., 15.
27. Ibid., 6–7.
28. Ibid., 13.
29. Ibid., 34.
32. Anonymous, Imperial Hubris: Why the West Is Losing the War on Terror (Dulles, VA: Brassey’s, 2004), 241.
38. Ibid., 54, 65–66.
39. Ibid., 266.
40. For more on this in relation to Iraq, see Bruce Hoffmann, “Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq.” *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 29 (2006): 103–121.
41. See, for example, Max Boot, *The Savage Wars of Peace: Small Wars and the Rise of American Power* (New York: Basic Books, 2002), and more recently, the U.S. Army’s revised Counter-Insurgency doctrine.
52. Which raises more questions on how some variations of state failure or weakness, such as contested, post-conflict and transitioning states, hosting multinational intervention forces, can manage and police their own vulnerabilities to terrorist exploitation. See Von Hippel, “Terrorist Space,” 10–12.
58. Byman, Deadly Connections, 266.

Chapter 2

1. Special thanks to Jenny Peterson for valuable research assistance and Michael Innes for a rigorous refereeing and editing. All opinions and remaining errors are solely my own.
6. See Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism and Edward Herman and Gerry O’Sullivan, The ‘Terrorism’ Industry: The Experts and Institutions that Shape Our View of Terror (New York: Pantheon Books, 1989).
10. See Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism.
18. Ibid., 90–91, original emphasis.
27. For an example of this narrative, see John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, and Michele Zanini, “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism,” in Ian Lesser, Bruce Hoffman, John Arquilla, David Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini, and Brian Jenkins, eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation Publications, 1999).
31. The following paper, for example, describes Iraq’s sponsorship of al Qaeda-linked terrorist groups as if it were proven fact, but without providing any empirical evidence. See Nicholas Berry, *Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Case of Iraq, Iran, Somalia and Sudan*, December 10, 2001, Centre for Defense Information, Washington, DC. Available at http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/rogues-pr.cfm.
33. Clare Sterling relied primarily on CIA sources, only to later find that the documents were forgeries, probably made for the CIA’s Cold War disinformation campaign. See Herman and O’Sullivan, *The ‘Terrorism’ Industry*, 181.

34. Criticisms of the limitations of neo-realist conceptions of “terrorist sanctuaries” are made in Innes, “Terrorist Sanctuaries and Bosnia-Herzegovina,” 300–302.

35. Annually, terrorism results in up to 7,000 fatalities, which is less than half the number of people murdered every year by handguns in the United States alone. As a threat to individual or national security, terrorism ranks far below state repression, small arms proliferation, organized crime, illegal narcotics, poverty, and disease. For a critique of the terrorist threat narrative, see John Mueller, “Six Rather Unusual Propositions about Terrorism,” *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 17 (2005): 487–505; and Ehud Sprinzak, “The Great Superterrorism Scare,” *Foreign Policy*, 112 (1998): 110–124.

36. This view is surprisingly persistent, particularly among officials who continue to attribute virtually every terrorist attack to al Qaeda. However, many scholars and journalists dispute this view, arguing that any rudimentary organization al Qaeda might have had was destroyed in Operation Enduring Freedom, and that it now exists more as a series of temporary cross-national alliances of national liberation groups and an ideological symbol than a coherent organization. See, among others: Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam* (London: Penguin, 2003); and Thomas Hegghammer, “Global Jihadism After the Iraq War,” *The Middle East Journal*, 60(1) (2006): 11–22.

37. Some scholars have argued that not only are terrorists far more vulnerable to military counterterrorism measures in collapsed states, but such environments also tend to be inhospitable and dangerous for foreigners. See, among others: Kenneth Menkhaus “Somalia and Somaliland: Terrorism, Political Islam, and State Collapse,” in Robert Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), 39–40.

38. Major empirical studies by Robert Pape and Marc Sageman, for example, show that the overwhelming majority of “terrorists” are middle or upper class, of above average educational standing, professionally employed, often married or in relationships, are well integrated into their communities, and generally have good future prospects. See Robert Pape, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism* (New York: Random House, 2005); and Marc Sageman, *Understanding Terror Networks* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004).


42. Brachman and Forest in this volume discuss the limits and forms of online recruitment. See also Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 163.
43. Byman, Deadly Connections, 8.
45. This argument is powerfully made in Beau Grosscup, Strategic Terror: The Politics and Ethics of Aerial Bombardment (London: Zed, 2006).
48. This doctrine guided U.S. policy toward South Africa at a time when it directly sponsored and supported massive civilian-directed proinsurgency terror by Renamo in Mozambique and Unita in Angola. It can be argued that South Africa could not have continued to prop up Renamo terror with impunity for more than a decade without U.S. support. Mahmood Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim: America, the Cold War, and the Roots of Terror (New York: Three Leaves Press, 2004), 87–95.
49. Evidence of the use of terror by the colonial authorities is contained in an extremely large literature on the history and nature of colonialism, as well as the large postcolonialism literature. For more immediately accessible summaries of colonial terror, see Barker, The No-Nonsense Guide to Terrorism, 61–86.
50. See, among others: Herman and O’Sullivan, The ‘Terrorism’ Industry; Gareau, State Terrorism and the United States; and Livingston, The Terrorism Spectacle. U.S. officials admitted as early as 1983 that the Contras were engaged in the killing of civilians, kidnapping, torture, and indiscriminate attacks. It later emerged that a CIA Contra training manual, Psychological Operations in Guerrilla Warfare, advocated exactly these kinds of civilian-directed proinsurgency tactics. Similar forms of training were provided
through proxies to the Afghan insurgents. Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*, 102, 116.


55. Ironically, and in a deliberate attempt to subvert the idea of U.S. support for state terror, many of these regimes received U.S. military assistance under the auspices of “counter-terrorism” programmes. See, among others: Alexander George, ed., *Western State Terrorism* (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1991); and Gareau, *State Terrorism and the United States*.


57. For example, evidence from former British and French intelligence officers suggests that MI6 paid large sums of money to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group, a terrorist group associated with al Qaeda, to assassinate Colonel Gadaffi in 1996. It is alleged that British intelligence provided sanctuary to members of the group in Britain and subsequently thwarted attempts by Libya to bring Osama bin Laden to justice. See “MI6 ‘halted’ Bin Laden Arrest,” *Guardian Weekly* (November 14–20, 2002). There is also evidence that British and American intelligence agencies provided a green light to various purported “Islamist” groups training insurgents to fight in Bosnia. See Michael Meacher, “Britain now faces its own blowback. Intelligence interests may thwart the July bombings investigation,” *The Guardian*, (September 10, 2005).


59. Mamdani makes the pertinent point that in places like Sierra Leone, Rwanda, and Mozambique governments were compelled to reconcile with terrorist movements. In this context, reconciliation became a codeword for impunity and may have functioned to sustain an international atmosphere of tolerance toward terror. Mamdani, *Good Muslim, Bad Muslim*, 250–251.

60. For a discussion of terror by the Afghan warlord, General Dostum, see Gareau, *State Terrorism and the United States*, 199–200. Gareau cites a number of reports by the UN and several human rights organizations documenting the use of violence against prisoners and civilians. Disturbingly, Western military scholars accept that the Afghan warlords employ “violent operating methods,” but argue that “agonizing them or calling them to account under Western legal structures is completely counterproductive to the reconstitution of Afghanistan. We must resist the inclination to be judgemental.” Sean Maloney, “Afghanistan: From Here to Eternity?” *Parameters*, (Spring 2004): 13.


63. For example, Emmanuel “Toto” Constant, a notorious former death squad commander from Haiti with suspected links to the CIA, has been given sanctuary in the United

64. The United States continues to harbor groups such as Government of Free Vietnam (GFVN), the Cambodian Freedom Fighters (CFF), and other Vietnamese and Laotian dissident groups who have been involved in a number of terrorist attacks over the past few years. See Joshua Kurlantzick, “Guerrillas in Our Midst: Is the United States Harbouring Terrorists? The American Prospect (June 3, 2002): 14–16.


66. This argument is powerfully made in relation to Colombia, where the United States has long employed counterinsurgency warfare to preserve social formations conducive to its political and economic interests, in Doug Stokes, “‘Iron Fists in Iron Gloves’: The Political Economy of US Terrorocracy Promotion in Colombia,” The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 8(3) (2006): 368–387.

67. As Carol Winkler has noted, official claims of providing a terrorist sanctuary have preceded virtually every U.S. military intervention since the Reagan era. See Winkler, In the Name of Terrorism.


69. This is the most conservative estimate based on the Iraq Body Count project, which as of August 28, 2006, estimated between 40,833 and 45,399 civilians had been killed in Iraq alone. Other studies from The Lancet put the figure at over 650,000. See http://www.antiwar.com/casualties/.

70. This argument is elegantly made in Stohl, “States, Terrorism and State Terrorism.”

71. Mamdani, Good Muslim, Bad Muslim, 256.

Chapter 3


10. Ibid., 102–112.

15. Ibid., 333.
17. See Alice Hills in this volume.
18. Arquilla et al., “Networks, Netwar, and Information-Age Terrorism.”
19. For an interesting discussion of how terrorists must “perform” differently in different spaces see Jeremy D. Kowalski, “The Geographical and Spatial Imaginings of Islamist Extremism/Terrorism,” Master’s thesis, Department of Geography, University of Waterloo, Canada, 2005. See also Alice Hills, in this volume, for a discussion of how nodes are located within terrorist spaces.
20. Flint, “Terrorism and Counterterrorism.”
21. I am grateful to Michael Innes for his thoughts and input on this matter.
37. Gregory, “Death of the Civilian?” I am indebted to Gregory’s essay for the following argument and references.

40. Cited in Gregory, “Death of the Civilian?”


Chapter 4


5. Ibid., 75.


8. Ibid., 112.

9. The Bosnian government subsequently helped the U.S. arrest Arabs in Bosnia with ties to al Qaeda.


12. Khassan Baiev, a Chechen doctor, summed up the Chechens’ position on the foreign fundamentalists in his country as follows, “These so called Wahhabis were beginning to cause problems in Chechnya. They claimed our Chechen traditions contradicted the Koran...we did not like it when they told us our Islam was not true Islam.” The Oath. A Surgeon Under Fire (New York: Walker Company, 2003), 213. This book is a must read for anyone who wants to understand Chechnya’s role in the War on Terrorism.


20. Ibid., 62.


23. Zarqawi rejected al Qaeda’s overtures while in Afghanistan and was not a member of bin Laden’s organization, and he certainly had no operational ties to Saddam Hussein’s Mukhabarat-Intelligence Service as claimed by the United States in 2003!


25. Ibid.


32. Bill Powell, “How They Killed Him,” *Time* (June 19, 2006); 34.


34. The example of Hamas’ localized anti-Israeli terrorism demonstrates that even insurgent-terrorists with an Islamist agenda can reject the path of global Salafite jihadism.


Chapter 5


4. The Horn of Africa is an imprecise geographic designation. For the purposes of this study, the Horn of Africa includes the seven member states in the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD)—Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Kenya, and Uganda.

5. Fieldwork conducted by the author in the region since 1998 included consultancies for UNDP, USAID, Small Arms Survey, Development Alternatives Inc., and International Crisis Group, as well as a research grant from the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed in this paper reflect only those of the author. The Harmony Project is a recent declassification of al Qa’ida and other documents seized by the U.S. government in Afghanistan and Iraq; the translated and original documents are posted on the project Web site as they are released. Available at http://www.ctc.usma.edu/aq_harmonylist.asp.


10. For a period of time in the early to mid-1990s, the government of Sudan played host to numerous leaders and groups from outside the Horn of Africa considered by the United States to be terrorists, including Abu Nidal, Islamic Jihad, Hamas, Hezbollah, and a host of individual terror suspects from North Africa. Some, such as Hezbollah and Hamas, continue to enjoy access to Khartoum; the government of Sudan argues that they are not terrorist fronts. This inventory is derived from Robert Rotberg, ed., *Battling Terrorism in the Horn of Africa* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2005).

11. The precise relationship between the East Africa cells which conducted these attacks and al Qaeda is the subject of debate; the increasingly decentralized nature of jihadist networks makes it increasingly difficult to attribute incidents simply to “al Qaeda.” Here the term “al Qaeda-affiliated” is used.

12. In addition, two major al Qaeda terrorist attacks took place just beyond the Horn of Africa in Yemen, the maritime attacks on the USS Cole and the French tanker Limburg.


14. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Ibid., 7.
25. Ibid.
27. Miscellaneous Harmony Project documents.
31. One al Qaeda suspect in the Paradise Hotel bombing exploded a concealed hand grenade while in custody, allowing Fazul to escape.
33. For data on regional arms flows, see various Small Arms Survey reports at www.smallarmssurvey.org.
34. A total of 455 airstrips and runways exist in Sudan and its immediate border areas. Data at www.smallarmssurvey.org.
35. Of the seven IGAD member states, only two—Somalia and Djibouti—are almost exclusively populated by one-faith group.
3. Tal Afar is more relevant than the better known operation against Falluja in April 2005, which was designed to punish and destroy, rather than deny sanctuary.
7. ICG, *In Their Own Words*, i.
18. Ibid., 25.
21. ICG, *In Their Own Words*, 16.
22. ICG, *In Their Own Words*, 21.
23. ICG, *In Their Own Words*, i.
24. ICG, *In Their Own Words*, ii.


40. aljazeera, “Iraqi troops sweep through Tal Afar.”

41. ICG, In Their Own Words, 24.

42. “How to Do Better,” The Economist (December 17, 2005), 22.


44. ICG, In Their Own Words, 4, 25.

45. ICG, In Their Own Words, 25. Contrast Cronin, “How al-Qaida Ends,” 42–43. Israeli operations against Hizbollah in Lebanon in 2006 reinforce the lesson that the destruction of a suspected sanctuary rarely denies terrorists physical or psychological space.

46. ICG, In Their Own Words, 25.

Chapter 7


22. Thamm, “The Nexus between Arms Trade, Drugs and Terrorism,” 123.


37. Thamm, “The Nexus between Arms Trade, Drugs and Terrorism,” 121.


39. Ibid.


41. Makarenko, “Transnational Crime and Its Evolving Links to Terrorism and Instability.”

42. Ibid.


45. Ibid., 23.

46. “Narcoterrorism,” *Terrorism Questions and Answers*.

47. See Williams, “Organizing Transnational Crime.”


50. Ibid.


52. Ibid.


56. “Drugs and Terror.”
57. Makarenko, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations.”
59. Thamm, “The Nexus between Arms Trade, Drugs and Terrorism,” 110.
60. Shelley, The Nexus of Organized International Criminals and Terrorism.
64. Thamm, “The Nexus between Arms Trade, Drugs and Terrorism.”
65. Ibid, 86.
69. Makarenko, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations.”
72. Makarenko, “Transnational Crime and Its Evolving Links to Terrorism and Instability.”
73. Makarenko, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations.”
74. Sheehan, Drugs, Crime and Terrorism.


78. Rotella, “Jihad’s Unlikely Alliance.”


82. See Makarenko, “A Model of Terrorist-Criminal Relations.”

Chapter 8

1. This chapter is an expansion and update of William C. Banks, *The Predator* (2003), a case prepared for the National Security Studies Program at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs of Syracuse University and the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of the Johns Hopkins University.


5. Gordon and Weiner, “A Nation Challenged”


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid.

10. Ibid.


12. Ibid.


18. Ibid.


22. Ibid.


30. Ibid.; Risen and Miller, “CIA Kills a Leader of Qaeda in Yemen.”

31. Risen and Miller, “CIA Kills a Leader of Qaeda in Yemen.”

32. Hersh, “Manhunt.”

33. Ibid.

34. Ibid.

35. “No funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress . . . .” Pub. L. No. 93-559, §32, 88 Stat. 1804 (1974). The amendment was a component of reforms in intelligence operations law designed to make U.S. covert operations decisions directly accountable to the decision makers. See Stephen Dycus, Arthur Berney, William Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, *National Security Law* 456–459 (3d ed. 2002).


39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
43. Lumpkin, “U.S. Can Target American Al-Qaida Agents.”
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Hersh, “Manhunt.”
48. Hersh, “Manhunt.”
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Woodward, “CIA Told to Do ‘Whatever Necessary’ to Kill Bin Laden.”
55. Ibid.
56. Ibid.
58. Jason Burke and Imitiz Gul, “The Drone, the CIA and a Botched Attempt to Kill bin Laden’s Deputy,” The Observer (January 15, 2006).
59. Quoted in Burke and Gul, “The Drone, the CIA and a Botched Attempt to Kill bin Laden’s Deputy.”

Chapter 9

The views expressed are those of the authors and not of the Department of the Army, the U.S. Military Academy, or any other agency of the U.S. Government.
Ronfeldt, Michele Zanini and Brian Michael Jenkins, eds., *Countering the New Terrorism* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1999), 41.


15. Portions of this paragraph are from Weimann, “Terrorist Dot Com.”


17. The *Al-Hesbah Forum* is currently inaccessible but had been found at www.alhesbah.org. The Flash document had been posted at http://heretic.maid.to/cgi-bin/stored/serio0835.swf.


21. The following story is explored in great detail in several articles of the Guardian Unlimited (Web site: http://www.guardian.co.uk/bombs), including Jeevan Vasagar, “Deadly Net Terror Websites Easy to Access” (Saturday July 1, 2000); Nick Hopkins and Sarah Hall, “David Copeland: A Quiet Introvert, Obsessed with Hitler and Bombs” (Friday June 30, 2000); and “Nailbomber ‘Used Net to Build Bombs’ “ (Monday June 5, 2000).

22. See Forest, “Training Camps and Other Centers of Learning”; and Forest, “Teaching Terrorism.”


24. For example, see Coll and Glasser “E-Qaeda from Afghanistan to the Internet.”

25. Ibid.


32. Coll and Glasser “E-Qaeda from Afghanistan to the Internet.”


34. Hoffman, Inside Terrorism.


36. Ibid.


39. However, it is doubtful that al Qaeda or any other group would actually want to “bring down the Internet.” Indeed, according to Louise Richardson, the Executive Dean of the Radcliffe Institute, for all the concern about “cyberterrorism,” the Internet is “far too valuable to al Qaeda” and other groups: “Al Qaeda could not function without the Internet.” See Ruth Walker, “Terror Online, and How to Counteract It,” Harvard Gazette (March 3, 2005). Available at: http://www.news.harvard.edu/gazette/2005/03.03/01-cyberterror.html.
43. Nye, “How to Counter Terrorism’s Online Generation.”
44. Ibid.

Chapter 10

* The author would like to thank Michael Innes for his patience and useful suggestions in connection with this project; Lorenzo Vidino, a specialist on European Islamist networks, for providing helpful feedback; and the NC-START Center at the University of Maryland, for providing funding for this research.

3. Cited by Lorenzo Vidino, Al Qaeda in Europe: The New Battleground of International Jihad (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005)), 171. Choudary is a leader of the radical London-based al-Muhajirun (The Emigrés [or Exiles]) organization. Note that every effort has been made in this article to transliterate Arabic, Farsi, and Urdu names in accordance with the “official” scholarly transliteration systems employed in Britain, but that in some cases the phonetic or idiosyncratic transliterations used by speakers of those languages have been retained (as in the case of Choudary), especially in cases where it has proven difficult or impossible to discern the original form of the name.
5. In this article the term *jihad* will be used, unless otherwise indicated, to refer to “armed struggle against unbelievers.” The term *jihad* is derived from the verbal root *jahada*, which means to “strive,” “struggle,” or “exert oneself,” especially in the path of Allah. While it is true that the Qur’an makes a distinction between the “greater jihad,” that is, struggling against the evil within oneself, and the “lesser jihad,” that is, waging armed struggle against unbelievers, and that medieval jurists recognized several distinct categories of *jihad* (e.g., *jihad* of the heart, of the tongue, of the hands, and of the sword), the fact remains that in early Muslim chronicles—apart from texts dealing exclusively with personal piety and Sufism—the term normally refers to armed struggle against unbelievers. See [mile] Tyan, “Djihad,” in Bernard Lewis, Charles Pellat, and Joseph Schacht, eds., Encyclopedia of Islam: New Edition [hereafter EI2] (Vol. 2) (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1983 [1965]), 538: “In law, according to general doctrine and in historical tradition, the *djihad* consists of military action with the object of the expansion of Islam and, if need be, of its defence… The notion stems from the fundamental principle of the universality of Islam: this religion, along with the temporal power which it implies, ought to embrace the whole universe, if necessary by force.” (Note that the Encyclopedia of Islam is the standard scholarly reference work on
Islam, one that is aimed at scholars more than at students.) For excellent analyses of the evolution of the meaning of *jihad*, see David Cook, *Understanding Jihad* (Berkeley and Los Angeles, CA: University of California, 2005); Reuven Firestone, *Jihad: The Origin of Holy War in Islam* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Rudolph Peters, *Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Marcus Weiner, 1996). In any event, despite the existence of multiple meanings, it is undeniable that violence-prone Islamists invariably use the term *jihad* to refer to armed struggle against unbelievers, and also that they have repeatedly sought to transform “jihad of the sword” (*jihad bi-al-sayf*) from being a sixth “unofficial” pillar (*rukn*) of the Islamic faith into one of its official duties.

6. This is a phrase used by Shaykh ‘Abdallah ‘Azzam from which the network later established by Osama bin Laden, al-Qaeda, borrowed its name.


9. A clear distinction must be made at the outset between Islam, one of the world’s most variegated and historically important religions, and Islamism, a radically anti-sectarian and anti-Western Islamic political ideology with both revolutionary and revivalist elements. Although the term “Islamism” is nowadays often mistakenly used as a synonym for “political Islam”—a subset of Islam that encompasses all the varying doctrines and movements, left, center, or right, that actively seek to “politicize Islam” or “Islamize politics”—in this study the terms “Islamism” and “Islamist” will be used to refer solely to the radical right components of the political Islam spectrum. For more on Islamist doctrine(s), compare Jeffrey M. Bale, “Islamism,” in Richard F. Pilch and Raymond Zilinskas, eds., *Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense* (New York: Wiley, 2005), 296–298; Emmanuel Sivan, *Radical Islam: Medieval Theology and Modern Politics* (New Haven, CT: Yale University, 1990); Abderrahim Lamchichi, *L’islamisme politique* (Paris: Harmattan, 2001); Johannes J. G. Iansen, *The Dual Nature of Islamic Fundamentalism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University, 1997); Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi’, *Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World* (Albany, NY: SUNY, 1996); and Martin Kramer, ed., *The Islamism Debate* (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University/Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997). The key fault line dividing Islamist movements in the West (and elsewhere) lies between the “gradualists” who are assiduously pursuing a more or less surreptitious “entryism” strategy until such time as they can gain sufficient demographic, cultural, and political influence to be able to fully dominate Muslim civil society and perhaps, eventually, to Islamize “infidel” host societies, and the jihadists who are employing violence to smite Muslim “apostates” and Western “unbelievers.” Among the jihadists, a further distinction should be made between (1) those who have adopted a relatively parochial local or national focus and therefore concentrate on “liberating” their own regions from “infidel” control or on overthrowing the “apostate” regimes in their own country, which they refer to as the “near enemy” (*al-‘adu al-qarib*), and (2) those who have adopted a utopian, expansionist, and frankly imperialist transnational agenda and therefore focus on attacking the “far enemy” (*al-‘adu al-ba‘id*), that is, America and its Western allies. Compare Fawaz A. Gerges, *The Far Enemy: Why Jihad went Global* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005),
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NOTES

1–3; and Dominque Thomas, Le Londonistan: La voie du djihad (Paris: Michalon, 2003), 6–8. For the delusional, utopian agenda of the transnational jihadists, see Jeffrey M. Bale, “Al-Qa’ida’s So-Called ‘Strategic’ Thinking,” forthcoming.

10. For the dar al-harb, which is best defined as non-Muslim “territories under perpetual threat of missionary war,” see Abel, “Dar Al-Harb,” 126.

11. Such entities are increasingly being exposed, described, and/or delineated by concerned scholars and investigative journalists. See, e.g., Berndt Georg Thamm, Terrorbasis Deutschland: Die islamistische Gefahr in unserer Mitte (Munich: Diederichs, 2004); Magdi Allam, Bin Laden in Italia: Viaggio nell’islam radicale (Milan: Mondadori, 2002); Claude Moniquet, Djihad et islamisme en Belgique: Tout sur les réseaux et les ramifications (Fléron: Jourdan le Clerq, 2005); Siem Eikelenboom, Jihad in de polder: De radicale islam in Nederland (Antwerp: L. J. Veen, 2004); and Gustavo de Aristegui, La yihad en España: La obsession por reconquistar Al-Ándalus (Madrid: Esfera de los Libros, 2005).


14. Note, for example, the nasty verbal sparring between “rejectionist” cleric Abu Hamza al-Masri and the “participationist” Muslim Council of Britain, cited in McRoy, From Rushdie to 7/7, pp. 194–196.

15. Several crucially important organizations that made up “Londonistan” unfortunately cannot be discussed herein. One of these was the ostensibly nonviolent “rejectionist” group Hizb al-Tahrir al-Islami (HT: Islamic Resistance Movement), a semiclandestine, cadre-based Islamist political organization established in Jordan in 1953 by Shaykh Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani (1909–1970), a Palestinian graduate of al-Azhar in Cairo. See esp. Suha Taji-Farouki, A Fundamental Quest: Hizb al-Tahrir and the Search for the Islamic Caliphate (London: Grey Seal, 1996). Others were the succession of Salafist “rejectionist” organizations created by Syrian exile and former UK HT leader ‘Umar Bakri Muhammad—al-Muhajirun (the Emigrés), al-Ghuraba’ (the Strangers), Ahl al-Sunna wa al-Jama’a (Supporters of the Sunna and the [Islamic] Community) and al-Firqat al-Najiyya (The Saved Sect). See further Maureen Cofflard, L’émir: La peur aura-t-elle le dessus? (Paris: Fayard, 2004); Thomas, Londonistan, 97–100; and Quintan Wiktorowicz, Radical Islam Rising: Muslim Extremism in the West (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005).

16. See, for example, O’Neill and McGrory, Suicide Factory, 108; and Crispin Black, 7/7, the London Bombs: What went Wrong? (London: Gibson Square, 2005), 31–32. Black is a former intelligence officer and Cabinet briefer who acknowledges the reality of this “Covenant of Security” with the Islamists. This is supported, from the opposite side of the political spectrum, by Nafeez Mossadeq Ahmed, The London Bombings: An Independent Inquiry (Woodstock, NY: Overlook, 2006). From the traditional Islamic point of view, there are two acceptable, albeit strictly temporary, types of relationships between believers and unbelievers that could perhaps be reconciled with such a Covenant of Security: that of the dar al-sulh (Abode of Truce), “territories not conquered by Muslim troops but by buying peace by the giving of tribute, the payment of which guarantees a truce or armistice (hudna, sulh),” and that of the dar al-’ahd (Abode of the Covenant), “territories existing under the temporary proprietorship of non-Muslims that fall neither within the boundaries of the dar al-Islam nor of the dar al-harb.” See, respectively, D. B. McDonald and A[rmad] Abel,


18. For the FIT and al-Minhaj, see Thomas, Londonistan, 172. Abu Qatada was a Palestinian-born religious scholar who spent time in Pakistan and Afghanistan, advocated the overthrow of “apostate” Muslim regimes, and later became known as al Qaeda’s “spiritual ambassador” in Europe. See Thomas, Londonistan, pp. 100–104; and Jane Corbin, Al Qaeda: In Search of the Terror Network that Threatens the World (New York: Thunder’s Mouth/Nation, 2003), 200–208.


20. Note that the Arabic name of this organization, the Lajnat al-Difa’ an al-Huquq wa al-Shari’iyya, has a rather different and specifically Islamic connotation, in that it refers to the “rights of the shari’a,” not to “legitimate” rights in a more general sense. For the CDLR, see Thomas, Londonistan, 173–176; Mamoun Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent (New York: Palgrave, 1999), 115–147; and Joshua Teitelbaum, Holier than Thou: Saudi Arabia’s Islamic Opposition (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2000), 49–72. Compare also International Crisis Group, “Saudi Arabia Backgrounder: Who are the Islamists?” September 21, 2004 report. For MIRA, see Fandy, Saudi Arabia and the Politics of Dissent, 149–175.


22. See D. Hazan, “Al-Tajdeed Versus al-Hesbah: Islamist Websites & the Conflict between Rival Arab and Muslim Political Forces,” MEMRI Web site, Inquiry and Analysis Series 275, May 17, 2006. For these Web sites, see www.tajdeed.org.uk, www.alhesbah.org, and www.alburak.net. Buraq was the name of the creature that carried Muhammad on his dreamlike “night journey,” first to Jerusalem and then to the Heavens and back, that is, Isra’ and Mi’raj, which supposedly occurred before the Hijra but after Muhammad’s visit to the people of Ta’if.


25. For the Reid case, see United States District Court, District of Massachusetts, United States of America v. Richard Colvin Reid, Indictment, Cr. 02-10013-WGY, 16 January 2002.

27. For more on these plots, see House of Commons, *Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005*, May 11, 2006 (London: HMSO, 2006); and Sandra Laville, Richard Norton-Taylor, and Vikram Dodd, “‘A Plot to Commit Murder on an Unimaginable Scale,’” [London] *Guardian* (August 11, 2006). However, the extent of the involvement of transnational networks, including al Qaeda, in these actions and plots is a disputed issue that still remains to be fully clarified.


32. For these developments, see Hassane Zerrouky, *La nébuleuse islamiste en France et en Algérie* (Paris: Éditions 1, 2002), passim.
33. One component in this network was the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Zagreb, Bosnia, a branch of the main office set up in New Jersey by blind Egyptian Shaykh ‘Umar b. ‘Abd al-Rahman, who in 1994 was convicted of instigating a plot to blow up several bridges and tunnels into New York City. Compare Thomas, *Londonistan*, 152; and Evan Kohlmann, *Al-Qaida’s Jihad in Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network* (New York: Berg, 2004), 39–41.
40. Ibid., 178–184, for the information on these Egyptian organizations in London.
44. O’Neill and McGrory, *Suicide Factory*, 66–311. The authors of this informative journalistic study provide many examples of seemingly inexplicable British government timidity in responding to domestic criminal and subversive activities in support of worldwide jihadist causes, all of which tend to validate the arguments made by more or less conservative critics of existing U.K. policies. See, for example, Melanie Phillips, *Londonistan* (New York: Encounter, 2006); and Michael Gove, *Celsius 7/7: How the West’s Policy
of Appeasement has Provoked yet More Fundamentalist Terror—and What has to be Done Now (London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 2006).


46. For the introduction and effects of these laws, see Thomas, Londonistan, 218–233. Even tougher laws were introduced after 7/7, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006.

47. See, for example, Sean O’Neill and Yaakov Lappin, “Britain’s Online Imam Declares War as He Calls Young to Jihad,” [London] Times (January 17, 2005). The imam in question was none other than Bakri Muhammad, who also stated then that all of Britain was henceforth part of the dar al-harb and that Muslims there should join al Qaeda. In February 2006, he characterized the 7/7 bombers as the “Fantastic Four.” See Ian Cobain et al, “Reborn Extremist Sect Had Key Role in London Protest,” [London] Guardian (February 11, 2006).

48. Anthony King, “One in Four Muslims Sympathises with Motives of Terrorists,” Daily Telegraph (July 23, 2005). On the other hand, two-thirds of British Muslims said that they should bear “some” or “a great deal” of the responsibility for preventing and punishing terrorist crimes, and 74% said that they would inform the police if they learned that someone they knew was planning to carry out a terrorist attack.


50. Richard Norton-Taylor, “MI5: 30 terror plots being planned in UK,” [London] Guardian (November 10, 2006). One of her points is worth noting in this context: “More and more people are moving from passive sympathy towards active terrorism through being radicalised or indoctrinated by friends, families, in organised training events here and overseas, by images on television, through chatrooms and Web sites on the Internet.”

Chapter 11


5. As in the case of the economic dimension of the sanctuaries that illicit economies provide, the belligerents may well face competition from other belligerent groups.
6. In the case of illicit drugs, full legalization remains politically infeasible in most countries. However, certain pariah governments, such as North Korea (and at times Panama and Afghanistan) that may not be significantly concerned about their international legitimacy and may be less sensitive to sanctions could adopt at least veiled legalization. Under such veiled legalization, illicit crop cultivation and drug production would remain de jure illegal, but de facto permitted, and the government would tax and regulate the illicit economy, and participate in the illegal traffic. Thus, unlike in the case of tacit acquiescence, the government would not only tolerate the illicit economy, but also actively manage it, even if not officially declaring it legal.

There are good reasons why some illicit economies should remain illicit—smuggling with WMD technologies and materials is a prime example where the consequences of legalization could be catastrophic. Full open legalization, however, remains a definite possibility in the case of other illicit economies and commodities, such as illicit logging, a major source of financial resources as well as political capital for belligerents around the world. A government can easily remove the prohibition on logging in national parks and tax the industry. While environmental groups may oppose such deregulation, the international pressure to amend the policy will likely be considerably smaller than in the case of legalization of illicit narcotics.


12. Rashid, Taliban, 117–118.


19. Ibid., 19–21.
21. Author’s interviews with U.S. and Afghan government officials. Another component of the insurgent forces in the south, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hezb-I-Islami Gulbuddin, has also actively attacked counternarcotics officials.
22. Ali, a major trafficker himself, was cutting profits on traffic in the north of Afghanistan while eradicating in the east. Author’s interviews in Afghanistan, September 2005.
24. Ibid.
25. Furthermore, like in Latin America, the United States is once again devoting only a small portion of the overall counternarcotics aid to Afghanistan to alternative development. For 2005, for example, out of the $780 million for counternarcotics, $660 million were for eradication and interdiction, and only $120 million for alternative development. See N.C. Aizenman, “Afghan Report Decline of Poppy Crop, Officials Credit Karzai’s Appeals, but Warn Aid Is Needed to Ensure Success,” *Washington Post* (February 6, 2005). Because of the scale of the devastation of the Afghan economy, alternative development will inevitably take a long time and major investments. See Vanda Felbab-Brown, “Afghanistan: When Counternarcotics Undermine Counterterrorism,” *Washington Quarterly*, 28(4) (Fall 2005): 55–72.
28. Aizenman, “Afghan Report Decline of Poppy Crop, Officials Credit Karzai’s Appeals, but Warn Aid Is Needed to Ensure Success.”
30. I am grateful to Sarah Chayes, former journalist and a development worker in Kandahar, for this information. Because of the possible threats to local Afghans, both the names of the village and its inhabitants are not used.

———. “Al-Qa’ida’s So-called ‘Strategic’ Thinking.” Forthcoming.


Black, Crispin. 7/7, the London Bombs: What Went Wrong? London: Gibson Square, 2005.


Kramer, Martin, ed. The Islamism Debate. Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University/Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, 1997.


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